. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2019 Mar 6.

Published in final edited form as: Rev Econ Stat. 2016 Sep 28;98(4):617–637. doi: 10.1162/REST_a_00586

Table 2.

Priming Effects for Protestants and Catholics

Protestant

Catholic

A. Amount Contributed to Public Good

Religion salient

0.16^**
(0.06)

−0.18^***
(0.07)

Constant

0.53^***
(0.05)

0.70^***
(0.05)

171

138

B. Expectation of Others’ Contribution to Public Good

Religion salient

0.03
(0.05)

−0.12^**
(0.05)

Constant

0.60^***
(0.03)

0.73^***
(0.04)

171

138

C. Relationship between Own Contribution and Expectation of Others’ Contribution

Religion salient

0.13^***
(0.05)

−0.07
(0.05)

E(Others’ contribution)

0 90^***
(0.06)

0.94^***
(0.06)

Constant

−0.01
(0.05)

0.01
(0.06)

171

138

D. Risk Aversion

Religion salient

−0.03
(0.06)

−0.11
(0.07)

Larger stakes

0.27^***
(0.05)

0.31^***
(0.05)

Constant

0.23^***
(0.05)

0.21^***
(0.05)

\hat{σ}

0.39
(0.03)

0.36
(0.03)

232

154

E. Discount Rate

Religion salient

0.35
(0.36)

0.43
(0.50)

1 week versus 2 weeks

0.00
(0.11)

−0.17
(0.17)

Constant

−3.02^***
(0.26)

−3.53^***
(0.36)

\hat{σ}

1.93
(0.16)

2.18
(0.21)

232

154

F. Dictator Game

Religion salient

−0.02
(0.04)

−0.04
(0.04)

Constant

0.21^***
(0.03)

0.17^***
(0.04)

177

139

G. Number of Anagrams Attempted

Religion salient

−0.71
(2.44)

1.76
(3.98)

Constant

29.03^***
(1.77)

31.09^***
(2.89)

H. Gift Exchange: Slope from Regression of Work Cost on Wages between $0 and $3.50

Religion salient

0.00
(0.02)

0.01
(0.02)

Constant

0.09^***
(0.01)

0.08^***
(0.01)

I. Gift Exchange: Wage Offered as Manager

Religion salient

0.05
(0.19)

0.01
(0.19)

Constant

1.39^***
(0.13)

1.28^***
(0.14)

This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the amount contributed to the public good (panels A and C), the expectation of others’ average contribution to the public good (panel B), the minimum risk premium required for a subject to accept a gamble (panel D), the log continuously compounded interest rate required to defer payment receipt (panel E), the amount given away (panel F), the number of anagrams attempted (panel G), the subject-specific slope coefficient from a regression of work cost expended as an Employee on managerial wage offered (panel H), or the wage offered as a Manager (panel I). “Religion salient” is a dummy for being in the religion-salient condition. “E(Others’ contribution)” is the subject’s expectation of other group members’ average contribution to the public good. “Larger stakes” is a dummy for if the sure payout in the risky choice was $100. “1 week versus 2 weeks” is a dummy for the intertemporal choice being between payments deferred for one week versus two weeks. Ordinary least squares regressions were run for each panel except panels D and E, where interval regressions were run, pooling each subjects’ two risk choices or two intertemporal choices together. in these latter two panels, the estimated conditional standard deviation of the latent dependent variable is denoted by $\hat{σ}$ . Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses below the point estimates. These standard errors are clustered by subject in panels D and E. Significant at

^**

5%,

^***

1%.