Table 5. Security and functionality comparison of the proposed scheme with other existing schemes.
| Attributes | Wen [3] | Zhu [34] | Wu et al. [57] | Cheng et al. [58] | Lee [59] | Proposed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| F 1 | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| F 2 | No | No | NA | NA | NA | Yes |
| F 3 | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| F 4 | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| F 5 | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| F 6 | No | NA | NA | No | NA | Yes |
| F 7 | No | NA | NA | Yes | NA | Yes |
| F 8 | No | Yes | NA | No | No | Yes |
| F 9 | Yes | NA | NA | No | No | Yes |
| F 10 | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| F 11 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| F 12 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| F 13 | Yes | Yes | NA | No | Yes | Yes |
| F 14 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
F 1: Login identity and password detection in the login phase; F 2: Login identity and password detection in the password change phase; F 3: Impersonation attack is avoided; F 4: Privileged-insider attack is avoided; F 5: Lost/stolen smart card revocation phase is present; F 6: Explicit session key confirmation property is present; F 7: No key control property is present; F 8: Password is changed without any help from the server; F 9: Ephemeral secrets leakage attack is avoided; F 10: User anonymity and unlinkability are present; F 11: Password guessing attack from lost smart card is avoided; F 12: Replay attack is avoided; F 13: Forward secrecy of the session key is present; F 14: modification/forgery attack is avoided.