Table B-2.
Impact of Income Shocks on Social Preferences
| Explanatory variable |
Dependent variable |
Correlation coefficient |
Regression coefficient |
# Obs. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Δ log income 2002 to 2007 | Outcome in 2007 | |||
| sent as dictator in anonymous game | −0.086 | −0.403 (0.325) [0.352] | 103 | |
| sent as dictator in chosen non-revealed game | 0.033 | −0.087 (0.314) [0.789] | 103 | |
| sent as dictator in revealed game | −0.100 | −0.573 (0.387) [0.275] | 103 | |
| sent as dictator in chosen revealed game | −0.075 | −0.566 (0.369) [0.261] | 103 | |
| trust people in the world | −0.097 | −0.140 (0.114) [0.180] | 122 | |
| trust people in the village | −0.016 | −0.056 (0.139) [0.736] | 122 | |
| trust closest neighbor | −0.047 | −0.069 (0.144) [0.546] | 122 | |
| bad to buy something you know is stolen | 0.001 | 0.019 (0.035) [0.507] | 122 | |
| would villagemates take advantage if had opportunity | 0.045 | 0.104 (0.108) [0.301] | 122 | |
|
| ||||
| Δ log income 2007 to 2009 | Outcome in 2009 | |||
| sent as dictator in anonymous game | −0.204 | −0.409 (0.456) | 41 | |
| sent as dictator in chosen non-revealed game | −0.151 | −0.277 (0.430) | 33 | |
| sent as dictator in revealed game | −0.100 | −0.123 (0.458) | 41 | |
| sent as dictator in chosen revealed game | −0.054 | 0.364 (0.903) | 33 | |
| trust people in the world | −0.102 | −0.125 (0.302) | 49 | |
| trust people in the village | −0.005 | 0.030 (0.280) | 49 | |
| trust closest neighbor | −0.076 | −0.270 (0.300) | 49 | |
| bad to buy something you know is stolen | −0.113 | −0.030 (0.088) | 49 | |
| would villagemates take advantage if had opportunity | −0.004 | 0.027 (0.229) | 49 | |
| negative reciprocity | 0.239* | 0.103 (0.089) | 49 | |
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Wild cluster bootrap p-values are in brackets.
Per-comparison significance: ***p <0.01,
p <0.05,
p <0.10.
FDR q-values: +++ q <0.01,
q <0.05,
q <0.10 calculated for 9 or 10 hypotheses within table and column.
In regression column these are based on the heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Controls in regressions include sex, age, education, and village fixed effects. Each regression additionally controls for social preferences in the previous round. In the top panel, the first four rows control for the amount sent as trustor and the average share returned as trustee in 2002. In the remaining rows of the first panel, the 2002 version of the 2007 outcome variable is included as a control variable. In all rows of the second panel, the 2007 version of the 2009 outcome is included as a control variable.