Table 4.

Summary of the proposed method to enhance DNA signatures, relative to the two main goals of disputing a falsely alleged GMO or confirming a genuine one (see Figure 2).

Performance	Meaning and significance	As realized in the proposed protocol
True positive	An authentic GMO can be verified as such. Signature verification protocol returns “ok”	Manufacturer/proxy can successfully run the cryptographic confirmation protocol The existence of the hashes of all the signature transgenes within the GMO is publicly verifiable (e.g., via hybridization)
False positive	The protocol falsely identifies/approves an unauthorized/adulterated GMO (danger of distributing a counterfeit)	Not possible, due to the cryptographic part of the protocol (as a necessary requirement to bring GMOs into circulation) : By virtue of the ZK property, attackers cannot impersonate true manufacturer; hence, cannot sell a counterfeit. The digital part is linked to the physical via signature hashes
True negative	An unauthorized GMO can be confirmed as such. Important that this is done via the physical part of the protocol as the digital part only gives information about the object	Physical denial part. Thereby, a GMO is not authentic, if at least OFTF: Not the complete set of signature hashes present within the genome (publicly verifiable via PCR, etc.) Verification by competent authorities (who have access to the secret of which clones are valid/dummy), according to the following Identify genetic adulterations (may require WGS) Amplify all valid clones If the illicit genetic alteration is found on a dummy clone, the GMO is a counterfeit
False negative	A genuine GMO is identified as inauthentic	Not possible, due to (1) the correctness/completeness of the digital part (an honest prover can successfully run the protocol), and (2) as long as physical signature components within the genome are stably integrated