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. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2016 Jul 1.
Published in final edited form as: Behav Processes. 2015 Apr 20;116:12–16. doi: 10.1016/j.beproc.2015.04.009

Figure 4.

Figure 4

Within-subject differences in cooperation rates between conditions. The frequency distribution of differences between a player's cumulative cooperation in the 1-2-9-10 condition and that player's cumulative cooperation in the 1-2-3-4 condition (the order was counterbalanced). Although the vast majority did not show a difference, the mean of 2.61 was significantly greater than 0 ( t(43) = 2.18, p < .05.), which indicated a greater cooperation in the 1-2-9-10 condition.