Table 2.
Placebo tests.
| Dependent Variables: Financial Performance | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Pseudo Legislation Year Being 2015 | Pseudo Legislation Year Being 2014 | Deleting the First Legislation Year 2016 | |
| Independent variables | |||
| Treatment group × Post legislation | −0.4589 (0.2510) |
−0.6586 (0.4761) |
−0.3593 * (0.1783) |
| Control variables | |||
| Post legislation | 0.0378 (0.0495) |
0.0441 (0.0422) |
−0.0784 (0.0399) |
| Treatment group | −0.0399 (0.2438) |
0.2107 (0.4735) |
−0.1727 (0.1654) |
| Hospital size | −0.0066 ** (0.0020) |
−0.0066 ** (0.0020) |
−0.0076 ** (0.0023) |
| Leverage | −0.0001 ** (0.0000) |
−0.0001 ** (0.0000) |
−0.0001 ** (0.0000) |
| Cash holding | −0.0712 ** (0.0124) |
−0.0712 ** (0.0123) |
−0.0662 ** (0.0145) |
| Cash flow | 0.0163 (0.0131) |
0.0162 (0.0130) |
0.0174 (0.0134) |
| Intercept | 1.5743 ** (0.0214) |
1.5611 ** (0.0256) |
1.6023 ** (0.0289) |
| Number of hospital-year observations | 25,926 | 25,926 | 20,498 |
| F statistics (p-Value) |
28.26 (0.0000) |
25.62 (0.0000) |
21.10 (0.0000) |
Notes: Standard difference-in-difference is implemented. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.