



55. Torrey FE, Zdanowicz MT, Kennard AD, et al. *The Treatment of Persons With Mental Illness in Prisons and Jails: A State Survey*. Arlington, VA: Treatment Advocacy Center and National Sheriff's Association; 2014. Available at: <http://tacreports.org/storage/documents/treatment-behind-bars/treatment-behind-bars.pdf>. Accessed September 8, 2014.
56. Smith GS, Wellman HM, Sorock GS, et al. Injuries at work in the US adult population: contributions to the total injury burden. *Am J Public Health*. 2005;95(7):1213–1219.
57. Testimony of Oregon corrections officer Mr. Harkins to the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America's Prisons "The systemic and institutional drivers of abuse and lack of safety" July 19–20, 2005, Newark, NJ, Vera Institute of Justice. Available at: <http://www.vera.org/files/public-hearing-2-day-1-accounts.pdf>. Accessed September 8, 2014.
58. Metzner JL, Fellner J. Solitary confinement and mental illness in US prisons: a challenge for medical ethics. *J Am Acad Psychiatry Law*. 2010;38(1):104–108.
59. Pettit B. *Invisible Men: Mass Incarceration and the Myth of Black Progress*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation; 2012.
60. Silove D. The psychosocial effects of torture, mass human rights violations, and refugee trauma: toward an integrated conceptual framework. *J Nerv Ment Dis*. 1999;187(4):200–207.
61. Maercker A, Schützwohl M. Long-term effects of political imprisonment: a group comparison study. *Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol*. 1997;32(8):435–442.
62. Bichescu D, Schauer M, Saleptsi E, Neculau A, Elbert T, Neuner F. Long-term consequences of traumatic experiences: an assessment of former political detainees in Romania. *Clin Pract Epidemiol Ment Health*. 2005;1(1):17.
63. Brenner GH. The expected psychiatric impact of detention in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and related considerations. *J Trauma Dissociation*. 2010;11(4):469–487.
64. Farhood LF, Chaaya M, Saab BR. Detainment and health: the case of the Lebanese hostages of war. *Int J Ment Health Nurs*. 2010;19(2):83–91.
65. Austin J, McGinnis K. *Classification of High-Risk and Special Management Prisoners: A National Assessment of Current Practices*. Washington, DC: US Dept of Justice, National Institute of Corrections; 2004.
66. Kaba F, Lewis A, Glowka-Kollisch S, et al. Solitary confinement and risk of self-harm among jail inmates. *Am J Public Health*. 2014;104(3):442–447.
67. Owers A. The protection of prisoners' rights in England and Wales. *Eur J Crim Pol Res*. 2006;12(2):85–91.
68. Stern V. The role of citizens and non-profit advocacy organizations in providing oversight. *Pace Law Rev*. 2010;30(5):1529.
69. Mann JM, Gostin L, Gruskin S, Brennan T, Lazzarini Z, Fineberg HV. Health and human rights. *Health Hum Rights*. 1994;1(1):6–23.
70. United Nations General Assembly. Special rapporteur on torture tells third committee use of prolonged solitary confinement on rise, calls for global ban on practice. Sixty-sixth General Assembly, Third Committee. 2011. Available at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/gashe4014.doc.htm>. Accessed September 15, 2014.

Assessing the Expected Impact of Global Health Treaties: Evidence From 90 Quantitative Evaluations

Steven J. Hoffman, BHSc, MA, JD, and John-Arne Røttingen, MD, PhD, MSc, MPA

We assessed what impact can be expected from global health treaties on the basis of 90 quantitative evaluations of existing treaties on trade, finance, human rights, conflict, and the environment.

It appears treaties consistently succeed in shaping economic matters and consistently fail in achieving social progress. There are at least 3 differences between these domains that point to design characteristics that new global health treaties can incorporate to achieve positive impact: (1) incentives for those with power to act on them; (2) institutions designed to bring edicts into effect; and (3) interests advocating their negotiation,

adoption, ratification, and domestic implementation.

Experimental and quasiexperimental evaluations of treaties would provide more information about what can be expected from this type of global intervention. (*Am J Public Health*. 2015;105:26–40. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2014.302085)

THERE HAVE BEEN MANY

calls over the past few years for new international treaties addressing health issues, including alcohol,¹ chronic diseases,² falsified/substandard medicines,³ health system corruption,⁴ impact evaluations,⁵ nutrition,⁶ obesity,⁷ research and development,⁸ and

global health broadly.⁹ These calls follow the perceived success of past global health treaties—most notably the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2002) and the revised International Health Regulations (2005)—and perceived potential for future impact.¹⁰ The World Health Organization's unusually expansive yet largely dormant powers for making new international treaties under its constitution's articles 19 and 21 are also cited as a reason for using them.^{11–13} Although few multilateral institutions are empowered to enact new treaties, in the World Health Organization's case, with just a majority vote of its governing assembly,

new regulations can automatically enter into force for all member states on communicable disease control, medical nomenclature, diagnostic standards, health product safety, labeling, and advertising unless states specifically opt out (article 21). Treaties in other health areas can be adopted by a two thirds vote of the World Health Organization's membership, with nonaccepting states legally required to take the unusual step of justifying their nonacceptance (article 19).¹⁴

The effect that can be expected from any new global health treaty, however, is as yet largely unknown. Negotiation, adoption, ratification, and even domestic



implementation of treaties do not guarantee achievement of the results that are sought. Contemporary history has shown how some states comply with international treaties whereas others neglect their responsibilities. Even those states that mostly comply with their international legal obligations do not necessarily comply with all of them. Citizens in the most prosperous and powerful countries may be surprised by the extent to which their own governments break international law and skirt responsibilities—which is well beyond what may be commonly assumed. Often states are even quite open about acknowledging their noncompliance, whether in statements to the media or in formal reports to international institutions.¹⁵ Perhaps most concerning is that even if we assume all international treaties cause at least some effects, there is no reason to believe these effects will all be intended and desirable. States can strategically use international treaty making to buy time before needing to act, placate domestic constituencies without changing domestic policies, provide a distraction from dissatisfaction, hide more pressing challenges, and justify unsavory expenditures. Ratifying international treaties can even provide political cover for engaging in behaviors—such as state-sponsored torture—that are more harmful than what was done or may have been acceptable before.^{15,16} In this way, advocates of new global health treaties cannot be sure whether they are successfully promoting their goals or unintentionally helping states undermine

the very objectives they so earnestly seek to be fulfilled.

The most obvious starting point to assess what impact can be expected from global health treaties would be evaluations of existing global health treaties—those that were adopted primarily to promote human health. These include the International Sanitary Conventions (1892, 1893, 1894, 1897, 1903, 1912, 1926, 1938, 1944, 1944, 1946), Brussels Agreement for Free Treatment of Venereal Disease in Merchant Seamen (1924), International Convention for Mutual Protection Against Dengue Fever (1934), International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation (1933, 1944), Constitution of the World Health Organization (1946), International Sanitary Regulations (1951), International Health Regulations (1969), Biological Weapons Convention (1972), Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (1989), Chemical Weapons Convention (1993), World Trade Organization Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (1994), Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction (1997), Rotterdam Convention on Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (1998), Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2000), Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001), World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2003), International Health Regulations (2005), and Minamata Convention on Mercury (2013).

However, few studies to date have empirically measured the real-world effect of these global health treaties across countries.^{17–19} Three studies modeled the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control's influence on national policies, finding that the treaty and its negotiation process were associated with certain countries adopting stronger tobacco control measures faster.^{20–22} Although it is not a treaty, there is a study that qualitatively evaluated the perceived effectiveness of the World Health Organization's Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel, finding it had no effect on 93% of key informants surveyed.²³

The evidence of international treaties' effects in other policy areas is rapidly expanding and can be used to inform judgments about what impact can be expected from existing and proposed global health treaties. The precise effects of international treaties, their causal pathways, and the conditions under which these pathways function is currently among the most heavily debated issues and contested puzzles in the fields of international law and international relations.^{17,18} This includes at least 90 quantitative studies evaluating the effect of international trade treaties,^{24–32} international financial treaties,^{33–67} international human rights treaties,^{68–98} international humanitarian treaties,^{99–105} and international environmental treaties.^{106–115}

ASSESSING IMPACT BY POLICY AREA

As with any complex regulatory intervention, the effect of international treaties will vary greatly

depending on the problems being addressed and the contexts in which they operate.¹⁸ Looking at their impact by policy area is particularly important for drawing insights about global health treaties because the latter are so diverse, with some proposals most reminiscent of international human rights treaties that promote norms (e.g., proposed health research and development treaty), international humanitarian treaties that constrain state behavior (e.g., proposed global health corruption protocol), international environmental treaties that impose regulatory obligations (e.g., proposed framework convention on alcohol control), and international trade treaties that regulate cross-border interactions (e.g., proposed falsified/substandard medicines treaty).

