Table 3:
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
βsn: | log(SN/Resident) | 0.888 (0.009) | 1.526 (0.748) | 1.923 (0.808) | 1.786 (0.821) | 1.878 (0.844) |
: | Price*Hybrid | −0.007 (0.000) | −0.012 (0.002) | −0.006 (0.002) | −0.012 (0.002) | −0.012 (0.002) |
: | Price*Private | −0.011(0.001) | −0.018 (0.004) | −0.019 (0.004) | −0.019 (0.004) | −0.018 (0.004) |
: | log(SN/Resident)*CMI | 0.226 (0.003) | 0.226 (0.003) | 0.221 (0.003) | 0.231 (0.003) | 0.230 (0.003) |
: | Distance in 100km | −25.79 (0.014) | −25.79 (0.014) | −25.86 (0.014) | −25.80 (0.014) | −25.79 (0.014) |
: | Distance2 | 22.45 (0.037) | 22.45 (0.037) | 22.47 (0.037) | 22.44 (0.037) | 22.42 (0.037) |
: | Therapist/Res*Min | −0.124 (0.001) | −0.124 (0.001) | −0.133 (0.001) | −0.122 (0.001) | −0.122 (0.001) |
: | Therapist/Res*Min*Short-Stay | 0.314 (0.007) | 0.314 (0.007) | 0.306 (0.008) | 0.312 (0.007) | 0.312 (0.007) |
: | Alzheimer*Alzheimer Unit | 0.414 (0.002) | 0.414 (0.002) | 0.419 (0.002) | 0.413 (0.002) | 0.413 (0.002) |
ϑ: | Occupancy< | 0.757 (0.002) | 0.628 (0.002) | |||
ϑhyb: | Occupancy< *Hybrid | −0.027 (0.003) | −0.088 (0.002) | |||
ϑpriv: | Occupancy< *Private | −0.044 (0.005) | −0.058 (0.002) | |||
Non-Profit Objective Parameter | 23.05 (0.944) | |||||
Public Objective Parameter | 36.14 (1.659) | |||||
Avg Benefit per SN/year | $133,336 ($15,605) | $139,607 ($72,999) | $166,511 ($76,278) | $154,711 ($76,513) | $171,685 ($84,130) | |
Avg Wage+Fringe Benefits/SN | $83,171 | $83,171 | $83,171 | $83,171 | $83,171 | |
Benefit-Cost | $50,165 ($15,605) | $56,436 ($72,999) | $83,340 ($76,278) | $71,540 ($76,513) | $88,514 ($84,130) | |
Cost Moments | Y | N | N | N | N | |
Rationing | N | N | 100% | 97% | 95% |
Notes. The table displays the estimated preference and nursing home objective parameters. Column 1 shows the baseline parameter estimates that are identified off from demand and cost moments. Estimates in column 2 are derived from demand moments only. Column 3 presents estimates from a first-come-first-serve rationing model. Columns 4 and 5 allow for asymetric rationing by payer type when occupancy falls short of 97% and 95%, respectively. Average benefits as well as average wage and fringe benefits per SN are measured in 2002. Th/res, SN/res, and Min abbreviate therapists per resident, skilled nurses per resident, and rehabilitative care minutes respectively. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses.