TABLE 2—
Impact of International Treaties, by Impact Area
| Outcome | Study Conclusions | Impact | Conditions |
| Impact on government policies | |||
| Civil and political rights (n = 12) | Keith found ratifying the ICCPR did not improve civil rights practices.68 | None | |
| Hathaway found ratifying the ICCPR did not improve civil liberties and did not increase fairness of trials, and ratifying the UN Covenant on the Political Rights of Women did not improve women’s ability to take part in government.69 | None | ||
| Neumayer found ratifying human rights treaties improved civil rights practices in democratic states or states with strong engagement in global civil society.71 | Positive | Democracy Civil society | |
| Abouharb and Cingraelli found SAAs promoted an institutionalized democracy, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of speech, and free and fair elections.72 | Positive | ||
| Cardenas found international and domestic human rights pressures did not improve civil rights practices but increased ratification of human rights treaties in countries without a national security threat, in which norm violations would threaten the elites’ economic interests and prohuman rights groups have public support.73 | None and positive | Security Elite interests Human rights groups | |
| Simmons found ratifying the ICCPR slightly improved civil liberties after 5 years, reduced government restrictions on religious freedoms most strongly in states transitioning between autocracy and democracy, and improved the fairness of trials only in countries transitioning between autocracy and democracy.78 | Positive | Transitional state | |
| Simmons found ratifying 6 international human rights treaties (e.g., ICCPR, ICESCR, CERD, CEDAW, CAT, and CRC) improved civil and political rights practices in states transitioning between autocracy and democracy.79 | Positive | Transitional state | |
| Simmons found ratifying the ICCPR’s optional protocol slightly improved civil liberties.80 | Positive | ||
| Hill found ratifying the CEDAW improved women’s political rights practices.84 | Positive | ||
| Cole found due process and personal liberty claims filed under the ICCPR’s Optional Protocol were more successful than were suffrage and family rights claims in HRC rulings.86 | Both | Claim type | |
| Lupu found ratifying the ICCPR improved government respect for freedoms of speech, association, assembly, and religion.95 | Positive | ||
| Lupu found ratifying CEDAW improved respect for women’s political rights.96 | Positive | ||
| Compliance with court rulings (n = 3) | Basch et al. found high noncompliance with remedies adopted by the IASHPR, with total compliance observed only after a long time.81 | None | |
| Hawkins and Jacoby found only partial compliance with rulings of the IACHR and ECtHR.83 | None | ||
| Staton and Romero found high compliance with IACHR rulings that were clearly expressed.90 | Positive | Ruling clarity | |
| Derogation from rights (n = 1) | Neumayer found that among ICCPR signatory states in declared states of emergency, democracies did not increase violations, whereas autocracies and some anocracies increased violations of both derogable and nonderogable rights.97 | Both | Regime type |
| Economic sanctions (n = 1) | Hafner-Burton and Montgomery found PTAs did not affect the likelihood of sanctions, but the likelihood was increased when the initiator had high centrality in the PTA network.49 | None and negative | Initiator centrality |
| Environment policies (n = 3) | Miles et al. found international environmental laws promoted positive behavioral changes by states and, to a lesser degree, improved the state of the environment.110 | Positive | |
| Breitmeier et al. found international environmental laws promoted significant compliance behavior by signatory states and sometimes improved the state of the environment, with knowledge of the problem, member states’ interests, and decision rule being key factors.113,115 | Positive | Knowledge Interests Decision rule | |
| Financial transactions restrictions (n = 4) | Simmons found states that ratified Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement were less likely to impose restrictions on their accounts.34–36 | Positive | |
| von Stein34–36 found the positive effect in Simmons45 was not because of Article VIII itself but the IMF’s informal conditions for selecting and pressuring states to ratify Article VIII. | None | ||
| Simmons and Hopkins found ratifying IMF Article VIII reduced account restrictions, even after accounting for selection effects.46 | Positive | ||
| Grieco et al. found states that ratified IMF Article VIII were less likely to impose account restrictions, even if their political orientation shifted away from monetary openness.60 | Positive | ||
