Table 2.
Cooperation dynamics
| Contributions to the public good | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No punishment | Punishment | |||||
| Laboratory | MTurk | Pooled | Laboratory | MTurk | Pooled | |
| Period | −0.900*** | −1.074*** | −1.037*** | 1.139 | 0.514* | 0.682** |
| (0.309) | (0.187) | (0.160) | (0.710) | (0.289) | (0.282) | |
| Final period | −3.400 | −2.292** | −2.512*** | −10.203** | −4.184** | −5.795*** |
| (2.253) | (0.958) | (0.881) | (4.881) | (1.688) | (1.797) | |
| MTurk | 5.421*** | 4.193 | ||||
| (1.867) | (4.904) | |||||
| Constant | 10.470*** | 17.046*** | 11.402*** | 25.980*** | 35.272*** | 29.601*** |
| (1.592) | (0.624) | (1.650) | (3.898) | (3.792) | (4.232) | |
| N | 720 | 2480 | 3200 | 720 | 2480 | 3200 |
| F | 8.75 | 33.66 | 34.45 | 2.19 | 3.12 | 3.75 |
Tobit estimation with left-censoring for ‘No punishment’ and right-censoring for ‘Punishment’. ‘Period’ is period number; ‘Final period’ is a dummy for last period; ‘MTurk’ is a dummy for the MTurk sample. Robust standard errors clustered on groups
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01