Table 4.
Veracity of alcohol industry arguments.
| Argument | Commentary and examples of evidence |
|---|---|
| Industry adheres to own self‐regulation codes/self‐regulation is working well or is better than formal regulation | Contrary evidence of the former. Strong contrary evidence of the latter 25, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53 |
| Industry only markets to those of legal age/is actively opposed to minors using product | Strong contrary evidence of the former. Contrary evidence of the latter 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57 |
| Existing regulation is satisfactory/existing regulation is satisfactory, but requires better enforcement | Strong contrary evidence. The available evidence indicates that the contemporary policy environment in Europe and the United States is ineffective in limiting both young people's exposure to alcohol marketing and the general effect of marketing on alcohol‐related harm 17, 47, 54, 56, 58 |
| Industry is responsible | Strong contrary evidence. Proxy measures of responsibility such as young people's exposure to alcohol marketing 54 and the weaknesses of industry self‐regulation 25, 47 contradict claims of industry responsibility |
| Individuals should consume product responsibly/individual‐level approach needed | Partially supported. There is some evidence of the effectiveness of individual‐level interventions. Controlled trials of brief alcohol interventions, for example, have reported primarily positive outcomes on weekly drinking and a range of alcohol‐related problems 59. However, this argument is used to imply that population‐based measures are either ineffective or less effective than individual‐level interventions. Studies of the relative effectiveness of different types of policy interventions 17, 60 indicate that there is strong contrary evidence of this contention |
| Industry has positive impact | No evidence/not researched. This assertion rests on narrow claims of social benefits associated with alcohol and the alcohol industry. There are no systematic analyses of the aggregate costs and benefits of current levels of alcohol consumptions (and, by implication, the alcohol industry as presently constituted) |
| Infringes legal rights of company (trademarks, intellectual property, constitutionally protected free speech (e.g. US First Amendment), international trade agreements) | No evidence/not researched |
| Regulation is more extensive than necessary/regulation is disproportionate | Strong contrary evidence 17, 25, 54, 56, 61 |
| Interferes with a free market economy | Equivocal. Restrictions on alcohol marketing are designed to manage externalities associated with the alcohol sector |
| The cost of compliance for manufacturers will be high/the time required for implementation has been underestimated | No evidence/not researched. There is no publicly available, independently verified evidence of the compliance costs that accompany marketing regulation |
| Regulation will result in financial or job losses (among manufacturers) | No evidence/not researched. There is no publicly available, independently verified evidence linking alcohol regulation to jobs losses in the industry. In principle, marketing restrictions may negatively affect employment in the alcohol and advertising sectors. Jobs losses that occur as a result of reduced earnings among alcohol producers (resulting from lower consumption) are likely to be offset by the creation of jobs in other parts of the economy which occurs when money which would otherwise be spent on alcohol is disbursed on other products |
| The regulation is discriminatory/ regulation will not affect all producers/customers equally | Equivocal. Marketing regulation need not be discriminatory if properly designed. However, its effects on producers and consumers is not likely to be equally felt |
| Regulation will cause economic/financial problems (for city, state, country or economic area (e.g. European Union)) | No evidence/not researched. There is no publicly available, independently verified evidence of these effects |
| Regulation will result in financial or job losses (among retailers and other associated industries, e.g. printing, advertising, leisure) | No evidence/not researched. There is no publicly available, independently verified evidence of the compliance costs that accompany marketing regulation |
| Regulation will have negative public health consequences | No evidence/not researched. There is no evidence to suggest that alcohol restrictions will have aggregate negative public health consequences |
| Regulation could have other negative unintended consequences | No evidence/not researched. Risks of negative unintended consequences resulting from policy innovation cannot be discounted. The important policy questions, however, concern the probability of these risks and whether negative outcomes associated with policy innovation outweigh its social benefits. There is no publicly available, independently verified evidence on these issues |
| Complicated/beyond industry's control | Contrary evidence. Alcohol‐related harm is multiple‐causal. However, when viewed against studies on the relationship between marketing and consumption (see above) studies outlining the volume 46 and focus of industry marketing 56, 62 suggest that marketing is a key driver of aggregate levels of consumption and, therefore, alcohol‐related harm |
| Collaboration with industry would be beneficial | Contrary evidence 47, 63, 64 |
| Characterizing policymakers and public health actors as authoritarian/denigrating policymakers and public health actor | Unable to comment |
| There is insufficient evidence that the proposed policy will work/marketing does not cause or change behaviour (it is only used for brand selection and capturing market share), so regulation will have no effect | Strong contrary evidence 16, 17, 65, 66 |