Table 1. Estimates of control and full multilevel models for dictator game (DG) and public goods game (PGG, linear) and resource dilemma game (RDG, Poisson).
| Estimate | Dictator game (N=358) |
Public goods game (N=718) |
Resource dilemma game (N=560) |
|||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Control |
Full |
Control |
Full |
Control |
Full |
|||||||
| Est | Se | Est | Se | Est | Se | Est | Se | Est | Se | Est | Se | |
| Intercept | 5.04 | 0.25 | 5.31 | 0.56 | 5.63 | 0.21 | 6.47 | 0.41 | 0.62 | 0.08 | −0.05 | 0.29 |
| Fixed effect | ||||||||||||
| Age | −0.07 | 0.12 | −0.11 | 0.12 | −0.14 | 0.11 | −0.12 | 0.11 | −0.01 | 0.03 | −0.02 | 0.03 |
| Sex | 0.57 | 0.27 | 0.58 | 0.3 | 1.09 | 0.23 | 0.94 | 0.26 | −0.18 | 0.06 | −0.16 | 0.07 |
| TeaFS | * | * | 0.005 | 0.002 | 0.005 | 0.002 | ||||||
| Occupation | −0.09 | 0.34 | 0.6 | 0.3 | −0.11 | 0.09 | ||||||
| Birth place | −0.04 | 0.35 | 0.55 | 0.29 | 0.01 | 0.09 | ||||||
| Close kin in game | 0.5 | 0.18 | 0.09 | 0.15 | 0.03 | 0.04 | ||||||
| Partner in game | 0.25 | 0.37 | 0.18 | 0.31 | 0.02 | 0.08 | ||||||
| Low FD | −0.9 | 0.44 | −0.97 | 0.32 | 0.16 | 0.1 | ||||||
| medium FD | −0.87 | 0.54 | −0.43 | 0.39 | −0.23 | 0.12 | ||||||
| Sex ratio | 0.04 | 0.89 | −1.75 | 0.65 | 1.52 | 0.56 | ||||||
| Random effect | ||||||||||||
| Village | 1.061 | 1.03 | 0.802 | 0.895 | 0.622 | 0.789 | 0.281 | 0.530 | 0.064 | 0.253 | 0.031 | 0.176 |
| Individual | 5.426 | 2.329 | 5.317 | 2.306 | 8.138 | 2.853 | 8.054 | 2.838 | ||||
| VPC | 16.4% | 13.1% | 7.1% | 3.37% | ||||||||
Linear multilevel models were used in the DG and PGG and generalized linear multilevel models (Poisson) were used in the RDG, with response variables dictator giving in the DG, public goods contribution in the PGG and tea taken in the RDG. The fixed effect predictors used in the models are sex (male=1, female=0), age (standardized age), birth place (in village=1, outside=0), close kin in the game (number of r=0.5 kin attending the same game), partner in the game (partner in=1, not=0), occupation (having job other than farmer/ herder=1, not =0), and fair share of tea (for RDG game) as individual level variables, sex ratio (proportion of men playing in the game) and dispersal norm (High FD as reference) as village level variables. Estimates in bold are significant at P<0.05, with P value calculated by using Satterthwaite approximations to estimate degrees of freedom (merModLmerTest package).
*For Dictator game and public goods game, the variable Tea fair share was not included in the analysis, so the cells for the variable are empty, because only in the RDG does the fair share change as previous players deplete the common pool resource.