Demand-side mechanisms |
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Incentives |
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Patient cost sharing |
Encourages consumers to internalize service costs |
Reduces overall health care use; does not require service-level measurement of overuse |
Patients do not discriminate between effective and low-value care; potentially harmful for vulnerable groups |
Value-based insurance design |
Communicates relative value of services to consumers through differential cost sharing, discouraging low-value care while promoting effective care |
Successfully used to encourage effective care |
No evidence regarding effect on overuse; requires complex benefit design, varying payment rates, and adequate appeal process |
Information |
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Patient education |
Supports patients to make informed decisions based on service value, possibly through structured shared decision making, use of decision aids, or public education campaigns |
Decision aids have been shown to reduce elective procedures; patient education has been shown to reduce overuse of benzodiazepines; little risk of adverse consequences |
Depends on precise population targeting, health literacy, and patient engagement and activation |
Provider report cards |
Gives patients or referring physicians value profiles of hospitals or clinicians; promotes competition through publicly available data on low-value care |
Public reporting may draw further attention to and motivate physicians to address overuse |
Little evidence that patients use quality data to choose providers; requires precise measurement and effective dissemination |
Supply-side mechanisms |
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Incentives |
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Pay for performance |
Encourages providers to consider value of health care services with bonuses for reducing low-value care |
Effective at priority setting; encourages physicians to focus on most harmful or costly forms of overuse |
Requires precise measurement; blunt instruments may reduce use of effective care; narrow focus on a limited set of services |
Prior authorization |
Requires approval from health plan to use service that may be low-value |
Systems already in place for most insurers |
Requires complex design; potentially reduces physician autonomy |
Risk sharing |
Encourages providers to consider value of services delivered, because of financial exposure for costs incurred (e.g., shared savings, capitation, bundled payments) |
Does not require precise measurement; preserves physician autonomy; encourages provider-level use of other mechanisms; physician practices with capitated payment have been shown to be more likely to measure overuse |
May reduce use of effective services; may foster patient backlash |
Information |
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Clinical decision support |
Supports clinicians with evidence-based care cues and cost information within electronic health record |
Shown to improve performance for some targets, including appropriateness of outpatient imaging |
Requires complex design and updating; under fee-for-service system, there is little financial incentive to invest in it |
Clinician education |
Supports clinicians with continuing education on evidence-based care and cost-conscious care delivery |
Success depends on educational intervention; use of clinical pathways has been shown to reduce costs and improve outcomes; little risk of adverse consequences |
Little evidence regarding effect on overuse |
Clinician feedback |
Supports clinicians with feedback on use of low-value care, suggestions for change, achievable benchmarks, and tools for improvement (e.g., Lean, Six Sigma) |
Shown to modestly improve use of effective services, especially among poor performers |
Little evidence regarding effect on overuse |