| Immunity agreements for international crimes (n = 2) | Kelley found states that valued the ICC and respected the rule of law were more likely to reject a nonsurrender agreement with the United States that would violate Article 86 of the Rome Statute.102 | Positive | |
| Nooruddin and Payton found states that entered the ICC, especially those with high rule of law, had high GDP, had defense pacts with the United States or were sanctioned by the United States and took longer to sign a BIA with the United States, whereas states that traded heavily with the United States signed more quickly.104 | Both | ICC membership US relations | |
| Personal integrity rights (n = 12) | Keith found ratifying the ICCPR did not improve personal integrity rights practices.68 | None | |
| Hafner-Burton found PTAs requiring member states to improve their human rights practices were more effective than were HRAs in improving personal integrity rights practices.27 | Positive and none | ||
| Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui found ratifying human rights treaties did not improve personal integrity rights practices, but participation in global civil society activities did.70 | None | ||
| Neumayer found ratifying human rights treaties improved personal integrity rights practices in democratic states or states with strong engagement in global civil society.71 | Positive | Democracy Civil society | |
| Abouharb and Cingranelli found SAAs worsened personal integrity rights practices.72 | Negative | ||
| Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui found ratifying the CAT or ICCPR did not improve personal integrity rights practices of highly repressive states even long into the future, regardless of democracy and civil society.74 | None | ||
| Greenhill found membership in IGOs whose member states have strong human rights records improved personal integrity rights practices.82 | Positive | ||
| Hill found ratifying the ICCPR worsened personal integrity rights practices.84 | Negative | ||
| Kim and Sikkink found domestic and international prosecutions of human rights violations and truth commissions reduced repressions of personal integrity rights.85 | Positive | ||
| Cole found ratifying the ICESCR worsened labor rights laws but improved labor rights practices.92 | Both | ||
| Lupu found ratifying the ICCPR did not improve personal integrity rights practices.95 | None | ||
| Lupu found ratifying the CEDAW improved respect for women’s economic and social rights and ratifying the ICCPR did not improve personal integrity rights.96 | Positive and none | ||
| Social policies (n = 3) | Linos found the promulgation of global norms (through ratifying International Labor Organization conventions and large presence of INGOs) increased length of maternity leave.89 | Positive | |
| Kim and Boyle found SAAs did not increase education spending but citizen engagement in global civil society did.91 | None | ||
| Helfer and Voeten found ECtHR rulings on LGBT issues increased the likelihood that states under the ECtHR’s jurisdiction that had not yet adopted a pro-LGBT policy would do so.94 | Positive | ||
| Trade policies (n = 2) | Bown found commitment to trade liberalization following WTO or GATT trade disputes was greater if the trading partner had the ability to retaliate.24 | Positive | Ability to retaliate |
| Kucik and Reinhardt found WTO member states that could take advantage of the WTO’s antidumping flexibility provision agreed to tighter tariff bindings and applied lower tariffs.30 | Positive | Flexibility provision | |
| Impact on people, places, or products | |||
| Domestic institutions (n = 2) | Ginsburg found BITs did not improve and in some cases worsened domestic institutions.42 | None | |
| Busse et al. found BITs promoted institutional development and may thus substitute for domestic measures to improve political governance.66 | Positive | ||
| Foreign investment (n = 27) | UNCTAD found BITs slightly increased FDI to developing countries.33 | Positive | |
| Banga found BITs with developed countries increased FDI inflows to developing countries.37 | Positive | ||
| Davies found renegotiations on BTTs involving the United States did not increase FDI stocks and affiliate sales in the United States.38 | None | ||
| Hallward-Driemeier found BITs did not increase FDI inflows to developing countries.39 | None | ||
| Egger and Pfaffermayr found BITs increased outward FDI stocks but only if they have been fully implemented.40 | Positive | Fully implemented | |
| di Giovanni found BTTs and bilateral service agreements increased M&A flows.41 | Positive | ||
| Grosse and Trevino found BITs signed by states in Central and Eastern Europe increased FDI inflows to the region.43 | Positive | ||
| Neumayer and Spess found BITs with developed countries increased FDI inflows to developing countries.44 | Positive | ||
| Egger and Merlo (2007) found BITs increased outward FDI stocks to host countries, with their long-term impact being greater than was their short-term impact.47 | Positive | Time | |
