Table 8.

Regression results of Dissent say on pay vote on female directors' weight.

Variable	Proportion of dissent say on may vote
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3
	B	t	B	t	B	t
Proportion of board female directors	−0.0346	−1.00
Proportion of audit committee female directors			−0.000724	−0.03
Proportion of remuneration committee female directors					−0.0478***	−2.73
Proportion of board independent directors	−0.0106	−0.42	−0.0108	−0.42	−0.00388	−0.16
Logarithm of board size	0.0124*	1.79	0.0123	1.52	0.0127*	1.80
Logarithm of total assets	0.00267	1.61	0.00254	1.43	0.00233	1.35
Return on assets	0.0371	1.42	0.0386	1.52	0.0429	1.61
Debt to assets ratio	0.00709	0.75	0.00685	0.71	0.0102	0.83
Annual market return	0.00547	0.87	0.00441	0.71	0.00769	1.02
Book to market ratio	−0.000684	−0.84	−0.000659	−0.80	−0.000364	−0.49
Constant	−0.0214	−0.94	−0.0247	−1.06	−0.0288	−1.27
No. of Obs.	371		361		329
Adjusted R2	0.0537		0.0504		0.0617
F	4.149		4.212		4.102
P	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000
No. Clusters	108		108		106

Regressions are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered by company. All models include 2-digit SIC and year dummies.

^*p < 0.1;

^***p < 0.01. In bold statistically significant coefficients of variables of interest.