Table 4.

Associations of welfare-state regime and country-level measures of welfare effort, emphasis and expenditure with change in CASP-12 scores following work exit and proportion of between-country differences explained

	Welfare regime	Effort		Emphasis	Expenditure
Variablea	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Welfare typology
Bismarckian	Ref.
Mediterranean	–2.15 (–3.23, –1.06)**
Social democratic	0.21 (–0.98, 1.43)
Post-communist	–0.85 (–1.81, 0.15)*
Liberal	–0.76 (–2.37, 0.78)
Social-protection spending
Total public (% GDP)		0.01 (–0.10, 0.10)
In-kind benefits (% GDP)			0.12 (–0.08, 0.31)
Cash benefits (% GDP)			–0.07 (–0.19, 0.05)
In-kind benefits (% public)				0.05 (–0.01, 0.10)
Total public (EUR 000s)					0.27 (0.02, 0.53)*
In-kind benefits (EUR 000s)						0.47 (–0.05, 0.97)*
Cash benefits (EUR 000s)						0.06 (–0.36, 0.52)
In-kind health benefits (EUR 000s)							–0.15 (–1.43, 1.03)
Other in-kind benefits (EUR 000s)							0.93 (0.00, 2.07)*
Old-age cash benefits (EUR 000s)							0.34 (–0.53, 1.41)
Working-age cash benefits (EUR 000s)							0.13 (–0.76, 1.00)
Country-level variance	0.51	1.18	1.01	0.96	1.00	0.93	1.31
Individual-level variance	19.17	19.18	19.17	19.18	19.15	19.17	19.17
Percent country-level variance	2.57	5.78	4.99	4.77	4.96	4.62	6.38
Percent explained (vs null)	62.11	14.76	26.53	29.66	26.86	31.96	5.99

^aIndependent effects of country-level welfare-state variables after full adjustment for individual-level variables: route of exit from work, age at exit from work, country-specific quartile of household net worth, logarithm of household income, frailty index, participation in social activities, partnership status, born abroad, year of exit event and CASP-12 at t₀.

^** p < 0.001; *p < 0.05.