Evaluations of international trade treaties have overwhelmingly found they encourage liberal trade policies and increase trade flows among participating states as intended. International financial treaties have similarly been found to reduce financial transaction restrictions and increase financial flows. Less evident is the impact of human rights treaties. These treaties have been found to improve respect for civil and political rights but only in countries with particular domestic institutions such as democracy,⁷¹ civil society,^{116,117} and judicial independence.¹¹⁸ International criminal treaties appear even more contested and uncertain. Some scholars have found war crime prosecutions to have no effect on violations¹¹⁹—some even claim it can worsen matters by lowering



losing parties' incentives to make peace¹²⁰—whereas others have found it improves postconflict reconstruction efforts by facilitating transitional justice.⁸⁵ International environmental treaties' effects are similarly debated. Some argue they can improve environmental protection,¹⁰⁶ especially by incentivizing private sector action,¹²¹ and others contend they merely codify existing practices, preferring incremental approaches that use nontreaty political mechanisms.¹²²

When categorizing each of the 90 quantitative evaluations according to whether they found positive, negative, or no effects—defined on the basis of the treaties' own stated purposes as found in the preamble text—it appears that trade and finance is where international treaties have been most “successful” (Figure 1a). The 9 studies evaluating international trade treaties overall found them to reduce trade volatility and increase trade flows,³¹ particularly among member states of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization²⁸ but also among nonmember participants.²⁹ Preferential trade agreements conditional on human rights standards were associated with less repression than were preferential trade agreements without them.²⁷ However, some studies suggest that international trade treaties do not guarantee increased trade flows²⁵ and that any increases may be limited to industrialized states and liberalized economic sectors.^{26,28} The 33 studies evaluating international financial treaties mostly found they increase foreign investment among participating

states,^{33-37,40,41,43,44,46-48,50,53,56,57,59,60,62-67} although some found they had no impact in certain circumstances,^{38,39,42,45,49,51,52,55,57,59,61,62} and others concluded they sometimes diminished investment (Table 1).^{49,50,54,55,58,65}

ASSESSING IMPACT BY TYPE OF OBJECTIVE

The effect of international treaties will also vary according to the type of objective sought. This insight is important for global health treaties because each proposal has different goals, from changing national government policies to regulating people, places, or products.

The good news is that most studies evaluating changes in national government policies found treaties had a positive effect in the direction drafters desired (Figure 1b). For example, World Trade Organization and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade membership increased trade liberalization^{24,30} just as the International Monetary Fund's Articles of Agreement successfully reduced restrictions on financial transactions.^{34-36,46,60} International environmental treaties promoted desired changes in national environmental policies,^{110,113,115} International Labor Organization conventions increased the length of maternity leave,⁸⁹ and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court has succeeded in preventing immunity agreements for international crimes by state parties.^{102,104}

The bad news is that treaties' influence on government policies did not always translate into

positive changes for people, places, or products—with “positive” defined on the basis of treaties' own stated goals in their preamble text (Figure 1c). Most studies that evaluated real-world outcomes found treaties had either no effect or the opposite effect than what was intended. For example, environmental agreements did not always reduce pollution,¹⁰⁶⁻¹¹² international humanitarian treaties did not reduce intentional civilian fatalities during wartime,¹⁰¹ human rights treaties did not improve life expectancy or infant mortality,⁷⁶ and structural adjustment agreements actually diminished these health indicators along with basic literacy rates and government stability.⁷² Eight studies are split on whether the Convention Against Torture improved, had no effect, or worsened torture practices.^{69,75,77,84,87,89,93,96}

Like the earlier analysis by policy area, a common trend here is that international treaties seem to be most successful in attaining economic objectives. This analysis additionally emphasizes how treaties seem to be least successful in realizing social goals. Although nearly all studies that evaluated these outcomes found treaties increased liberal economic policies, trade flows, and foreign investment, few studies reported improvements in government stability, peace, pollution, torture, war crimes, or health. More studies concluded that treaties had negative effects in these noneconomic areas than either positive or no effects (Table 2; individual summaries of the 90 quantitative evaluations are available as a supplement to the online version of


this article at <http://www.ajph.org>).

IMPORTANCE OF INCENTIVES, INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERESTS

What impact can be expected from global health treaties? According to our analysis, not very much. International treaties have consistently succeeded in shaping economic matters just as they have consistently failed in achieving social progress (including improved health status).

But global health treaties are not necessarily destined to fail. Although there may be intrinsic differences between economic and social domains, there are at least 3 differences in how treaties are characteristically designed between these areas that suggest ways new global health treaties could be constructed to achieve positive effect.

First, international economic treaties tend to provide immediate benefits to states and governing elites such that action aligns with their short-term self-interests. International treaties on social issues rarely offer immediate benefits and usually impose costs on those in charge. This suggests new global health treaties can have greater impact if they too include incentives for those with power to act on them. This hypothesis aligns with neorealist theories from political science and international relations and game theory from economics that emphasize the role of incentives in shaping national agendas and the priorities of elites.^{79,123,124}



Note. Outcomes were deemed either “positive” or “negative” on the basis of whether they aligned or contradicted treaties’ own stated goals as found in their preamble text. We coded studies that drew both positive and negative conclusions twice in the bar chart coloring but only once in the tally of studies presented beside each label. This explains why there are 2 studies evaluating the impact of international law on immunity agreements for international crimes although the bar chart coloring indicates that 66% of studies found a positive impact and 33% found a negative impact. This also explains why there are 4 studies evaluating the impact of international law on peace yet the bar chart coloring indicates that 2 studies found a positive impact, 2 found a negative impact, and 1 found no impact. The figure does not show the impact of international laws on derogation from rights, economic sanctions, public support, and water levels because these 4 outcome measures were only evaluated in a single study each.

FIGURE 1—Number of studies showing positive, negative, and no impact on (a) any outcome measure by policy area, (b) government policies by type of objective, and (c) people, places, and products by type of objective.

Second, international economic treaties tend to incorporate institutional mechanisms for promoting compliance, dispute resolution, and accountability that are typically absent from socially focused treaties that must instead rely on the “naming and shaming” efforts of progressive states and civil society. Examples of institutional mechanisms include automatic penalties, sanctions, mandatory

arbitration, regular reporting requirements, and compliance assessments. This suggests that new global health treaties can have greater effect if they include institutions specifically designed to bring edicts into effect. This hypothesis aligns with institutionalist theories that emphasize the role of implicit or explicit structures in defining expectations, constraining decisions, distributing power, and

incentivizing behavior^{125,126} as well as international legal process theories that view treaties as organizing devices and constraints on diplomatic practice.¹²⁷

Third, international economic treaties tend to have the support of powerful interest groups who advocate their full implementation and few strong opponents who can advocate against them. This most notably includes those

industry groups and multinational corporations with extremely generous lobbying budgets, worldwide affiliates, and access to sophisticated advocacy professionals, which are resources not typically used by industry to address social challenges. Progressive civil society organizations are comparatively underfunded. This suggests that new global health treaties can have greater impact either if their



