Table 7.

Regression results of CEO pay on executive, proprietary and independent female directors' presence.

Variable	Relative annual increase of CEO pay						Proportion of equity and option based CEO pay
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6
	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t
Independent female directors presence at the board	0.130	0.86					0.0313	0.62
Proprietary female directors presence at the board			−0.267**	−2.32					0.0512	0.99
Executive female directors presence at the board					0.339	1.04					−0.0634**	−2.35
Proportion of board independent directors	0.122	0.58	0.0319	0.15	0.274	1.30	−0.197	−1.60	−0.127	−1.25	−0.172	−1.62
Logarithm of board size	0.0994	0.84	0.166	1.49	0.116	1.05	0.0232	0.92	0.0174	0.75	0.0269	1.03
Logarithm of total assets	−0.0112	−0.39	−0.0165	−0.60	−0.0151	−0.53	0.00109	0.18	0.00121	0.20	0.00102	0.18
Return on assets	−0.315	−0.82	−0.362	−0.97	−0.261	−0.86	−0.0104	−0.12	−0.00781	−0.09	−0.0240	−0.28
Debt to assets ratio	−0.0767	−0.50	−0.110	−0.73	−0.0828	−0.61	0.0147	0.53	0.0150	0.60	0.0112	0.44
Annual market return	0.0417	0.42	0.0496	0.54	0.0686	0.71	−0.0554*	−1.93	−0.0502*	−1.93	−0.0532*	−1.94
Book to market ratio	0.0145	1.51	0.0159*	1.69	0.0143	1.43	−0.000691	−0.31	−0.000976	−0.43	−0.000604	−0.26
Constant	0.0948	0.21	0.245	0.54	0.0955	0.22	−0.0394	−0.34	−0.0613	−0.46	−0.0360	−0.31
No. of Obs.	243		243		243		297		297		297
Adjusted R2	0.0618		0.0741		0.0647		0.181		0.184		0.181
F	5.005		4.602		4.549		1.847		1.914		1.775
p	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000		0.0330		0.0258		0.0430
No. of firms clusters	92		92		92		95		95		95

Regressions are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered by company. All models include 2-digit SIC and year dummies.

^*p < 0.1;

^**p < 0.05. In bold statistically significant coefficients of variables of interest.