| Büthe and Milner found WTO or GATT membership, PTAs, and BITs increased FDI inflows to developing countries.48,56 | Positive | ||
| Millimet and Kumas found BTTs increased inbound and outbound US FDI activity (i.e., flows, stocks, and affiliate sales) in countries with low FDI activity and decreased inbound and outbound US FDI activity in countries with high FDI activity.50 | Both | Base FDI activity | |
| Yackee found BITs, even the formally strongest ones with international arbitration provisions, did not increase FDI inflows to developing countries.51 | None | ||
| Aisbett found that although BITs seemingly increased FDI outflows, the measured effect was simply because of the endogeneity of BIT adoption.52 | None | ||
| Barthel et al. found DTTs increased FDI stocks between partner countries.53 | Positive | ||
| Blonigen and Davies found recently formed BTTs decreased outbound FDI stocks and flows to partner countries.54 | Negative | ||
| Blonigen and Davies found BTTs involving the United States decreased outbound FDI stocks and affiliate sales from the United States and did not affect inbound FDI stocks and affiliate sales to the United States.55 | None and negative | ||
| Coupé et al. found BITs, but not DTTs, increased FDI inflows to countries undergoing economic transition.57 | Positive and none | Economic transition | |
| Egger et al. found BTTs decreased outward FDI stocks to host countries.58 | Negative | ||
| Gallagher and Birch found BITs with the United States did not increase FDI inflows from the United States to Latin American and Mesoamerican states, whereas BITs with all countries increased total FDI inflows to Latin American states.59 | None and positive | ||
| Louie and Rousslang found BTTs with the United States did not affect the rates of return that US companies required on their FDI.61 | None | ||
| Millimet and Kumas found BTTs increased time-lagged inbound FDI stocks and flows but did not affect inbound affiliate sales and outbound FDI stocks, flows, and affiliate sales.62 | Positive and none | ||
| Neumayer found DTTs with the United States increased outbound FDI stocks from the United States, whereas DTTs with all countries increased general inbound FDI stocks and FDI inflows but only in middle-income countries.63 | Positive | Economic status | |
| Salacuse and Sullivan found BITs with the United States increased FDI inflows to developing countries, both generally from other countries and specifically from the United States.64 | Positive | ||
| Yackee found BITs decreased FDI inflows to developing countries, whereas those signed with countries at low political risk increased FDI inflows.65 | Both | Political risk | |
| Busse et al. found BITs increased FDI inflows to developing countries.66 | Positive | ||
| Tobin and Rose-Ackerman found BITs increased FDI inflows to developing countries that had a suitable political–economic environment.67 | Positive | Investment environment | |
| Government stability (n = 2) | Abouharb and Cingranelli found SAAs increased the probability and prevalence of antigovernment rebellion.72 | Negative | |
| Hollyer and Rosendorff found autocracies that ratified the CAT had longer tenures in office and experienced less oppositional activities.88 | Positive | ||
| Health and well-being (n = 2) | Abouharb and Cingranelli found SAAs led to worse quality of life as measured by basic literacy rate, infant mortality, and life expectancy at aged 1 year.72 | Negative | |
| Palmer et al. found ratifying human rights treaties did not improve life expectancy, infant mortality, maternal mortality, or child mortality.76 | None | ||
| Peace (n = 4) | Meernik found judicial actions of the ICTY did not improve societal peace in Bosnia.99 | None | |
| Simmons and Danner found the ICC terminated civil conflicts and promoted engagement in peace agreements in nondemocratic and low rule-of-law member states.105 | Positive | Nondemocracy | |
| Hafner-Burton and Montgomery found membership in IGOs increased the likelihood of participation in militarized international disputes.100 | Negative | ||
| Hafner-Burton and Montgomery found membership in trade institutions decreased the likelihood of militarized disputes between states with relatively equal economic positions and increased the likelihood of militarized disputes between states with unequal positions.32 | Both | Economic status | |
| Pollution (n = 6) | Mitchell found a treaty mandating tankers to install pollution-reduction equipment was more effective than was a treaty that set a legal limit to tanker oil discharges.106 | Both | |
| Murdoch and Sandler found the Montreal Protocol did not reduce CFC emissions but rather codified previous voluntary reductions by member states.107 | None | ||
| Murdoch et al. found the Helsinki Protocol reduced sulfur emissions but the Sofia Protocol did not reduce nitrogen oxides emissions in European states because of differences in the source and spread of each pollutant.108 | Both | ||