TABLE 1—Impact of Different Areas of Laws on Any Outcome Measure

Area of Law	Negative Impact	No Impact	Positive Impact
International human rights law (n = 31)	69	68	71
	70	73,a	73,a
	72	74	78
	81,b	75	79
	84,a	76,b	80
	86,a	77	82
	87	83,b	84,a
	92,a	91	85
	97,a	93,a	86,a
		95,a	88
		96,a	89
		97,a	90,b
			92,a
			93,a
		95,a	
		96,a	
		98,b	
		94	
International humanitarian law (n = 7)	100	99,b	102,b
	104,a,b	101	103
			105,b
			104,a,b
International environmental law (n = 10)	106,a,b	107	106,a,b
	108,a	109,a,b	108,a
		111,b	109,a,b
		112	110,b
		114,a,b	113,b
			114,a,b
International trade law (n = 9)	32,a	25	24
		26,a	26,a
		27,a	27,a
			28
			29
			30
			31
			32,a

Continued

aims match those of powerful interests or if supporters can build sufficiently strong coalitions of their own. This hypothesis aligns with institutionalist theories that stress how treaties serve as focal points for social mobilization and provide resources for political movements,^{79,124} critical legal theories that view treaties as offering language with which actors assert claims,^{128,129} and network theories that emphasize the role of transnational advocacy networks and networked governmental authorities in shaping domestic political decision making.^{130,131}

Less important, this analysis suggests, is for new global health treaties to (1) allow individuals to bring claims against their own governments (e.g., domestic human rights litigation), (2) address an urgent imperative requiring immediate action (e.g., climate change), or (3) promote ideals of an ethical world (e.g., peace). These features are typically absent from the seemingly effective international economic treaties and characteristic of the seemingly less effective treaties addressing social problems. This hypothesis is in opposition to legal theories supporting individual litigation,¹³² cosmopolitanism’s ideal of shared morality,^{133,134} and constructivist theories that emphasize ideas, norms, language, and the power of treaty-making processes.^{22,135–138}

EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASIEXPERIMENTAL METHODS

Our analysis of 90 quantitative evaluations is a start in

assessing what impact can be expected from global health treaties and in identifying design characteristics of treaties that have historically achieved greater effect. But global health decision makers need stronger and more specific conclusions than existing research can offer. This is a matter not just of needing more research but also of needing a greater diversity of methodological approaches.

All but 2 of the 90 quantitative evaluations relied on observational study designs that by themselves do not facilitate causal inferences. The vast majority employed time-series cross-sectional analysis (n = 69), with the remaining studies using time-series analysis (n = 3),^{33,99,114} cross-sectional analysis (n = 6),^{33,61,76,90,102,111} Cox proportionate hazard models (n = 4),^{34–36,80,104,105} generalized method of moments analysis (n = 1),⁴⁷ quantile treatment effect distribution analysis (n = 1),⁵⁰ formal model analysis (n = 1),¹⁰⁹ and descriptive statistics (n = 7).^{81,83,106,110,113,115}

This is not all bad news. Time-series cross-sectional analysis is a relatively strong design that increases the number of and variation across observations by incorporating both the temporal (e.g., year) and spatial (e.g., country) dimensions of data. This makes parameter estimates more robust and allows the testing of variables that would display negligible variability when examined across either time or space alone.^{139,140} But like most models of observational data, causal inferences from time-series cross-sectional analyses are undermined by the possibility of confounding,



TABLE 1—Continued

International financial law (n = 33)	49,a	38	33,b
	50,a,b	39	34–36
	54	42	37
	55,a	45	40
	58,b	49,a	41
	65,a	51	43
			52
			55,a
			57,a
			59,a
			61,b
			62,a
			56
			57,a
			59,a
			60
			62,a
		63	
		64	
		65,a	
		66	
		67	
No. of studies	20	34	59

Note. Except where indicated, numbers in each column refer to reference citations in this paper. The citations are listed in chronological order.

^aThese 23 studies are listed more than once, as they featured multiple conclusions about the impact of international law on measured outcomes.

^bThese 23 studies used time-series analysis (n = 3),^{33,99,114} cross-sectional analysis (n = 6),^{33,61,76,90,102,111} Cox proportionate hazard models (n = 4),^{34–36,80,104,105} generalized method of moments analysis (n = 1),⁴⁷ quantile treatment effect distributional analysis (n = 1),⁵⁰ formal model analysis (n = 1),¹⁰⁹ descriptive statistics (n = 6),^{81,83,106,110,113,115} survey experiments (n = 1),⁹⁸ and difference-in-difference analysis (n = 1).⁵⁸ One of these studies used both time-series analysis and cross-sectional analysis.³³ The other 67 studies^{24–32,37–46,48,49,51–57,59,60,62–75,77–79,82,84–89,91–97,100,101,103,107,108,112} and 2 of the studies with Cox proportionate hazard modeling^{34–36,80} used time-series cross-sectional analysis.

reverse causation and the non-random distribution of interventions (i.e., international treaties) that may be linked to the outcomes measured.^{141,142}

Unfortunately we found only 2 experimental or quasiexperimental evaluations of specific international treaties for any policy area, despite these representing stronger methodological designs for

measuring effects. The single experiment we found was a survey of 2724 American adults testing public reaction to Myanmar’s forced labor practices, which found that respondents who were told that Myanmar’s actions violated an international law were more likely to support sanctions than were uninformed respondents.⁹⁸ The quasiexperiment was

a difference-in-difference analysis of bilateral tax treaties’ effect on foreign investment.⁵⁸ Quasiexperimental methods have been used extensively to evaluate the effects of legislation, policies, and regulations in domestic contexts,^{143–146} but they do not appear to be popular in the study of international instruments thus far.

CONCLUSIONS

States have increasingly relied on international treaties to manage the harmful effects of globalization and reap its potential benefits. Sometimes they seek to mitigate a threat or resolve a collective action problem; other times they hope to promote a specific norm, signal intentions, or encourage the production of global public goods. Motivating such international treaty making is the idea that states are willing to constrain their behavior or accept positive obligations if other states do the same. This type of international cooperation is viewed by many as essential for progress across many policy areas, including for health, because of how risks now travel between states irrespective of national boundaries (e.g., pandemics), and where attaining rewards often requires coordinated action or resources on a scale beyond any single country’s willingness to pay (e.g., research and development for neglected diseases).

But evidence of international treaties’ effects on health is scant, making it difficult to draw reasonable inferences on what

impact can be expected from new treaties that either regulate health matters or aim to promote better health outcomes. The only 2 studies that evaluated health outcomes found that human rights treaties had no impact on a variety of health indicators⁷⁶ and that structural adjustment agreements had a negative effect on them.⁷²

As long as the evidence remains unclear, we should not assume new global health treaties will achieve positive outcomes. Their inconsistent effects undermine the oft-cited claim that treaties can have a greater effect on people, places, products, or policies than do other instruments, such as political declarations, codes of practice, or resolutions.¹⁴⁷ The precise mechanism through which states make commitments to each other seems less important than does the content of the commitment, the regime complexes it joins,^{148,149} financial allocations,¹⁵⁰ dispute resolution procedures,¹⁵¹ processes for promoting accountability,¹⁵² and the support of states and other stakeholders to see commitments fully implemented.¹⁵³ Arguments about “hard law” versus “soft law” and “binding” versus “non-binding” seem less important than do strategic conversations about incentivizing elites, institutionalizing compliance mechanisms, and activating interest groups. Without such conversations, new global health treaties will have less chance of achieving their intended impact, or, worse, they could even cause harm as some treaties may already have done. ■



