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. 2016 Jan;13(114):20150907. doi: 10.1098/rsif.2015.0907

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© 2016 The Authors.

Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited.

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Figure 2. — Coalition stability. (a) Externally unstable coalition—benefits of the coalition are greater than the free-riding pay-off, giving non-signatories the incentive to join. (b) Internally unstable coalition—benefits of free-riding are greater than benefits from coalition giving signatories an incentive to defect. (c–e) Effects of travel restrictions on coalition stability for different numbers of interconnected countries n (x-axis) and for increasing numbers of signatories k (y-axis). Blue shading shows internally stable coalitions, externally stable coalitions are shaded orange, and their overlap shows self-enforcing coalitions. Coalitions in yellow are neither externally nor internally stable, and area in white shows unfeasible coalitions. R₀ = 5, coupling strength = 20μ/(n − 1), a_i = 0.1, c_Ii = 5. (c) No travel restrictions, (d) expensive travel restrictions, q = 1000, (e) inexpensive travel restrictions, q = 5000.