Table 3.
Cooperation dynamics (no punishment)
| Contribution to the public good (no punishment) | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Laboratory | MTurk | Pooled | |
| Period | −0.401** | −0.503*** | −0.485*** |
| (0.204) | (0.094) | (0.085) | |
| Final period | −2.826 | −1.316 | −1.600** |
| (1.941) | (0.827) | (0.757) | |
| Mean peer contribution in t−1 | 0.953*** | 1.043*** | 1.027*** |
| (0.125) | (0.060) | (0.054) | |
| MTurk | 0.759 | ||
| (0.778) | |||
| Constant | −0.830 | −0.006 | −0.696 |
| (1.674) | (1.237) | (0.931) | |
| N | 648 | 2232 | 2880 |
| F | 29.05 | 163.74 | 177.16 |
Left-censored Tobit estimation. ‘Period’ is period number; ‘Mean peer contribution in t−1′ is the average contribution of the other members in the group in t−1; ‘MTurk’ is a dummy for the MTurk sample. Robust standard errors clustered on groups
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01