TABLE 2—Impact of International Treaties, by Impact Area

Outcome	Study Conclusions	Impact	Conditions
Impact on government policies			
Civil and political rights (n = 12)	Keith found ratifying the ICCPR did not improve civil rights practices. ⁶⁸	None	
	Hathaway found ratifying the ICCPR did not improve civil liberties and did not increase fairness of trials, and ratifying the UN Covenant on the Political Rights of Women did not improve women's ability to take part in government. ⁶⁹	None	
	Neumayer found ratifying human rights treaties improved civil rights practices in democratic states or states with strong engagement in global civil society. ⁷¹	Positive	Democracy Civil society
	Abouharb and Cingraelli found SAAs promoted an institutionalized democracy, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of speech, and free and fair elections. ⁷²	Positive	
	Cardenas found international and domestic human rights pressures did not improve civil rights practices but increased ratification of human rights treaties in countries without a national security threat, in which norm violations would threaten the elites' economic interests and prohuman rights groups have public support. ⁷³	None and positive	Security Elite interests Human rights groups
	Simmons found ratifying the ICCPR slightly improved civil liberties after 5 years, reduced government restrictions on religious freedoms most strongly in states transitioning between autocracy and democracy, and improved the fairness of trials only in countries transitioning between autocracy and democracy. ⁷⁸	Positive	Transitional state
	Simmons found ratifying 6 international human rights treaties (e.g., ICCPR, ICESCR, CERD, CEDAW, CAT, and CRC) improved civil and political rights practices in states transitioning between autocracy and democracy. ⁷⁹	Positive	Transitional state
	Simmons found ratifying the ICCPR's optional protocol slightly improved civil liberties. ⁸⁰	Positive	
	Hill found ratifying the CEDAW improved women's political rights practices. ⁸⁴	Positive	
	Cole found due process and personal liberty claims filed under the ICCPR's Optional Protocol were more successful than were suffrage and family rights claims in HRC rulings. ⁸⁶	Both	Claim type
	Lupu found ratifying the ICCPR improved government respect for freedoms of speech, association, assembly, and religion. ⁹⁵	Positive	
	Lupu found ratifying CEDAW improved respect for women's political rights. ⁹⁶	Positive	
Compliance with court rulings (n = 3)	Basch et al. found high noncompliance with remedies adopted by the IASHPR, with total compliance observed only after a long time. ⁸¹	None	
	Hawkins and Jacoby found only partial compliance with rulings of the IACHR and ECHR. ⁸³	None	
Derogation from rights (n = 1)	Staton and Romero found high compliance with IACHR rulings that were clearly expressed. ⁹⁰	Positive	Ruling clarity
	Neumayer found that among ICCPR signatory states in declared states of emergency, democracies did not increase violations, whereas autocracies and some anocracies increased violations of both derogable and nonderogable rights. ⁹⁷	Both	Regime type
Economic sanctions (n = 1)	Hafner-Burton and Montgomery found PTAs did not affect the likelihood of sanctions, but the likelihood was increased when the initiator had high centrality in the PTA network. ⁴⁹	None and negative	Initiator centrality
Environment policies (n = 3)	Miles et al. found international environmental laws promoted positive behavioral changes by states and, to a lesser degree, improved the state of the environment. ¹¹⁰	Positive	
	Breitmeier et al. found international environmental laws promoted significant compliance behavior by signatory states and sometimes improved the state of the environment, with knowledge of the problem, member states' interests, and decision rule being key factors. ^{113,115}	Positive	Knowledge Interests Decision rule

Continued



TABLE 2—Continued

Financial transactions restrictions (n = 4)	Simmons found states that ratified Article VIII of the IMF's Articles of Agreement were less likely to impose restrictions on their accounts. ³⁴⁻³⁶	Positive	
	von Stein ³⁴⁻³⁶ found the positive effect in Simmons ⁴⁵ was not because of Article VIII itself but the IMF's informal conditions for selecting and pressuring states to ratify Article VIII.	None	
	Simmons and Hopkins found ratifying IMF Article VIII reduced account restrictions, even after accounting for selection effects. ⁴⁶	Positive	
	Grieco et al. found states that ratified IMF Article VIII were less likely to impose account restrictions, even if their political orientation shifted away from monetary openness. ⁶⁰	Positive	
Immunity agreements for international crimes (n = 2)	Kelley found states that valued the ICC and respected the rule of law were more likely to reject a nonsurrender agreement with the United States that would violate Article 86 of the Rome Statute. ¹⁰²	Positive	
	Nooruddin and Payton found states that entered the ICC, especially those with high rule of law, had high GDP, had defense pacts with the United States or were sanctioned by the United States and took longer to sign a BIA with the United States, whereas states that traded heavily with the United States signed more quickly. ¹⁰⁴	Both	ICC membership US relations
Personal integrity rights (n = 12)	Keith found ratifying the ICCPR did not improve personal integrity rights practices. ⁶⁸	None	
	Hafner-Burton found PTAs requiring member states to improve their human rights practices were more effective than were HRAs in improving personal integrity rights practices. ²⁷	Positive and none	
	Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui found ratifying human rights treaties did not improve personal integrity rights practices, but participation in global civil society activities did. ⁷⁰	None	
	Neumayer found ratifying human rights treaties improved personal integrity rights practices in democratic states or states with strong engagement in global civil society. ⁷¹	Positive	Democracy Civil society
	Abouharb and Cingranelli found SAAs worsened personal integrity rights practices. ⁷²	Negative	
	Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui found ratifying the CAT or ICCPR did not improve personal integrity rights practices of highly repressive states even long into the future, regardless of democracy and civil society. ⁷⁴	None	
	Greenhill found membership in IGOs whose member states have strong human rights records improved personal integrity rights practices. ⁸²	Positive	
	Hill found ratifying the ICCPR worsened personal integrity rights practices. ⁸⁴	Negative	
	Kim and Sikkink found domestic and international prosecutions of human rights violations and truth commissions reduced repressions of personal integrity rights. ⁸⁵	Positive	
	Cole found ratifying the ICESCR worsened labor rights laws but improved labor rights practices. ⁹²	Both	
Lupu found ratifying the ICCPR did not improve personal integrity rights practices. ⁹⁵	None		
Lupu found ratifying the CEDAW improved respect for women's economic and social rights and ratifying the ICCPR did not improve personal integrity rights. ⁹⁶	Positive and none		
Social policies (n = 3)	Linos found the promulgation of global norms (through ratifying International Labor Organization conventions and large presence of INGOs) increased length of maternity leave. ⁸⁹	Positive	
	Kim and Boyle found SAAs did not increase education spending but citizen engagement in global civil society did. ⁹¹	None	
	Helper and Voeten found ECtHR rulings on LGBT issues increased the likelihood that states under the ECtHR's jurisdiction that had not yet adopted a pro-LGBT policy would do so. ⁹⁴	Positive	

Continued



TABLE 2—Continued

Trade policies (n = 2)	Bown found commitment to trade liberalization following WTO or GATT trade disputes was greater if the trading partner had the ability to retaliate. ²⁴	Positive	Ability to retaliate
	Kucik and Reinhardt found WTO member states that could take advantage of the WTO's antidumping flexibility provision agreed to tighter tariff bindings and applied lower tariffs. ³⁰	Positive	Flexibility provision
Impact on people, places, or products			
Domestic institutions (n = 2)	Ginsburg found BITs did not improve and in some cases worsened domestic institutions. ⁴²	None	
	Busse et al. found BITs promoted institutional development and may thus substitute for domestic measures to improve political governance. ⁶⁶	Positive	
Foreign investment (n = 27)	UNCTAD found BITs slightly increased FDI to developing countries. ³³	Positive	
	Banga found BITs with developed countries increased FDI inflows to developing countries. ³⁷	Positive	
	Davies found renegotiations on BITs involving the United States did not increase FDI stocks and affiliate sales in the United States. ³⁸	None	
	Hallward-Driemeier found BITs did not increase FDI inflows to developing countries. ³⁹	None	
	Egger and Pfaffermayr found BITs increased outward FDI stocks but only if they have been fully implemented. ⁴⁰	Positive	Fully implemented
	di Giovanni found BITs and bilateral service agreements increased M&A flows. ⁴¹	Positive	
	Grosse and Trevino found BITs signed by states in Central and Eastern Europe increased FDI inflows to the region. ⁴³	Positive	
	Neumayer and Spess found BITs with developed countries increased FDI inflows to developing countries. ⁴⁴	Positive	
	Egger and Merlo (2007) found BITs increased outward FDI stocks to host countries, with their long-term impact being greater than was their short-term impact. ⁴⁷	Positive	Time
	Büthe and Milner found WTO or GATT membership, PTAs, and BITs increased FDI inflows to developing countries. ^{48,56}	Positive	
	Millimet and Kumas found BITs increased inbound and outbound US FDI activity (i.e., flows, stocks, and affiliate sales) in countries with low FDI activity and decreased inbound and outbound US FDI activity in countries with high FDI activity. ⁵⁰	Both	Base FDI activity
	Yackee found BITs, even the formally strongest ones with international arbitration provisions, did not increase FDI inflows to developing countries. ⁵¹	None	
	Aisbett found that although BITs seemingly increased FDI outflows, the measured effect was simply because of the endogeneity of BIT adoption. ⁵²	None	
Barthel et al. found BITs increased FDI stocks between partner countries. ⁵³	Positive		
Blonigen and Davies found recently formed BITs decreased outbound FDI stocks and flows to partner countries. ⁵⁴	Negative		
Blonigen and Davies found BITs involving the United States decreased outbound FDI stocks and affiliate sales from the United States and did not affect inbound FDI stocks and affiliate sales to the United States. ⁵⁵	None and negative		
Coupé et al. found BITs, but not DTTs, increased FDI inflows to countries undergoing economic transition. ⁵⁷	Positive and none	Economic transition	
Egger et al. found BITs decreased outward FDI stocks to host countries. ⁵⁸	Negative		
Gallagher and Birch found BITs with the United States did not increase FDI inflows from the United States to Latin American and Mesoamerican states, whereas BITs with all countries increased total FDI inflows to Latin American states. ⁵⁹	None and positive		

