Table 2.

Summary of the final generalized linear mixed-effects model (log odds) of children’s offer reciprocation in the Dictator Game as predicted by population (ASD, TD) and puppet’s offer (fair, unfair); note that the ASD group and puppet’s fair offer are taken as reference levels

Fixed effects	Estimated coefficient	Std. error	Z	Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	− 0.16	0.6	− 0.27	0.79
Population (TD)	1.4	0.79	1.78	0.07
Puppet’s offer (unfair)	2.03	0.9	2.26	0.02

	AIC	BIC	logLik	Deviance
	51.7	59.3	− 21.9	43.7

AIC Akaike information criterion; BIC Bayesian information criterion; logLik log-likelihood; Pr(>|z|), probability/statistical significance