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. 2018 Jun 4;96(2):323–368. doi: 10.1111/1468-0009.12327

Table 4.

Summary of Findings on the Effects of Decentralization on Health System Performance

Author(s), (Year), Country Study Design, Unit of Analysis, Data Year Implementation of Decentralization Decentralization Variables Health Indicators Effects, Magnitude
  • Faguet and Sánchez (2014)16

  • Colombia

  • Longitudinal ecological analysis

  • Municipality

  • 1993‐2004

  • Phase 1: Limited fiscal measures (1970s)

  • Phase 2: Political and administrative matters (1980s)

  • Phase 3: Public services provision and social investment; increased fiscal transfer (1990s)

  • Phase 4: Extensive devolution of powers and responsibilities to municipal and departmental governments (2001)

Fiscal resource control: Local own revenue (local taxes and charges) as a share of total expenditure Change in the poor population covered by public health insurance Beneficial effect: An increase of health expenditure by 1 standard deviation is associated with the expansion of health insurance coverage by 2.33%‐14.07%
Provincial/central control: A dummy variable indicating if a municipality is certified to receive transfers directly from central government Beneficial effect: A municipality that has certification is more likely to expand its health insurance coverage by 8.4%‐12.6%
  • Hodge, Firth, Jimenez‐Soto, and Trisnantoro (2015)30

  • Indonesia

  • Repeated cross‐sectional, individual‐level analysis

  • Individual

  • 1991, 1994, 1997, 2002/2003, 2007/2008

Fiscal, administrative, and political administration were implemented starting in 2001 in all provinces and districts The timing of decentralization: A dummy variable indicating if a birth delivery took place after the implementation of decentralization (2001) Facility‐based delivery (a dummy variable indicating if a birth delivery took place in a medical facility)
  • Beneficial effect: The probability of delivering birth at a health facility in post‐decentralization era was 3.12 to 3.67 percentage points higher than before decentralization (increasing trend)

  • Harmful effect: The probability of delivering at a health facility in post‐decentralization era and in non‐Java/Bali region was 5.7 to 7.3 percentage points lower compared to that in Java/Bali region before decentralization (widening regional disparity)

  • Kengia, Igarashi, and Kawabuchi (2013)32

  • Tanzania

  • Repeated cross‐sectional, individual‐level analysis

  • Individual

  • 1992, 1996, 1999, 2004/2005

  • 1980s: Economic liberalization measures were adopted

  • 1993: User fees were introduced in government health facilities

  • 1996: Community Health Fund was implemented

  • 2000: Decentralization by devolution (D‐by‐D)

The timing of decentralization: A set of dummy variables indicating if observation belongs to one of the decentralization periods A dummy variable of whether a respondent utilized a skilled birth attendant
  • Harmful effect: After the implementation of D‐by‐D policy, the log‐odd of utilizing skilled birth attendants was 1.18 percentage points lower than before among wealthy population group

  • Beneficial effect: After the implementation of D‐by‐D policy, the log‐odds of utilizing skilled birth attendants among the poor and poorest population groups were 1.15‐1.26 percentage points higher than the wealthiest group

  • Khaleghian (2004)33

  • Multiple countries (low‐ and middle‐income countries)

  • Longitudinal ecological analysis

  • Country

  • 1980‐1997

Varied from one country to another The adoption of decentralization framework: A dummy variable indicating if a country adopted decentralization policy
  • Proportion of children immunized with DPT3 and measles at 1 year of age (coverage rates)

  • Beneficial effect: In countries implementing decentralization, the immunization coverage rates were 16.00‐19.06 and 13.4 ‐15.53 percentage points higher for DPT3 and measles, respectively (all samples)

  • Harmful effect: Among middle‐income countries, the immunization coverage rates in countries adopting decentralization were 4.92‐17.41 and 5.51‐9.87 percentage points lower for DPT3 and measles, respectively

  • Maharani and Tampubolon (2015)34

  • Indonesia

  • Cross‐sectional, individual analysis

  • Household

  • 2011

Fiscal, administrative, and political administration were implemented starting in 2001 in all provinces and districts Fiscal commitment to health sector: The ratio of local public expenditure on health to total local public expenditure
  • Complete immunization status among children aged 12‐23 months

No significant effect
  • Bustamante (2010)39

  • Mexico

  • Cross‐sectional, individual‐level analysis

  • Household

  • 2003

  • 1982: Started decentralization of health care providers but halted in 1988‐1994

  • 1995: Resumed the decentralization process

  • 1998: Decentralized and centralized managed health providers coexist

The adoption of decentralization: A dummy variable indicating if the household is served by decentralized health providers (health care services providers managed by the state government) Utilization of preventive services
  • Harmful effect: The marginal probability of an average household served by a decentralized health care provider was 3.6‐6.5 percentage points lower than an average household served by centralized health care providers

Out‐of‐pocket health expenditures
  • Harmful effect: The average out‐of‐pocket health expenditure among households served by decentralized health care providers was 31.9‐39.9 percentage points higher than households served by centralized health care providers

  • Kruse, Pradhan, and Sparrow (2012)40

  • Indonesia

  • Longitudinal ecological analysis

  • District

  • 2001‐2006

Fiscal, administrative, and political administration were implemented starting in 2001 in all provinces and districts Fiscal commitment to health sector: District per capita public health spending Outpatient health care utilization rates
  • Beneficial effects:

  • ‐Each additional 1% increase in district public health spending led to an increase of 0.016 outpatient visits to a health care provider per person per month

  • ‐Each additional 1% increased in public health spending increased the utilization rate by 0.014 and 0.020 outpatient visits to a health care provider per person per month for the poorest and second wealth quartiles, respectively

Household out‐of‐pocket health spending No significant effect