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. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2016 May 6.
Published in final edited form as: J Econom. 2010 May;156(1):106–129. doi: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2009.09.010

Table 5.

Estimates of Model (behavioral equations and covariance terms)

Baseline Traditional model with Binary Health

Estimate (Std. Error) Estimate (Std. Error)

Pecuniary Utility
τ .336 (.060) .325 (.060)
UnpC(t) Non-Pecuniary Utility Career (C)
Constant .546 (.338) .772 (.193)
ληC (Health, η) −.776 (.397) −1.590 (.242)
λHI (Has Health Insurance) .063 (.043) .131 (.102)
UnpB(t) Non-Pecuniary Utility Bridge (B)
Constant −.908(.486) .242 (.197)
ληB (Health, η) −1.357(.351) −2.978 (.394)
λHI (Has Health Insurance) .063 (.043) .131 (.102)
UnpA(t) Non-Pecuniary Utility DI (A)
Constant −2.102(.399 ) −3.496 (1.690)
ληA (Health, η) .851 (.212) 2.900 (1.657)
λHI (Has Health Insurance) .063 (.043) .131 (.102)
UnpN(t) Non-Pecuniary Utility Non-Work (N)
Constant Normalized to zero Normalized to zero
ληN (Health, η) Normalized to zero Normalized to zero
λHI (Has Health Insurance) .063 (.043) .129 (.104)
Health Equation See Table 4 N.A.
Initial Conditions Equation See Table 4 Not Shown
Covariance Terms
σκ 1.423 (.322) .824 (.052)
COV(εI, νt) −.309 (.106) −.319 (.125)
COV(μt, εtC) −.191 (.173) N.A.
COV(μt, εtB) .216 (.128) N.A.
COV(εI, κ) −.784 (.412) .008 (.255)

Log Likelihood Function Value −940.033

Although not shown, each non-pecuniary equation also includes two dummy variables characterizing a person’s education level (less than high school and more than high school). The effect of health insurance is constrained to be the same across choices.