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. 2015 Apr 29;10(4):e0123355. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0123355

Table 1. Manipulation of coercive and legitimate power before (Periods 1–20) and after the change in the tax authority (Periods 21–40).

Experimental conditions Control conditions
Periods in experiment Periods in experiment
1–20 21–40 1–20 21–40
Experiment 2 low coercive high coercive high coercive high coercive
high coercive low coercive low coercive low coercive
Experiment 3 low legitimate high legitimate high legitimate high legitimate
high legitimate low legitimate low legitimate low legitimate
Experiment 4 high coercive/ low legitimate high coercive/ high legitimate high coercive/ high legitimate high coercive/ high legitimate
low coercive/ high legitimate high coercive/ high legitimate
high coercive/ high legitimate high coercive/ low legitimate high coercive/ low legitimate high coercive/ low legitimate
low coercive/ low legitimate high coercive/ low legitimate
high coercive/ high legitimate low coercive/ high legitimate low coercive/ high legitimate low coercive/ high legitimate
low coercive/ low legitimate low coercive/ high legitimate
high coercive/ low legitimate low coercive/ low legitimate low coercive/ low legitimate low coercive/ low legitimate
low coercive/ high legitimate low coercive/ low legitimate