Table 5.
Hypothesis 2: Cox Regression of Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status and Access to Employment-based Option
| Model 2. Cox Regression of Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status and Access to Employment-based Option (hazards in odds ratios) | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Two-way interaction between insurance status and access to employment-based option | |||
| Insurance Status | Access to Employment-based Option | ||
| Insured under own name | Yes | (reference) | |
| Insured under own name | No | 0.59* | |
| Insured under someone else's plan | Yes | 0.43*** | a |
| Insured under someone else's plan | No | 0.18*** | b |
| Gov't Insurance (Medicare, Medicaid) | Yes | 1.03 | |
| Gov't Insurance (Medicare, Medicaid) | No | 0.37*** | |
| Uninsured | Yes | 1.03 | |
| Uninsured | No | 0.39*** | |
| Logged family monthly income | 0.41*** | ||
| Test of Hypothesis 2: Not having an employment-based source of health insurance coverage outside the marriage further lowers the divorce risk of people enrolled in their spouses’ plans. | ||
|---|---|---|
| Key Coefficients for Hypothesis Test | ||
| a | Insured under someone else's plan & has employment-based option | 0.43*** |
| b | Insured under someone else's plan & has no employment-based option | 0.18*** |
| Ratio of b to a | 0.41*** | |
Note: Model includes age, age-squared, race, education, children, higher-order marriage, and marriage duration as controls. Coefficients are not shown. N=17,388 (men n=8,091; women n=9,297). Values are weighted to represent the US population.
Note: P-values of one-sided t-tests are corrected adjusted for False Discovery Rate (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995).
p < .05.
p < .01.
p < .005.