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. 2005 Jan 26;102(8):3153–3158. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0409523102

Fig. 4.

Fig. 4.

The strategic responses and corresponding dynamics change with the number of hospitals that interact. (a) The response curves (solid) for increasing n. The strategic optimum, the points at which a focal hospital's optimal investment matches the investment of other hospitals, decreases with n (the dashed line shows equal investments). Note also that the coordinated optimum for many hospitals is the same as the optimum investment for a single hospital, n = 1. (b) These decisions affect the rate at which resistance increases. For n = 10, an epidemic occurs if hospitals allocate at the strategic optimum, whereas the coordinated optimum prevents emergence for more than a decade. Hence, the epidemic will be delayed and less severe in isolated areas. The transmission function here is the same one used for Fig. 2, with 1/λ = 2,000 days and 1/r ≈ 1,500 days.