Continued



TABLE 2—Continued

	Louie and Rousslang found BTTs with the United States did not affect the rates of return that US companies required on their FDI. ⁶¹	None	
	Millimet and Kumas found BTTs increased time-lagged inbound FDI stocks and flows but did not affect inbound affiliate sales and outbound FDI stocks, flows, and affiliate sales. ⁶²	Positive and none	
	Neumayer found DTTs with the United States increased outbound FDI stocks from the United States, whereas DTTs with all countries increased general inbound FDI stocks and FDI inflows but only in middle-income countries. ⁶³	Positive	Economic status
	Salacuse and Sullivan found BITs with the United States increased FDI inflows to developing countries, both generally from other countries and specifically from the United States. ⁶⁴	Positive	
	Yackee found BITs decreased FDI inflows to developing countries, whereas those signed with countries at low political risk increased FDI inflows. ⁶⁵	Both	Political risk
	Busse et al. found BITs increased FDI inflows to developing countries. ⁶⁶	Positive	
	Tobin and Rose-Ackerman found BITs increased FDI inflows to developing countries that had a suitable political-economic environment. ⁶⁷	Positive	Investment environment
Government stability (n = 2)	Abouharb and Cingranelli found SAAs increased the probability and prevalence of antigovernment rebellion. ⁷²	Negative	
	Hollyer and Rosendorff found autocracies that ratified the CAT had longer tenures in office and experienced less oppositional activities. ⁸⁸	Positive	
Health and well-being (n = 2)	Abouharb and Cingranelli found SAAs led to worse quality of life as measured by basic literacy rate, infant mortality, and life expectancy at aged 1 year. ⁷²	Negative	
	Palmer et al. found ratifying human rights treaties did not improve life expectancy, infant mortality, maternal mortality, or child mortality. ⁷⁶	None	
Peace (n = 4)	Meemik found judicial actions of the ICTY did not improve societal peace in Bosnia. ⁹⁹	None	
	Simmons and Danner found the ICC terminated civil conflicts and promoted engagement in peace agreements in nondemocratic and low rule-of-law member states. ¹⁰⁵	Positive	Nondemocracy
	Hafner-Burton and Montgomery found membership in IGOs increased the likelihood of participation in militarized international disputes. ¹⁰⁰	Negative	
	Hafner-Burton and Montgomery found membership in trade institutions decreased the likelihood of militarized disputes between states with relatively equal economic positions and increased the likelihood of militarized disputes between states with unequal positions. ³²	Both	Economic status
Pollution (n = 6)	Mitchell found a treaty mandating tankers to install pollution-reduction equipment was more effective than was a treaty that set a legal limit to tanker oil discharges. ¹⁰⁶	Both	
	Murdoch and Sandler found the Montreal Protocol did not reduce CFC emissions but rather codified previous voluntary reductions by member states. ¹⁰⁷	None	
	Murdoch et al. found the Helsinki Protocol reduced sulfur emissions but the Sofia Protocol did not reduce nitrogen oxides emissions in European states because of differences in the source and spread of each pollutant. ¹⁰⁸	Both	
	Helm and Sprinz found the Helsinki Protocol reduced sulfur dioxide emissions and the Oslo Protocol reduced nitrogen dioxide emissions but fell short of the calculated optimum levels. ¹⁰⁹	Positive and none	
	Finus and Tjøtta found the sulfur emission reduction targets set by the Oslo Protocol were lower than were those expected without an international agreement. ¹¹¹	None	
	Ringquist and Kostadinova found the Helsinki Protocol did not reduce sulfur emissions in Europe. ¹¹²	None	

Continued



TABLE 2—Continued

Public support (n = 1)	Putnam and Shapiro found public support for government action against Myanmar increased when respondents were informed that Myanmar's forced labor practices violated international law. ⁹⁸	Positive	
Torture (n = 8)	Hathaway found ratifying the CAT led to worse torture practices, whereas additionally ratifying Article 21 of the CAT (which allows state to state complaints) did not change them. ⁶⁹	None and negative	
	Gilligan and Nesbitt found ratifying the CAT did not improve torture practices. ⁷⁵	None	
	Powell and Staton found ratifying the CAT improved torture practices in states with strong domestic systems of legal enforcement. ⁷⁷	Positive	Legal enforcement
	Hill found ratifying the CAT led to worse torture practices. ⁸⁴	Negative	
	Hollyer and Rosendorff found autocracies that ratified the CAT continued their torture practices but at slightly lower levels. ⁸⁸	Positive	
	Conrad and Ritter found ratifying the CAT improved torture practices in dictatorships with politically secure leaders but did not change practices in those with politically insecure leaders. ⁹³	Positive and none	Leader security
	Lupu found ratifying the CAT was not associated with lower torture rates. ⁹⁶	None	
Trade flows (n = 5)	Conrad found ratifying the CAT increased the likelihood of torture in dictatorships with power sharing but only when judicial effectiveness was high. ⁸⁷	Negative	Judicial effectiveness
	Rose found WTO or GATT membership did not increase trade. ²⁵	None	
	Gowa and Kim found GATT membership increased trade between Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom, and United States but did not affect trade between other member states. ²⁶	Positive and none	
	Subramanian and Wei found WTO or GATT membership increased trade for industrial states, especially when trading partners were also WTO or GATT members. ²⁸	Positive	Industrialized partners
	Tomz et al. found WTO or GATT participation, formally or as a nonmember, increased trade. ²⁹	Positive	
	Mansfield and Reinhardt found membership in the WTO or GATT and PTAs reduced export volatility and thereby increased export levels. ³¹	Positive	
War crimes and genocide (n = 3)	Hathaway found ratifying the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide led to worse genocide practices. ⁶⁹	Negative	
	Valentino et al. found international humanitarian law did not reduce intentional civilian fatalities during wartime, regardless of regime type and identity of enemy combatants. ¹⁰¹	None	
	Morrow found democracies had fewer violations of international humanitarian laws during wartime, and joint ratification of laws promoted reciprocity between warring states. ¹⁰³	Positive	Democracy
Water levels (n = 1)	Bernauer and Siegfried found water release from the Toktogul reservoir after the 1998 Naryn/Syr Darya basin agreement met mandated levels, but was significantly higher than the calculated optimum levels. ¹¹⁴	Positive and none	

Note. BIA = Bilateral Immunity Agreement; BIT = Bilateral Investment Treaty; BTT = Bilateral Tax Treaty; CAT = Convention Against Torture; CEDAW = Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; CERD = Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; CFC = chlorofluorocarbon; CRC = Convention on the Rights of the Child; DTT = Double Taxation Treaty; ECtHR = European Court of Human Rights; FDI = foreign direct investment; GATT = General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; HRC = Human Rights Committee; IACHR = Inter-American Court of Human Rights; IASHRP = Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection; ICC = International Criminal Court; ICCPR = International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; ICESCR = International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; ICTY = International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; IGO = intergovernmental organization; IMF = International Monetary Fund; INGO = international nongovernmental organization; LGBT = lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender; M&A = merger and acquisition; PTA = Preferential Trade Agreement; SAA = Structural Adjustment Agreement; UN = United Nations; WTO = World Trade Organization.



