Fig. 4.

Equilibrium structure for the scenarios of coordination and complementation. The payoff of a cultural trait increases with its perceived frequency for the coordination scenario (a, b) and decreases for the complementation scenario (c, d). a, c individuals are equally likely to interact with both types (X _ii = X _rr = X _ir = 1.0); b, d individuals are more likely to interact with individuals of the same type (X _ir = 0.1; X _ii = X _rr = 1.0). Lines indicate how the left-hand side (red) and the right-hand side (black) of the equilibrium condition M = Ψ(p _i). Equilibria are present when red and black lines cross; arrows depict the stability of the equilibria (shown only for Δc = 0.5). In both scenarios, coexistence equilibria are more likely to exist if individuals from different types are relatively likely to interact with each other (a, c), and when the resident type is relatively culturally conservative (solid lines)