Table 4.

Regression results of CEO pay on female directors' weighting.

Variable	Relative annual increase of CEO pay						Proportion of equity and option based CEO pay
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6
	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t
Proportion of board female directors	−0.271	−0.51					0.108	0.58
Proportion of audit committee female directors			0.477	1.39					0.0622	0.50
Proportion of remuneration committee female directors					−0.761**	−2.43					−0.0350	−0.30
Proportion of board independent directors	0.264	1.13	0.231	1.04	0.278	1.24	−0.176	−1.64	−0.176	−1.58	−0.240**	−2.11
Logarithm of board size	0.119	1.08	0.187	1.28	0.184	1.11	0.0262	1.01	0.0229	0.76	0.0396	1.36
Logarithm of total assets	−0.0135	−0.48	−0.0163	−0.53	−0.0225	−0.69	0.000935	0.16	0.000735	0.13	0.00157	0.25
Return on assets	−0.350	−0.96	−0.332	−0.91	−0.0130	−0.04	−0.00798	−0.09	−0.0126	−0.15	−0.00624	−0.07
Debt to assets ratio	−0.0932	−0.62	−0.0610	−0.41	−0.190	−0.97	0.0124	0.48	0.0144	0.50	0.0101	0.28
Annual market return	0.0634	0.69	0.0225	0.25	0.106	1.00	−0.0542*	−1.91	−0.0525*	−1.85	−0.0530*	−1.73
Book to market ratio	0.0151	1.55	0.0160*	1.74	0.00505	0.74	−0.000805	−0.36	−0.000562	−0.25	0.000343	0.15
Constant	0.137	0.31	−0.113	−0.26	0.217	0.43	−0.0518	−0.40	−0.0374	−0.30	−0.0528	−0.42
No. of Obs.	243		236		213		297		290		264
Adjusted R2	0.0587		0.0712		0.0597		0.180		0.178		0.157
F	4.927		4.446		3.864		1.788		1.767		1.426
p	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000		0.0409		0.0441		0.145
No. of firms clusters	92		92		84		95		95		87

Regressions are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered by company. All models include 2-digit SIC and year dummies.

^*p < 0.1;

^**p < 0.05. In bold statistically significant coefficients of variables of interest.