About the Authors

Steven J. Hoffman is with the Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, Canada, and the Department of Global Health and Population, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA. John-Arne Røttingen is with the Division of Infectious Disease Control, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway, and the Institute of Health and Society, University of Oslo, Norway.

Correspondence should be sent to Steven J. Hoffman, Fauteux Hall, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, 57 Louis-Pasteur Street, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1N 6N5 (e-mail: steven.hoffman@uottawa.ca). Reprints can be ordered at <http://www.ajph.org> by clicking the "Reprints" link.

This article was accepted May 11, 2014.

Contributors

S.J. Hoffman originated the study and wrote the first draft of the article. J.-A. Røttingen contributed to the analysis and revised successive drafts of the article for important intellectual content.

Acknowledgments

S. J. H. is financially supported by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research and the Trudeau Foundation.

Thank you to Julio Frenk, Benn McGrady, Graham Reynolds, and the participants of seminars at Chatham House, Harvard School of Public Health, Osgoode Hall Law School, Oxford University, Queen's University, and the University of British Columbia for feedback on earlier drafts of this article and to Jennifer Edge, Zain Rizvi, Vivian Tam, and Charlie Tan for research assistance.

Note. S. J. H. was previously employed by the World Health Organization and the United Nations Secretary-General's Office. J.-A. R. was chair of the World Health Organization's Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and Development: Financing and Coordination that recommended adoption of an international convention on health research and development.

Human Participant Protection

No protocol approval was necessary because no human participants were involved.

References

1. Sridhar D. Regulate alcohol for global health. *Nature*. 2012;482:302.

2. Gostin LO. Non-communicable diseases: healthy living needs global governance. *Nature*. 2014;511(7508):147–149.

3. Fighting fake drugs: the role of WHO and pharma. *Lancet*. 2011;377(9778):1626.

4. Kohler JC, Makady A. Harnessing global health diplomacy to curb corruption in health. *J Health Dipl*. 2013;1(1):1–14.

5. Oxman AD, Bjørndal A, Becerra-Posada F, et al. A framework for mandatory impact evaluation to ensure well informed public policy decisions. *Lancet*. 2010;375(9712):427–431.

6. Basu S. Should we propose a global nutrition treaty? 2012. Available at: <http://epianalysis.wordpress.com/2012/06/26/nutritiontreaty>. Accessed January 4, 2014.

7. Urgently needed: a framework convention for obesity control. *Lancet*. 2011;378(9793):741.

8. Denticio N, Ford N. The courage to change the rules: a proposal for an essential health R&D treaty. *PLoS Med*. 2005;2(2):e14.

9. Gostin LO. Meeting basic survival needs of the world's least healthy people: toward a framework convention on global health. *Georgetown Law J*. 2008;96(2):331–392.

10. Fidler DP. The globalization of public health: the first 100 years of international health diplomacy. *Bull World Health Organ*. 2001;79(9):842–849.

11. Taylor AL. Global governance, international health law and WHO: looking towards the future. *Bull World Health Organ*. 2002;80(12):975–980.

12. Gostin LO. World health law: toward a new conception of global health governance for the 21st century. *Yale J Health Policy Law Ethics*. 2005;5(1):413–424.

13. Hoffman SJ, Røttingen JA. Split WHO in two: strengthening political decision-making and securing independent scientific advice. *Public Health*. 2014;128(2):188–194.

14. World Health Organization. Constitution of the World Health Organization. 45th ed. 2005. Available at: http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf. Accessed January 4, 2014.

15. Hoffman SJ. Ending medical complicity in state-sponsored torture. *Lancet*. 2011;378(9802):1535–1537.

16. Hathaway OA. Why do countries commit to human rights treaties? *J Conflict Resolut*. 2007;51(4):588–621.

17. Hafner-Burton E, Victor DG, Lupu Y. Political science research on international law: the state of the field. *Am J Int Law*. 2012;106(1):47–97.

18. Shaffer G, Ginsburg T. The empirical turn in international legal scholarship. *Am J Int Law*. 2012;106(1):1–46.

19. Hoffman SJ, Røttingen JA. Dark sides of the proposed Framework Convention on Global Health's many virtues: a systematic review and critical analysis. *Health Hum Rights*. 2013;15(1):117–134.

20. Wipfli HL, Fujimoto K, Valente TW. Global tobacco control diffusion: the case of the framework convention on tobacco control. *Am J Public Health*. 2010;100(7):1260–1266.

21. Sanders-Jackson AN, Song AV, Hiilamo H, Glantz SA. Effect of the framework convention on tobacco control and voluntary industry health warning labels on passage of mandated cigarette warning labels from 1965 to 2012: transition probability and event history analyses. *Am J Public Health*. 2013;103(11):2041–2047.

22. Wipfli H, Huang G. Power of the process: evaluating the impact of the framework convention on tobacco control negotiations. *Health Policy*. 2011;100(2–3):107–115.

23. Edge JS, Hoffman SJ. Empirical impact evaluation of the WHO global code of practice on the international recruitment of health personnel in Australia, Canada, UK and USA. *Global Health*. 2013;9:60.

24. Bown CP. On the economic success of GATT/WTO dispute settlement. *Rev Econ Stat*. 2004;86(3):811–823.

25. Rose AK. Do we really know that the WTO increases trade? *Am Econ Rev*. 2004;94(1):98–114.

26. Gowa J, Kim SY. An exclusive country club: the effects of the GATT on trade, 1950–94. *World Polit*. 2005;57(4):453–478.

27. Hafner-Burton EM. Trading human rights: how preferential trade agreements influence government repression. *Int Organ*. 2005;59(3):593–629.

28. Subramanian A, Wei SJ. The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly. *J Int Econ*. 2007;72(1):151–175.

29. Tomz M, Goldstein JL, Rivers D. Do we really know that the WTO increases trade? *Am Econ Rev*. 2007;97(5):2005–2018.

30. Kucik J, Reinhardt E. Does flexibility promote cooperation? An application to the global trade regime. *Int Organ*. 2008;62(3):477–505.

31. Mansfield ED, Reinhardt E. International institutions and the volatility of international trade. *Int Organ*. 2008;62(4):621–652.

32. Hafner-Burton EM, Montgomery AH. War, trade and distrust: why trade agreements don't always keep the peace. *Conflict Management & Peace Sci*. 2012;29(3):257–278.

33. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. *Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s*. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization; 1998.

34. Simmons BA. International law and state behavior: commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs. *Am Polit Sci Rev*. 2000;94(4):819–835.

35. Simmons BA. Money and the law: why comply with the public international law of money? *Yale J Int Law*. 2000;25(2):323–362.

36. Simmons BA. The legalization of international monetary affairs. *Int Organ*. 2000;54(3):573–602.

37. Banga R. *Impact of Government Policies and Investment Agreements on FDI Inflows*. Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations. Working Paper No. 116; 2003.

38. Davies RB. Tax treaties, renegotiations, and foreign direct investment. *Econ Anal Policy*. 2003;33(2):251–273.

39. Hallward-Driemeier M. *Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment? Only a Bit—and They Could Bite*. World Bank Policy Research. Working Paper No. 3121; 2003.

40. Egger P, Pfaffermayr M. The impact of bilateral investment treaties on foreign direct investment. *J Comp Econ*. 2004;32(4):788–804.

41. di Giovanni J. What drives capital flows? The case of cross-border M&A activity and financial deepening. *J Int Econ*. 2005;65(1):127–149.

42. Ginsburg T. International substitutes for domestic institutions: bilateral investment treaties and governance. *Int Rev Law Econ*. 2005;25(1):107–123.

43. Grosse R, Trevino LJ. New institutional economics and FDI location in Central and Eastern Europe. *Manage Rev*. 2005;45(2):123–145.



