Table 1.
Theories relating marriage to wages
| (1) | (2) | (3) | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
| |||
| Causal marriage premium: Anticipation | Reverse causality: Wages affect marriage | Spurious association: Transition to adulthood | |
| Theory |
![]() Men’s work behavior changes due to marriage, including in anticipation of taking on the husband role. |
![]() Men delay marriage until financial goals are achieved. |
![]() During the transition to adulthood, men mature rapidly, often marry, and experience wage increases. |
|
| |||
| Relevant literature | Cheng (2016), Waite and Gallagher (2000) | Edin and Kefalas (2005), Oppenheimer (2003), Oppenheimer, Kalmijn and Lim (1997), Smock, Manning and Porter (2005), Sweeney (2002), Xie et al. (2003) | Hogan and Astone (1986), Rindfuss (1991), Shanahan (2000) |
|
| |||
| Empirical predictions | |||
| Marriage exit | Wages decline after divorce. | Wages decline before divorce. | Wages flat through divorce. |
| Heterogeneity by timing | Wages increase prior to marriage regardless of marriage timing. | Wages increase prior to marriage regardless of marriage timing. | Wages increase more among those who marry young. |
| Shotgun marriage | Smaller premarital wage increases for shotgun marriages than others. | Smaller premarital wage increases for shotgun marriages than others. | Similar premarital wage increases, regardless of shotgun marriage status. |


