Table 1.
Parameters and description.
| Notation | Description |
|---|---|
| I e1 | The initial return of enterprise who adopts “passive pollution control” strategy |
| I e2 | The initial return of enterprise who adopts “positive pollution control” strategy |
| I e3 | In the case of public participation, reputation benefits of enterprise for active pollution control |
| I p1 | Psychological benefits of public for participation in environmental governance |
| I p2 | If enterprise adopts “positive pollution control” strategy, then the public get the benefits of environmental improvement |
| Ig | If enterprise adopts “positive pollution control” strategy, then the government get the potential benefits |
| Le | If enterprise adopts “passive pollution control” strategy, in the case of public participation, enterprises will lose reputation |
| Lp | If enterprises adopt “passive pollution control” strategy, public will suffer from environmental pollution |
| Ce | The pollution control cost of enterprise |
| C g1 | If government adopts “positive supervision” strategy, the cost of human, material, and financial resources invested by the government |
| C g2 | If enterprise adopts “passive pollution control” strategy which leads to pollution accidents, the cost of government handling accidents |
| Cp | Participation cost of the public including information cost, opportunity cost, and sometimes infringement cost. |
| R | Rewards for public participation in environmental governance when government adopts “positive supervision” strategy. |
| F | If enterprise adopts “passive pollution control” strategy, in the case of government positive supervision, enterprise will be penalized by the government. |
| S | If the enterprise adopts “positive pollution control” strategy, in the case of government positive supervision, enterprises will get environmental protection subsidies given by the government. |
| p | The probability that enterprise adopts “passive pollution control” strategy and is reported by the public. |