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. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2016 Feb 18.
Published in final edited form as: Salud Publica Mex. 2016 Feb;58(1):62–70. doi: 10.21149/spm.v58i1.7669

Table II.

Tobacc o industry and health advocacy activity during passage of Costa Rica Law 9028 (2010–2012)

Tobacco industry
Health advocates
Examples Responses Examples Results
Arguments
 Smoke-free laws violate constitutional rights for smokers
  • Hired prominent law firm to write legal opinion defending smokers’ rights (April 2010)*

  • Lobbied legislators to argue the constitution provides a right to health and not a right to smoke

  • Provided legislators with a constitutional legal opinion defending the right to health (June 2010)21

  • Constitutional Court ruling confirmed the right to health (March 2012)29


 Smoke-free laws result in revenue losses for hospitality industry (restaurants and hotels)
  • Industry front groups, the Chamber of Restaurants and Chamber of Hotels complained in media about potential revenue losses16

  • Provided President Chinchilla and legislators international studies debunking these arguments

  • Presented President Chinchilla and legislators with letters from international health groups detailing the international studies that debunk tobacco industry arguments used around the world

  • Eight months after Law 9028 passed, 80% of a group of employers reported no change or an increase in business (October 2012)


 Raising tobacco taxes will result in an increase in contraband
  • Warned legislators about this throughout legislative period12

  • Recruited international experts to provide legislators information that a rise in taxes did not increase contraband

  • Recruited Reina Roa from Panama’s to testify that a rise in taxes did not increase contraband in Panama (May 2011)22

  • Two years after Law 9028 passed, Finance Ministry verified tax increase had little to no impact on smuggled cigarettes (March 2014)

Tactic/Strategy
 Request private meetings with government officials and health groups to negotiate bills
  • Requested private meetings with:

  • Health Minister Ávila (March 2010)11

  • Legislators (April-Nov 2011)13

  • RENATA (August 2011)

  • Educated government officials about the importance of FCTC Article 5.3

  • Coordinated a press conference with Legislator Orlando Hernandez, author of the original strong bill, to denounce Health Minister Ávila’s private meeting with the industry (March 2010)§

  • Health Minister Ávila accepted private meeting with industry (March 2010)11

  • Legislators publically stated FCTC did not allow private meetings with tobacco industry (July- Nov 2011)13

  • RENATA rejected tobacco industry request for a meeting (August 2011)#


 Lobby government officials to present alternative and weakened versions of the bill
  • Weakened versions of the bill presented to committee

  • Ávila altered bill (12 March 2010)11

  • Aiza substitute language (30 Nov 2010)18

  • Aiza amended bill (22 March 2011)20

  • Aiza amended bill (24 August 2011)25

  • Denounced weakened versions of the bill

  • Lobbied and pushed for strong versions of the bill

  • Presented key information to legislators

  • Coordinated advocacy campaigns

  • Generated media coverage at opportune moments

  • Presented President Chinchilla and legislators with letters from international health groups detailing the scientific evidence surrounding smoking to illustrate that the proposals were weak and that these were typical tobacco industry arguments used globally

  • Placed 1.5 meter cylinders with victims in front of Legislative Assembly to denounce weak bill (January 2015)23

  • Held a press conference for FCTC importance to push strong bill (February 2011&

  • Filled the public seating area in the Legislative Assembly to pressure Legislators to withdraw weakened version of bill (March 2011)&

  • Held a press conference with Legislators to denounce Aiza’s alternative amended bill (August 2011)&

  • Placed large clock in front of Legislative Assembly to illustrate tobacco death and push strong bill (September 2011)26

  • Legislators dropped all weakened versions of the bill (March 2010–August 2011)

  • Legislators passed a strong bill in the Social Issues Committee (August 2011)24

  • Legislators passed strong bill in full Legislative Assembly (February 2012)28


 Press legislators to block strong versions of the bill from coming to a vote
  • Pressed Legislator Alicia Fournier, President of the Social Issues Committee, to deny strong versions of the bill from coming to a vote (Sept 2010–April 2011)17

  • Capitalized on government shifts that provided a key opening for a strong version of the bill to be introduced and summoned for a vote

  • Laura Chinchilla elected Costa Rican president (May 2010)

  • Rita Chaves becomes president of Social Issues Committee (April 2011)

  • Daisy Corrales becomes Health Minister (July 2011)

  • Rita Chaves helped introduce strong bill in Social Issues Committee (February 2011)19

  • Daisy Corrales lobbied President on the importance and popularity of strong bill (July- November 2011)

  • President Chinchilla summoned bill for vote to the full Legislative Assembly (November 2011)27

*

Chavarria, Edwin. Interview by Eric Crosbie, November 11, 2014

Arrieta, Teresita. Interview by Eric Crosbie, November 7, 2014

§

Saravia, Susana. Interview by Eric Crosbie, November 10, 2014

#

Castro, Roberto. Interview by Eric Crosbie, November 10, 2014

&

Zamora, Gabriella. Interview by Eric Crosbie, November 10, 2014

Corrales, Daisy. Interview by Eric Crosbie, November 11, 2014