44. Neumayer E, Spess L. Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries? *World Dev.* 2005;33(10):1567–1585.
45. von Stein J. Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance. *Am Polit Sci Rev.* 2005;99(4):611–622.
46. Simmons BA, Hopkins DJ. The constraining power of international treaties: theory and methods. *Am Polit Sci Rev.* 2005;99(4):623–631.
47. Egger P, Merlo V. The impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI dynamics. *World Econ.* 2007;30(10):1536–1549.
48. Büthe T, Milner HV. The politics of foreign direct investment into developing countries: increasing FDI through international trade agreements? *Am J Pol Sci.* 2008;52(4):741–762.
49. Hafner-Burton EM, Montgomery AH. Power or plenty: how do international trade institutions affect economic sanctions? *J Conflict Resolut.* 2008;52(2):213–242.
50. Millimet DL, Kumas A. *Reassessing the Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on US FDI Activity.* Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University; 2008. Working Paper No. 704.
51. Yackee JW. Bilateral investment treaties, credible commitment, and the rule of (international) law: do BITs promote foreign direct investment? *Law Soc Rev.* 2008;42(4):805–832.
52. Aisbett E. Bilateral investment treaties and foreign direct investment: correlation versus causation. In: Sauvants K, Sachs L, eds. *The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2009:395–437.
53. Barthel F, Busse M, Neumayer E. The impact of double taxation treaties on foreign direct investment: evidence from large dyadic table data. *Contemp Econ Policy.* 2009;28(3):366–377.
54. Blonigen BA, Davies RB. Do bilateral tax treaties promote foreign direct investment? In: Sauvants K, Sachs L, eds. *The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2009:461–485.
55. Blonigen BA, Davies RB. The effects of bilateral tax treaties on U.S. FDI Activity. In: Sauvants K, Sachs L, eds. *The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2009:485–513.
56. Büthe T, Milner HV. Bilateral investment treaties and foreign direct investment: a political analysis. In: Sauvants K, Sachs L, eds. *The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2009:171–225.
57. Coupé T, Orlova I, Skiba A. The effect of tax and investment treaties on bilateral FDI flows to transition countries. In: Sauvants K, Sachs L, eds. *The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2009:681–715.
58. Egger P, Larch M, Pfaffermayr M, Winner H. The impact of endogenous tax treaties on foreign direct investment: theory and empirical evidence. In: Sauvants K, Sachs L, eds. *The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2009:513–541.
59. Gallagher KP, Birch MBL. Do investment agreements attract investment? Evidence from Latin America. In: Sauvants K, Sachs L, eds. *The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2009:295–311.
60. Grieco JM, Gelpi CF, Warren TC. When preferences and commitments collide: the effect of relative partisan shifts on international treaty compliance. *Int Organ.* 2009;63(2):341–355.
61. Louie HJ, Rousslang DJ. Host-country governance, tax treaties, and U.S. direct investment abroad. In: Sauvants K, Sachs L, eds. *The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2009:541–563.
62. Millimet DL, Kumas A. It's all in the timing: assessing the impact of bilateral tax treaties on U.S. FDI activity. In: Sauvants K, Sachs L, eds. *The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2009:635–659.
63. Neumayer E. Do double taxation treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries? In: Sauvants K, Sachs L, eds. *The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2009:659–687.
64. Salacuse JW, Sullivan NP. Do BITs really work?: An evaluation of bilateral investment treaties and their grand bargain. In: Sauvants K, Sachs L, eds. *The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2009:109–171. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388534.001.0001.
65. Yackee J. Do BITs really work? Revisiting the empirical link between investment treaties and foreign direct investment. In: Sauvants K, Sachs L, eds. *The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2009:379–395.
66. Busse M, Königer J, Nunnenkamp P. FDI promotion through bilateral investment treaties: more than a bit? *Rev World Econ.* 2010;146:147–177.
67. Tobin JL, Rose-Ackerman S. When BITs have some bite: the political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties. *Rev Int Organ.* 2011;6(1):1–32.
68. Keith LC. The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: does it make a difference in human rights behavior? *J Peace Res.* 1999;36(1):95–118.
69. Hathaway OA. Do human rights treaties make a difference? *Yale Law J.* 2002;111(8):1935–2042.
70. Hafner-Burton EM, Tsutsui K. Human rights in a globalizing world: the paradox of empty promises. *Am J Sociol.* 2005;110(5):1373–1411.
71. Neumayer E. Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights? *J Conflict Resolut.* 2005;49(6):925–953.
72. Abouharb R, Cingranelli D. *Human Rights and Structural Adjustment.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 2007.
73. Cardenas S. *Conflict and Compliance: State Responses to International Human Rights Pressure.* Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press; 2007.
74. Hafner-Burton EM, Tsutsui K. Justice lost! The failure of international human rights law to matter where needed most. *J Peace Res.* 2007;44(4):407–425.
75. Gilligan MJ, Nesbitt NH. Do norms reduce torture? *J Legal Stud.* 2009;38(2):445–470.
76. Palmer A, Tomkinson J, Phung C, et al. Does ratification of human-rights treaties have effects on population health? *Lancet.* 2009;373(9679):1987–1992.
77. Powell EJ, Staton JK. Domestic judicial institutions and human rights treaty violation. *Int Stud Q.* 2009;53(1):149–174.
78. Simmons BA. Civil rights in international law: compliance with aspects of the “International Bill of Rights.” *Indiana J Glob Leg Stud.* 2009;16(2):437–481.
79. Simmons BA. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 2009.
80. Simmons BA. Should states ratify protocol? Process and consequences of the optional protocol of the ICESCR. *Norwegian J Hum Rights.* 2009;27(1):64–81.
81. Basch F, Filippini L, Laya A, Nino M, Rossi F, Schreiber B. The effectiveness of the inter-American system of human rights protection: a quantitative approach to it functioning and compliance with its decisions. *Int J Hum Rights.* 2010;7(12):9–35.
82. Greenhill B. The company you keep: international socialization and the diffusion of human rights norms. *Int Stud Q.* 2010;54(1):127–145.
83. Hawkins D, Jacoby W. Partial compliance: a comparison of the European and inter-American courts of human rights. *J Int Law Int Relat.* 2010;6(1):35–85.
84. Hill DW Jr. Estimating the effects of human rights treaties on state behavior. *J Polit.* 2010;72(4):1161–1174.
85. Kim H, Sikkink K. Explaining the deterrence effect of human rights prosecutions for transitional countries. *Int Stud Q.* 2010;54(4):939–963.
86. Cole WM. *Individuals v. States: An Analysis of Human Rights Committee Rulings, 1979–2007.* Bozeman, MT: Montana State University; 2011. Working Paper.
87. Conrad CR. Divergent incentives for dictators: domestic institutions and (international promises not to) torture. *J Conflict Resolution.* 2014;58(1):34–67.
88. Hollyer JR, Rosendorff PB. Why do authoritarian regimes sign the convention



