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. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2018 Aug 1.
Published in final edited form as: J Dev Econ. 2015 Aug 19;117:151–170. doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.07.008

Table 7.

Tests for Sample Attrition from 2007

2007 survey and 2009 survey 2007 survey and 2010 survey 2007 game and 2009 game 2007 game and 2010 game
in both
(1)
attrit
(2)
diff1
(3)
diff2
(4)
in both
(5)
attrit
(6)
diff1
(7)
diff2
(8)
in both
(9)
attrit
(10)
diff1
(11)
diff2
(12)
in both
(13)
attrit
(14)
diff1
(15)
diff2
(16)
hhd income 14,614 (11,564) 24,545 (39,286) −9,931*** (2,559) −4,161 (3,946) 17,510 (13,006) 25,607 (42,735) −8,097*** (2,638) [0.050]** 243 (1,481) [0.904] 14,743 (11,728) 21,600 (31,981) −6,858*** (2,529) 1,634 (2,016) 15,922 (8,752) 22,216 (34,051) −6,294*** (2,224) [0.036]** 320 (1,290) [0.853]
log(hhd inc) 9.33 (0.75) 9.70 (0.82) −0.37*** (0.11) −0.34 (0.21) 9.56 (0.67) 9.70 (0.86) −0.14* (0.08) [0.279] 0.03 (0.08) [0.758] 9.35 (0.72) 9.63 (0.78) −0.28** (0.12) −0.03 (0.16) 9.50 (0.65) 9.63 (0.81) −0.12 (0.09) [0.259] 0.06 (0.09) [0.628]
hhd size 4.88 (2.63) 4.91 (2.36) −0.03 (0.39) −0.24 (0.66) 4.98 (2.58) 4.88 (2.32) 0.10 (0.27) [0.750] 0.29 (0.27) [0.355] 4.78 (2.49) 5.00 (2.37) −0.22 (0.41) −1.05 (0.93) 4.75 (2.29) 5.03 (2.41) −0.28 (0.29) [0.197] −0.08 (0.29) [0.818]
male 0.63 (0.49) 0.68 (0.47) −0.04 (0.07) −0.04 (0.17) 0.64 (0.48) 0.68 (0.47) −0.04 (0.05) [0.337] 0.06 (0.06) [0.044]** 0.49 (0.51) 0.65 (0.50) −0.16** (0.08) −0.01 (0.20) 0.65 (0.48) 0.63 (0.48) 0.03 (0.06) [0.612] 0.13** ((0.07) [0.051]*
age 48.49 (17.56) 50.15 (15.30) −1.66 (2.60) 7.71 (6.91) 51.39 (15.62) 49.46 (15.51) 1.93 (1.67) [0.420] 1.72 (1.88) [0.567] 48.17 (18.80) 47.95 (16.14) 0.23 (3.04) 16.93** (6.97) 51.95 (15.09) 46.86 (16.64) 5.09*** (1.94) [0.035]** 6.32*** (2.13) [0.022]**
ed 5.12 (2.50) 5.05 (3.03) 0.08 (0.39) −1.94 (1.25) 5.05 (2.63) 5.05 (3.09) −0.00 (0.29) [0.988] −0.23 (0.34) [0.570] 4.90 (2.36) 5.21 (2.98) −0.31 (0.40) −1.91** (0.81) 4.89 (2.10) 5.26 (3.11) −0.37 (0.30) [0.231] −0.78** (0.36) [0.047]**
risky choices 1.71 (1.68) 2.13 (1.78) −0.42 (0.25) −0.87 (0.56) 2.04 (1.78) 2.10 (1.77) −0.06 (0.19) [0.756] −0.21 (0.22) [0.349] 1.90 (1.67) 2.13 (1.79) −0.23 (0.28) −0.45 (0.67) 2.15 (1.80) 2.09 (1.77) 0.06 (0.23) [0.822] −0.13 (0.25) [0.646]
time preference 120 (67) 209 (593) −89*** (31) 8 (18) 156 (456) 215 (594) −58 (53) [0.446] −23 (56) [0.593] 117 (59) 196 (570) −79** (32) 19 (18) 182 (550) 188 (536) −7 (69) [0.942] 59 (74) [0.626]
sent as dictator 4.59 (2.33) 5.15 (2.73) −0.56 (0.39) −0.84 (0.75) 4.79 (2.46) 5.17 (2.75) −0.38 (0.32) [0.468] 0.17 (0.35) [0.717]
trust in village 3.51 (1.19) 3.18 (1.08) 0.33* (0.18) 0.61* (0.37) 3.35 (1.15) 3.17 (1.07) 0.19 (0.12) [0.072]* 0.12 (0.13) [0.190] 3.71 (1.19) 3.22 (1.07) 0.49** (0.19) 0.66** (0.31) 3.47 (1.10) 3.21 (1.09) 0.26* (0.14) [0.051]* 0.14 (0.15) [0.304]
# Obs. 49 400 119 330 41 330 81 290

Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses for means while heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses for the tests of differences. Wild cluster bootrap p-values are in brackets.

Per-comparison significance: *** p<0.01,

**

p<0.05,

*

p<0.1.

Columns 1, 5, 9, and 13 show information for the non-attriters while Columns 2, 6, 10, and 14 show information for the attriters. Diff1 is coefficient in regression controlling only for participation at the later date. Diff2 is coefficient in regression aditionally controlling for village fixed effects. Income is in thousands of Guarani. All variables are measured in 2002.