James, 1890 |
James (1890)
on the distinction between “me” and “not-me,” and their relation to “I” (the Thinker): “We may sum up by saying that personality implies the incessant presence of two elements, and objective person, known by a passing subjective Thought and recognized as continuing in time. Hereafter let us see the words ME and I for the empirical person and the judging Thought.,” p. 371 “(…) it would follow that all that is experienced is, strictly considered, objective; that this Objective falls asunder into two contrasted parts, one realized as ‘Self,’ the other as ‘not-Self;’ and that over and above these parts there is nothing save the fact that they are known, the fact of the stream of thought being there as the indispensable subjective condition of their being experienced at all. But this condition of the experience is not one of the things experienced at the moment; this knowing is not immediately known. It is only known in subsequent reflection. (…) Each ‘section’ of the stream would then be a bit of sciousness or knowledge of this sort, including and contemplating its ‘me’ and its ‘not-me’ as objects which work out their drama together, but not yet including or contemplating its own subjective being. (…) The sciousness in question would be the Thinker, and the existence of this thinker would be given to us rather as a logical postulate than as that direct inner perception” p. 304 |
James, 1890 |
James (1890)
on “I” (referred to as the Thinker) as a metaphysical issue: “But who the Thinker would be, or how many distinct Thinkers we ought to suppose in the universe, would all be subjects for an ulterior metaphysical inquiry,” p. 304 |
Wittgenstein, 1958 |
Wittgenstein’s (1958)
distinction between the use of “I” as subject and as object: “There are two different cases in the use of the word “I” (or “my”) which I might call “the use as object” and “the use as subject.” Examples of the first kind are these: “My arm is broken,” “I have grown six inches,” “I have a bump on my forehead,” “The wind blows my hair about.” Examples of the second kind are: “I see so-and-so,” “I hear so-and-so,” “I try to lift my arm,” “I think it will rain,” “I have toothache.” (…) It is possible that, say in an accident, I should feel a pain in my arm, see a broken arm at my side, and think it is mine, when really it is my neighbor’s. And I could, looking into a mirror, mistake a bump on his forehead for one on mine. On the other hand, there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have a toothache. To ask “are you sure it’s you who have pain?” would be nonsensical.”, pp. 66–67 |
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