Table 1.
Author, year | N | F | Education | Handedness | Age | Task | Contrast | Foci |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Baumgartner, 2012 | 16 | 0 | n/r | right | 24.5 ± 2.2 | Third-party punishment task | Outgroup(BC) > Ingroup(AC + ABC)weighted | 8 |
Bellucci, 2016 | 26 | 13 | university | right | 26.0 ± 5.7 | Criminal scenarios (vignettes) evaluation and punishment assignment as a third-party | Experimental > Control | 6 |
Buckholtz, 2008 | 16 | 8 | n/r | right | 18–42 | Third-party legal decision-making task (scenarios evaluation) | High > low punishment | 11 |
Corradi-dell’Acqua, 2013 | 23 | 9 | n/r | n/r | 18–35 | Ultimatum Game | Rejected > accepted unfair offers | 2 |
Feng, 2016 | 22 | 11 | university | right | 22.9 ± 1.6 | Third-party punishment task | Unfair > fair | 19 |
Guo, 2013 | 21 | n/r | university | right | n/r | Ultimatum Game | (Reject-Accept)Unfair Loss > (Reject-Accept)Unfair Gain | 20 |
Hu, 2015 | 25 | n/r | n/r | n/r | n/r | Third-party help and punishment task | Punish > punish control | 8 |
Kohls, 2013 | 22 | 11 | university | n/r | 25.6 ± 3.5 | Social incentive delay task (SID) | Anticipation avoi > con | 6 |
Outcome avoi > con | 2 | |||||||
Moor, 2012 | 15 | 8 | n/r | right | 20.38 ± 0.85 | Cyberball paradigm & punishment questionnaires | Team2 > team1 (19–21 years old) | 5 |
Spitzer, 2007 | 23 | n/r | university | right | n/r | Monetary task with control and punishment conditions | Punishment > Control | 20 |
Strobel, 2011 | 24 | 11 | university | n/r | 23.8 ± 3.8 | First-person and third-person Dictator Game with punishment option | Punishment > no punishment | 17 |
Treadway, 2014 | 30 | 10 | n/r | right | 18–30 | Scenarios evaluation and punishment assignment | Punished > Not punished trials | 15 |
Vrticka, 2008 | 16 | 8 | n/r | right | 23.6 ± 3.6 | Perceptual task with social feedback | Angry > Smiling Faces with Lost Feedback | 3 |
Wang, 2017 | 26 | 15 | university | right | 20.92 ± 2.04 | Third-party punishment task | Unfair > fair | 9 |
Wei, 2018 | 25 | n/r | university | right | n/r | Modified Ultimatum Game | Unfair > fair | 6 |
Will, 2015 | 26 | 16 | n/r | right | 20.7 ± 1.97 | Cyberball & Dictator Game | Percentage inequality for excluders > percentage inequality for includers * | 33 |
Wu, 2015 | 27 | n/r | university | right | n/r | Ultimatum Game & Dictator Game | DG following the unfair UG > DF following the fair UG | 1 |
Note: n/r: not reported. Age is reported either in mean and standard deviation or in range. * derived by whole-brain contrast, positive correlation with punishment frequency.