| Helm and Sprinz found the Helsinki Protocol reduced sulfur dioxide emissions and the Oslo Protocol reduced nitrogen dioxide emissions but fell short of the calculated optimum levels.109 | Positive and none | ||
| Finus and Tjøtta found the sulfur emission reduction targets set by the Oslo Protocol were lower than were those expected without an international agreement.111 | None | ||
| Ringquist and Kostadinova found the Helsinki Protocol did not reduce sulfur emissions in Europe.112 | None | ||
| Public support (n = 1) | Putnam and Shapiro found public support for government action against Myanmar increased when respondents were informed that Myanmar’s forced labor practices violated international law.98 | Positive | |
| Torture (n = 8) | Hathaway found ratifying the CAT led to worse torture practices, whereas additionally ratifying Article 21 of the CAT (which allows state to state complaints) did not change them.69 | None and negative | |
| Gilligan and Nesbitt found ratifying the CAT did not improve torture practices.75 | None | ||
| Powell and Staton found ratifying the CAT improved torture practices in states with strong domestic systems of legal enforcement.77 | Positive | Legal enforcement | |
| Hill found ratifying the CAT led to worse torture practices.84 | Negative | ||
| Hollyer and Rosendorff found autocracies that ratified the CAT continued their torture practices but at slightly lower levels.88 | Positive | ||
| Conrad and Ritter found ratifying the CAT improved torture practices in dictatorships with politically secure leaders but did not change practices in those with politically insecure leaders.93 | Positive and none | Leader security | |
| Lupu found ratifying the CAT was not associated with lower torture rates.96 | None | ||
| Conrad found ratifying the CAT increased the likelihood of torture in dictatorships with power sharing but only when judicial effectiveness was high.87 | Negative | Judicial effectiveness | |
| Trade flows (n = 5) | Rose found WTO or GATT membership did not increase trade.25 | None | |
| Gowa and Kim found GATT membership increased trade between Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom, and United States but did not affect trade between other member states.26 | Positive and none | ||
| Subramanian and Wei found WTO or GATT membership increased trade for industrial states, especially when trading partners were also WTO or GATT members.28 | Positive | Industrialized partners | |
| Tomz et al. found WTO or GATT participation, formally or as a nonmember, increased trade.29 | Positive | ||
| Mansfield and Reinhardt found membership in the WTO or GATT and PTAs reduced export volatility and thereby increased export levels.31 | Positive | ||
| War crimes and genocide (n = 3) | Hathaway found ratifying the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide led to worse genocide practices.69 | Negative | |
| Valentino et al. found international humanitarian law did not reduce intentional civilian fatalities during wartime, regardless of regime type and identity of enemy combatants.101 | None | ||
| Morrow found democracies had fewer violations of international humanitarian laws during wartime, and joint ratification of laws promoted reciprocity between warring states.103 | Positive | Democracy | |
| Water levels (n = 1) | Bernauer and Siegfried found water release from the Toktogul reservoir after the 1998 Naryn/Syr Darya basin agreement met mandated levels, but was significantly higher than the calculated optimum levels.114 | Positive and none | |
Note. BIA = Bilateral Immunity Agreement; BIT = Bilateral Investment Treaty; BTT = Bilateral Tax Treaty; CAT = Convention Against Torture; CEDAW = Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; CERD = Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; CFC = chlorofluorocarbon; CRC = Convention on the Rights of the Child; DTT = Double Taxation Treaty; ECtHR = European Court of Human Rights; FDI = foreign direct investment; GATT = General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; HRC = Human Rights Committee; IACHR = Inter-American Court of Human Rights; IASHRP = Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection; ICC = International Criminal Court; ICCPR = International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; ICESCR = International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; ICTY = International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; IGO = intergovernmental organization; IMF = International Monetary Fund; INGO = international nongovernmental organization; LGBT = lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender; M&A = merger and acquisition; PTA = Preferential Trade Agreement; SAA = Structural Adjustment Agreement; UN = United Nations; WTO = World Trade Organization.