Table 1.

Elements of social responsibility represented by passages from research articles

	Increasing transmissibility of H5N1 influenza virus	Gene drives to alter wild populations
Basis/values	The benefits of H5N1 virus transmission research may or may not result in immediate applications—accumulating knowledge in basic research is an incremental process. However, we believe that our best way to limit the impact of pandemics is to be better prepared than we are now by knowing more about the pathogen and how it may evolve. (Fouchier, Garcia-Sastre and Kawaoka)	Gene drives may be capable of addressing ecological problems by altering entire populations of wild organisms, but their use has remained largely theoretical due to technical constraints. Here we consider the potential for RNA-guided gene drives based on the CRISPR nuclease Cas9 to serve as a general method for spreading altered traits through wild populations over many generations. (Esvelt et al.)
Approach	Upon signing the research contract, a new GMO permit – explicitly for conducting work with airborne-transmissible H5N1 virus and early pandemic viruses – was obtained from the Dutch Ministry for Infrastructure and the Environment (I&M) in 2007. I&M and COGEM [Dutch Committee Genetic Modification] concluded that the proposed work could be performed with negligible risk to humans and the environment under the conditions realized… (Herfst et al. “Supplemental Materials for Airborne Transmission of Influenza a/H5n1 Virus between Ferrets”)	Technologies with the potential to significantly influence the lives of the general public demand societal review and consent. As self-propagating alterations of wild populations, RNAguided gene drives will be capable of influencing entire ecosystems for good or for ill. As such, it is imperative that all research in this nascent field operate under conditions of full transparency, including independent scientific assessments of probable impacts and thoughtful, informed, and fully inclusive public discussions. (Esvelt et al.) “We could easily have laboratory tests within the next few months and then field tests not long after that. That’s if everybody thinks it’s a good idea…If we’re going to talk about it at all in advance, rather than in the past tense, now is the time.” (De Chant and Nelsen)
Timing	From the conception phase of the research onward, biosafety and biosecurity experts were consulted to provide assurance that facilities and working conditions were such that the safety and security could be ensured at all times. (Herfst et al. “Airborne Transmission of Influenza a/H5n1 Virus between Ferrets”)	For emerging technologies that affect the global commons, concepts and applications should be published in advance of construction, testing, and release. This lead time enables public discussion of environmental and security concerns, research into areas of uncertainty, and development and testing of safety features. (Oye et al.) (See also Approach)
Participants	Our work on aerosol transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus was done completely openly, and the decision to perform the work was reached upon serious local, national, and international consultation. The work has been discussed among staff members of the Department of Virology at Erasmus Medical Medical Center (MC) since 1997, followed by consultation with local biosafety officers and facility managers. Over several years, numerous international influenza specialists and other virologists operating in class-3 and-4 facilities were consulted, and a plan was drawn to obtain adequate research facilities in Rotterdam. (Fouchier, Herfst and Osterhaus)	I thought it might be useful to get into the room people with slightly different material interests [so we invited] regulators, nonprofits, companies, and environmental groups… The idea was to get people to meet several times, to gain trust” before “decisions harden.” (De Chant and Nelsen) (See also comments about public involvement under “Transparency”)
Transparency	See Participants, above.	Because we are all affected by the state of our ecosystems, public oversight of technologies capable of ecological management will be essential. We recommend that all future research involving gene drives and other technologies capable of altering populations and ecosystems be conducted in full public view, with all empirical data and predictive models freely and openly shared with the global community in a transparent and understandable format. Only through broadly inclusive and well-informed public discussions can we as a society decide how best to manage our shared environment. (Esvelt, Church and Lunshof)