Table 8.
Determinants of peer punishment
| Decision to punish (0 = no; 1 = yes) | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Logit estimation | ||||||||
| Prosocial punishment | Antisocial punishment | |||||||
| Lab | MTurk | Pooled | Pooled and controls | Lab | MTurk | Pooled | Pooled and controls | |
| Punisher’s contribution | 0.046 | −0.003 | 0.011 | −0.002 | −0.143*** | −0.153*** | −0.142*** | −0.130*** |
| (0.051) | (0.023) | (0.022) | (0.026) | (0.024) | (0.026) | (0.018) | (0.020) | |
| Target’s contribution | −0.059 | −0.118*** | −0.100*** | −0.097*** | −0.013 | 0.010 | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| (0.038) | (0.029) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.025) | (0.021) | (0.015) | (0.020) | |
| Others’ avg. contribution | 0.038 | 0.054*** | 0.047*** | 0.065*** | −0.025 | −0.019 | −0.023 | −0.017 |
| (0.035) | (0.019) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.028) | (0.024) | (0.018) | (0.019) | |
| Received p in t−1 | −0.034 | −0.025 | −0.028 | −0.076** | 0.129*** | 0.069** | 0.094*** | 0.103*** |
| (0.027) | (0.045) | (0.023) | (0.032) | (0.031) | (0.034) | (0.023) | (0.025) | |
| Period | −0.117*** | −0.111** | −0.113*** | −0.103*** | 0.024 | 0.036 | 0.031 | 0.032 |
| (0.039) | (0.044) | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.062) | (0.056) | (0.041) | (0.048) | |
| Final period | −0.115 | −0.077 | −0.077 | −0.236 | −1.800*** | 0.595* | −0.159 | −0.014 |
| (0.341) | (0.366) | (0.275) | (0.313) | (0.587) | (0.340) | (0.388) | (0.434) | |
| MTurk | −0.855*** | −0.983*** | −1.132*** | −1.983*** | ||||
| (0.307) | (0.302) | (0.347) | (0.403) | |||||
| Age | 0.005 | 0.025 | ||||||
| (0.017) | (0.019) | |||||||
| Female | −1.171*** | −0.078 | ||||||
| (0.260) | (0.381) | |||||||
| Single child | −0.320 | 0.099 | ||||||
| (0.376) | (0.457) | |||||||
| Foreign | 1.403* | −2.380*** | ||||||
| (0.739) | (0.628) | |||||||
| Membership | 0.019 | −0.838* | ||||||
| (0.288) | (0.462) | |||||||
| Constant | 0.206 | 0.202 | 0.854* | 1.216* | −0.560 | −2.137*** | −0.878** | −1.101 |
| (0.812) | (0.393) | (0.466) | (0.712) | (0.379) | (0.682) | (0.442) | (0.682) | |
| N | 370 | 900 | 1270 | 1201 | 1790 | 6540 | 8330 | 7949 |
| Chi2 | 27.51 | 38.98 | 48.60 | 109.88 | 111.55 | 85.36 | 187.39 | 254.26 |
| Decision to punish (0 = no; 1 = yes) | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Multilevel mixed effects estimation | ||||||||
| Prosocial punishment | Antisocial punishment | |||||||
| Lab | MTurk | Pooled | Pooled and controls | Lab | MTurk | Pooled | Pooled and controls | |
| Punisher’s contribution | 0.000 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.000 | −0.008*** | −0.004*** | −0.005*** | −0.004*** |
| (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
| Target’s contribution | −0.012*** | −0.021*** | −0.018*** | −0.018*** | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
| Others’ avg. contribution | 0.013*** | 0.011*** | 0.012*** | 0.015*** | 0.000 | −0.001 | −0.001 | 0.000 |
| (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
| Received p in t−1 | −0.009 | −0.004 | −0.007 | −0.012*** | 0.010*** | 0.003*** | 0.004*** | 0.004*** |
| (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
| Period | −0.014 | −0.011** | −0.012*** | −0.013*** | 0.004* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| (0.009) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
| Final period | −0.037 | −0.045 | −0.043 | −0.040 | −0.081*** | 0.018*** | 0.010* | 0.011* |
| (0.086) | (0.047) | (0.041) | (0.042) | (0.019) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | |
| MTurk | −0.190*** | −0.215*** | −0.044*** | −0.088*** | ||||
| (0.059) | (0.072) | (0.016) | (0.018) | |||||
| Age | 0.001 | 0.001 | ||||||
| (0.003) | (0.001) | |||||||
| Female | −0.204*** | 0.001 | ||||||
| (0.052) | (0.011) | |||||||
| Single child | −0.085 | 0.002 | ||||||
| (0.076) | (0.016) | |||||||
| Foreign | 0.154 | −0.071** | ||||||
| (0.105) | (0.028) | |||||||
| Membership | −0.070 | −0.035** | ||||||
| (0.063) | (0.014) | |||||||
| Constant | 0.611*** | 0.437*** | 0.622*** | 0.700*** | 0.187*** | 0.104*** | 0.156*** | 0.176*** |
| (0.123) | (0.092) | (0.084) | (0.122) | (0.042) | (0.016) | (0.020) | (0.027) | |
| N | 370 | 900 | 1270 | 1201 | 1790 | 6540 | 8330 | 7949 |
| Chi2 | 24.64 | 98.78 | 129.04 | 168.92 | 138.89 | 116.77 | 197.44 | 226.82 |
Logit and Multilevel mixed effects estimation, which allows for individual and group differences, as well as for treatment-specific residuals. We split the analysis into two different types of punishment. Pro-social punishment includes instances where the punisher’s contribution to the public good in that round exceeded that of their target. Anti-social punishment includes instances where the target contributed at least as much as the punisher. ‘Punisher’s contribution’ is the contribution of the participant punishing; ‘Target’s contribution’ is the contribution of the punished participant; ‘Average contribution others’ is the mean contribution of the other two members of the group; ‘Received punishment in t−1′ is the punishment amount received from others in the previous period; ‘Period’ is the period number; ‘Final period’ is a dummy for the last period; ‘MTurk’ is a dummy for the MTurk sample; demographic controls are the same of Table 6. Robust standard errors clustered on groups for the Logit model
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01