Table 6.

Regression results of CEO pay on executive, proprietary and independent female directors' weighting.

	Relative annual increase of CEO pay						Proportion of equity and option based CEO pay
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6
	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t
Proportion of independent board female directors	0.483	0.72					0.393	1.58
Proportion of proprietary board female directors			−1.401*	−1.78					−0.117	−0.53
Proportion of executive board female directors					2.673	1.01					−0.459**	−2.38
Proportion of board independent directors	0.148	0.64	0.0814	0.42	0.281	1.34	−0.244*	−1.96	−0.181	−1.63	−0.173	−1.63
Logarithm of board size	0.116	1.05	0.134	1.23	0.120	1.06	0.0266	1.07	0.0285	1.10	0.0263	1.01
Firm logarithm of total assets	−0.0128	−0.45	−0.0146	−0.52	−0.0142	−0.50	0.000735	0.13	0.000346	0.06	0.000837	0.14
Return on assets	−0.323	−0.86	−0.350	−0.93	−0.259	−0.86	−0.00681	−0.08	−0.0123	−0.15	−0.0231	−0.27
Debt to assets ratio	−0.0868	−0.59	−0.100	−0.66	−0.0815	−0.61	0.0144	0.50	0.0114	0.45	0.0111	0.44
Annual market return	0.0453	0.45	0.0549	0.58	0.0695	0.72	−0.0616**	−2.21	−0.0511*	−1.87	−0.0531*	−1.94
Book to market ratio	0.0146	1.49	0.0160*	1.67	0.0143	1.43	−0.000780	−0.35	−0.000525	−0.25	−0.000599	−0.26
Constant	0.0993	0.22	0.227	0.50	0.0664	0.15	−0.0378	−0.34	−0.0251	−0.21	−0.0318	−0.28
No. of Obs.	243		236		213		297		290		264
Adjusted R2	0.0584		0.0720		0.0545		0.184		0.178		0.157
F	4.862		4.492		3.818		1.698		1.747		1.393
p	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000		0.0565		0.0475		0.1600
No. of firms clusters	92		92		84		95		95		87

Regressions are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered by company. All models include 2-digit SIC and year dummies.

^*p < 0.1;

^**p < 0.05. In bold statistically significant coefficients of variables of interest.