Skip to main content
. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2018 Aug 1.
Published in final edited form as: J Dev Econ. 2015 Aug 19;117:151–170. doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.07.008

Table 10.

Stability of Social Preferences in Games

Explanatory
variable		 Dependent
variable		 Correlation
coefficient		 Regression
coefficient		 #
Obs.
ALTRUISM
sent as trustor in 2002 sent as dictator in anonymous game in 2007 0.297*** ++ 0.298* (0.173) [0.221] 103
share returned as trustee in 2002 sent as dictator in anonymous game in 2007 0.132 1.171 (1.939) [0.628] 103
sent as dictator in anonymous game in 2007 sent as dictator in anonymous game in 2009 −0.107 −0.180 (0.190) 41
sent as dictator in chosen non-revealed game in 2007 sent as dictator in chosen non-revealed game in 2009 0.138 0.126 (0.091) 33
TRUST
sent as trustor in 2002 sent as dictator in revealed game in 2007 0.354*** +++ 0.513*** (0.174)++ [0.037]** 103
share returned as trustee in 2002 sent as dictator in revealed game in 2007 0.283*** ++ 4.335* (2.189) [0.118] 103
sent as dictator in revealed game in 2007 sent as dictator in revealed game in 2009 0.049 −0.050 (0.145) 41
sent as dictator in chosen revealed game in 2007 sent as dictator in chosen revealed game in 2009 −0.118 −0.236 (0.229) 33
RECIPROCITY
share returned as trustee in 2002 positive reciprocity in 2010 0.009 0.473 (0.376) [0.309] 43
share returned as trustee in 2002 negative reciprocity in 2010 0.123 −0.430 (0.334) [0.216] 43

Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Wild cluster bootrap p-values are in brackets.

Per-comparison significance: ***p <0.01,

**

p <0.05,

*

p <0.10.

FDR q-values: +++ q <0.01,

++

q <0.05,

+

q <0.10 calculated for 10 hypotheses within table and column.

In regression column these are based on the heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Controls in regressions include log income, sex, age, education, and village fixed effects.