Table 1.
Second party punishment (2PP) | Third party punishment (3PP) | Punishment and recompense (PR) | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Punishment | Recompense | |||||||
b | SE | b | SE | b | SE | b | SE | |
Intercept | 3.2*** | 0.55 | 2.85*** | 0.51 | −14.7*** | 2.7 | 8.1** | 2.63 |
Dictator Offer | −0.054*** | 0.01 | −0.03*** | 0.01 | 0.32*** | 0.04 | −0.149*** | 0.04 |
LTP (group) | −1.88* | 0.76 | −0.11 | 0.69 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 6.7° | 3.6 |
Dictator Offer × LTP | 0.02 | 0.02 | −0.04*** | 0.01 | −0.1 | 0.06 | −0.09* | 0.05 |
Each model used the size of the dictator's offer, the participant group (LTP vs. control) and their interaction as predictors. The model for punishment in the 2PP (F = 11.5***, observations = 429), punishment in the 3PP (F = 32.3***, observations = 429), punishment in the 3PR (F = 32.1***, observations = 415), and recompense in the 3PR (F = 25.4***, observations = 415) were each significant
p < 0.05,
p < 0.01,
p < 0.001,
pone-tailed < 0.05).