Figure 2.

Numerically determined Nash equilibria (NE) for i=A,B asymmetric sects whose defining parameters and initial conditions are the same. All (p_i,k_i) strategies satisfy the constraint defined by equation (4.8) and may be chosen independently by the two sects. Dashed black curves represent the symmetry-enforced optimum strategy discussed in §4.2; solid black curves correspond to the symmetric Nash equilibria; long-dashed blue and dash-dot red curves correspond to the asymmetric Nash equillibria for the two sects. Note that the latter asymmetric Nash equillibria emerge only for large enough values of λ. (a,c) The Nash equilibria attack rate k^NE_i for i=A,B; the corresponding indoctrination rates may be derived from the constraint p_i=ω(1−k_i). (b,d) The relative equilibrium radical population $r_i^{\mathrm{eq}}$ for i=A,B. In (a,b) ω=16 and in (c,d) ω=160.