- against torture? Signaling, domestic politics and non-compliance. *Q J Pol Sci*. 2011;6(3-4):275-327.
89. Linos K. Diffusion through democracy. *Am J Pol Sci*. 2011;55(3):678-695.
90. Staton JK, Romero A. Clarity and compliance in the inter-American human rights system. Presented at: International Political Science Association-European Consortium of Political Research Joint Conference; February 16-19, 2011; Sao Paulo, Brazil.
91. Kim M, Boyle EH. Neoliberalism, transnational education norms, and education spending in the developing world, 1983-2004. *Law Soc Inq*. 2012;37(2):367-394.
92. Cole W. Strong walk and cheap talk: the effect of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on policies and practices. *Social and Economic Rights in Law and Practice*. 2013;92(1):165-194.
93. Conrad CR, Ritter EH. Treaties, tenure, and torture: the conflicting domestic effects of international law. *J Polit*. 2013;75(2):397-409.
94. Helfer LR, Voeten E. International courts as agents of legal change: evidence from LGBT rights in Europe. *Int Organ*. 2014;68(1):77-110.
95. Lupu Y. Best evidence: the role of information in domestic judicial enforcement of international human rights agreements. *Int Organ*. 2013;67(3):469-503.
96. Lupu Y. The informative power of treaty commitment: using the spatial model to address selection effects. *Am J Pol Sci*. 2013b;57(4):912-925.
97. Neumayer E. Do governments mean business when they derogate? Human rights violations during declared states of emergency. *Rev Int Organ*. 2013;8(1):1-31.
98. Putnam TL, Shapiro JN. International law and voter preferences: the case of foreign human rights violations. New York, NY: Columbia University; 2013. Working Paper.
99. Meernik J. Justice and peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal affects societal peace in Bosnia. *J Peace Res*. 2005;42(3):271-289.
100. Hafner-Burton EM, Montgomery AH. Power positions: international organizations, social networks, and conflict. *J Conflict Resolut*. 2006;50(1):3-27.
101. Valentino B, Huth P, Croco S. Covnants without the sword: international law and the protection of civilians in times of war. *World Polit*. 2006;58(3):339-377.
102. Kelley J. Who keeps international commitments and why? The International Criminal Court and bilateral nonsurrender agreements. *Am Polit Sci Rev*. 2007;101(3):573-589.
103. Morrow JD. When do states follow the laws of war? *Am Polit Sci Rev*. 2007;101(3):559-572.
104. Nooruddin I, Payton AL. Dynamics of influence in international politics: the ICCs, BIAs, and economic sanctions. *J Peace Res*. 2010;47(6):711-721.
105. Simmons BA, Danner A. Credible commitments and the International Criminal Court. *Int Organ*. 2010;64(2):225-256.
106. Mitchell RB. Regime design matters: intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance. *Int Organ*. 1994;48(3):425-458.
107. Murdoch JC, Sandler T. The voluntary provision of a pure public good: the case of reduced CFC Emissions and the Montreal Protocol. *J Public Econ*. 1997;63(3):331-349.
108. Murdoch JC, Sandler T, Sargent K. A tale of two collectives: sulphur versus nitrogen oxides emission reduction in Europe. *Economica*. 1997;64(254):281-301.
109. Helm C, Sprinz D. Measuring the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. *J Conflict Resolut*. 2000;44(5):630-652.
110. Miles E, Underdal A, Andresen S, Wettestad J, Skjaereth JB, Carlin EM. *Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory With Evidence*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 2002.
111. Finus M, Tjøtta S. The Oslo Protocol on sulfur reduction: the great leap forward? *J Public Econ*. 2003;87(9-10):2031-2048.
112. Ringquist EJ, Kostadinova T. Assessing the effectiveness of international environmental agreements: the case of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol. *Am J Pol Sci*. 2005;49(1):86-102.
113. Breitmeier H, Young O, Zurn M. *Analyzing International Environmental Regimes: From Case Study to Database*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 2006.
114. Bernauer T, Siegfried T. Compliance and performance in international water agreements: the case of the Naryn/Syr Darya Basin. *Glob Gov*. 2008;14(4):479-501.
115. Breitmeier H, Underdal A, Young OR. The effectiveness of international environmental regimes: comparing and contrasting findings from quantitative research. *Int Stud Rev*. 2011;13(4):579-605.
116. Merry SE. Transnational human rights and local activism: mapping the middle. *Am Anthropol*. 2006;108(1):38-51.
117. Merry SE. New legal realism and the ethnography of transnational law. *Law Soc Inq*. 2006;31(4):975-995.
118. Keith LC. Judicial independence and human rights protection around the world. *Judicature*. 2002;85(4):195-200.
119. Snyder J, Vinjamuri L. Trials and errors: principle and pragmatism in strategies of international justice. *Int Secur*. 2003;28(3):5-44.
120. Ku J, Nzelibe J. Do international criminal tribunals deter or exacerbate humanitarian atrocities? *Washington Univ Law Rev*. 2006;84(4):777-833.
121. Prakash A, Potoski M. Racing to the bottom? Trade, environmental governance and ISO 14001. *Am J Pol Sci*. 2006;50(2):350-364.
122. Victor DG. Toward effective international cooperation on climate change: numbers, interests and institutions. *Glob Environ Polit*. 2006;6(3):90-103.
123. Snidal D. The game theory of international politics. *World Polit*. 1985;38(1):25-57.
124. Hoffman SJ. Mitigating inequalities of influence among states in global decision-making. *Glob Policy J*. 2012;3(4):421-432.
125. Krasner SD. Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables. *Int Organ*. 1982;36(2):185-205.
126. Waltz K. *Theory of International Politics*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill; 1979.
127. Chayes A, Ehrlich T, Lowenfeld AF. *International Legal Process*. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company; 1968.
128. Koskeniemi M. The politics of international law. *Eur J Int Law*. 1990;1(1):4-32.
129. Kennedy D. *The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 2004.
130. Keck ME, Sikkink K. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 1998.
131. Slaughter AM. *A New World Order*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 2004.
132. Koh HH. How is international human rights law enforced? *Indiana Law J*. 1999;74(4):1397-1417.
133. Archibugi D. *The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 2008.
134. Held D. Restructuring global governance: cosmopolitanism, democracy and the global order. *Millennium*. 2009;37(3):535-547.
135. Finnemore M. *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; 1996.
136. Ruggie JG. What makes the world hang together? Neo-utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge. *Int Organ*. 1998;52(4):855.
137. Wendt A. Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. *Int Organ*. 1992;46(2):391-425.
138. Yach D, Bettcher D. Globalisation of tobacco industry influence and new global responses. *Tob Control*. 2000;9(2):206-216.
139. Franzese R. Models for time-series-cross-section data. 2010. Available at: <http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/FranzeseJWAC.TSCS.1.Introduction.pdf>. Accessed January 6, 2014.
140. Podesta F. Recent developments in quantitative comparative methodology: the case of pooled time series-cross sectional analysis. Brescia, Italy: Università Brescia; 2002. DSS Paper SOC 3-02.
141. Beck N, Katz JN. What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section data. *Am Polit Sci Rev*. 1995;89(3):634-647.
142. Sekhon JS. The statistics of causal inference in the social sciences. 2012. Available at: <http://sekhon.berkeley.edu/causalinf/causalinf.pres.pdf>. Accessed January 6, 2014.
143. Loftin C, McDowell D, Wiersema B, Talbert JC. Effects of restrictive licensing of handguns on homicide and suicide in the District of Columbia. *N Engl J Med*. 1991;325(23):1615-1620.
144. Humphreys DK, Eisner MP, Wiebe DJ. Evaluating the impact of flexible alcohol trading hours on violence: an



interrupted time series analysis. *PLoS ONE*. 2013;8(2):e55581.

145. Ma ZQ, Kuller LH, Fisher MA, Ostroff SM. Use of interrupted time-series method to evaluate the impact of cigarette excise tax increases in Pennsylvania, 2000–2009. *Prev Chronic Dis*. 2013; 10:E169.

146. Morgan OW, Griffiths C, Majeed A. Interrupted time-series analysis of regulations to reduce paracetamol (acetaminophen) poisoning. *PLoS Med*. 2007;4(4): e105.

147. Gostin LO, Friedman E. Towards a framework convention on global health: a transformative agenda for global health justice. *Yale J Health Policy Law Ethics*. 2013;13(1):1–75.

148. Alter KJ, Meunier S. The politics of international regime complexity. *Perspect Polit*. 2009;7(1):13–24.

149. Drezner DW. The power and peril of international regime complexity. *Perspect Polit*. 2009;7(1):65–70.

150. Chang AY, Röttingen JA, Hoffman SJ, Moon S. *Governance Arrangements for Health R&D*. Geneva, Switzerland: Graduate Institute of International & Development Studies and Cambridge, MA: Harvard Global Health Institute; 2014.

151. Hoffman SJ. Making the International Health Regulations matter: promoting compliance through effective dispute resolution. In: Rushton S, Youde J, eds. *Routledge Handbook on Global Health Security*. Oxford, UK: Routledge. In Print.

152. Hoffman SJ, Röttingen JA. Global health governance after 2015. *Lancet*. 2013;382(9897):1018.

153. Hoffman SJ, Röttingen JA. Assessing implementation mechanisms for an international agreement on research and development for health products. *Bull World Health Organ*. 2012;90(11): 854–863.