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. 2015 Sep 18;42(4):874–880. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbv123

Table 2.

Hypotheses Concerning Possible Neurobiological Mechanisms of SDs

Phenomenological Domains of SDs (Early Heidelberg School) Neurocognitive/Neurobiological Model Brain Area/Function
Movements and mental processes are experienced as having independence from self11–13,16,17 Dysfunctional self-monitoring mechanisms: -Somatosensory-related cortices (postcentral gyrus, insula)35,45
-Abnormal self-referential processing -Hippocampus, parahippocampal cortex, and cingulate cortex23
-Sensorimotor integration dysfunction/ abnormal feed forward mechanism
(see table 1: 1.5, 1.7)
-Bilateral temporoparietal junction and neighboring areas
Although intensely experienced, there is increased passivity and nonparticipation in one’s own experience11–13,14–17
-CMS, insula26–28
-Dorsal ACC and lateral PFC29
(see table 1: 1.4, 1.5, 1.7)
Thoughts, feelings, actions, volition come under foreign power which paralyzes the I11–13,14,15
(see table 1: 1.6)
In the thought disturbances of the SDs (eg, thought insertion, thought withdrawal, thought broadcasting), thinking is experienced as sensory. The collapse between thinking and perceiving is a direct “perception.”
(see table 1: 1.7)
Possible shared mechanisms of SDs across modalities16,17
(see table 1: 1.5, 1.6)
Self-other boundary confusion11–13
(see table 1: 1.1 1.4)
Sense of being embodied subject
(see table 1: 1.7, 1.9)
“No temporal order prevails, each sensory impression is equally valued, replacing its predecessor”11–13,16 ,17 Disrupted salience: -Dysregulation of the dopamine system, due to the chaotic firing of midbrain neurons and increased striatal dopamine release, leads to dysregulation of the hippocampal- VTA loop38,40,42
-Increased striatal dopaminergic transmission causes the aberrant attribution of salience to non- novel or unrewarding stimuli and the development of inappropriate associations that underlie SDs and psychotic symptoms such as delusions
(see table 1: 1.1, 1.3, 1.8)
-Corticostriatal network comprising the midbrain, basal ganglia, lateral medial temporal, and prefrontal cortex41,42
Loss of “common sense” disrupts the on-line contribution from past experience (context) in shaping the inner continuity of consciousness, with attendant disturbances in time perception14–17 Weakening of the “grounding” effect of context: -Hippocampus, amygdala, and medial prefrontal cortex17
-Alteration of the inner continuity of consciousness in terms of prediction from past experience -Increased striatal dopamine release, leading to dysregulation of the hippocampal-VTA loop38,40,42
Aberrant novelty salience
-Reduced expectation (Bayesian priors) in prediction error signaling22
(see table 1: 1.2, 1.3, 1.8)

Note: ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; CMS, cortical midline structures; PFC, prefrontal cortex; SD, self-disorder; VTA, ventral tegmental area.