Table 1.
Selected institutional variables, and how they are expected to influence the success of land-sparing policies.
| Variable | Expected influence on success of land sparing | Mapped constraint |
|---|---|---|
| Technical advice |
Where available: greater potential for adoption and dissemination of technologies and practices that can increase yields, avoid land degradation and improve compliance with environmental legislation. Where unavailable: less potential for dissemination of new practices and technologies; such areas could be targeted to improve knowledge exchange through farmer networks or civil society support. |
Percentage of those receiving technical advice is below median (25.3%) |
| Labour availability |
Where high: potential to increase yields using labour-intensive methods, but also greater risk of leakage if practices used to increase yields reduce the need for labour. Where low: less risk of leakage, but perhaps more challenging and costly to close yield gaps; targeted technical advice could help. |
Very high or very low labour availability (within upper or lower quartiles) |
| Land tenure security |
Where secure (with legal title or lease): farmers can have confidence they will not lose investments in soils, irrigation equipment and other investments in productivity; also likely to have greater access to credit and more interest in improving yields. Where insecure (without legal title): farmers have little incentive to focus on sustaining yields in long term, more incentive to maximize current-year profits even if it results in land degradation; such areas could be targeted for efforts to strengthen and formalize land tenure. |
Percentage of those without secure tenure is above median (2.1%) |
| Size of rural properties |
Where high: farmers have greater access to credit and capital to invest in yield increases, and must comply with Forest Code; fewer farmers may be eligible for agricultural support from government. Where low: smallholders have access to agricultural support, but may have less access to credit or private capital and may struggle to close yield gaps (which may not be a priority for them); fewer opportunities for large-scale conservation/restoration within single landholdings; opportunities to improve access to technical support, credit and to develop landowner networks for conservation. |
Not mapped as constraint as all property size classes present both opportunities and constraints |
| Educational attainment |
Where high: local actors may have greater agency, such as ability to access and adopt new practices and to participate in planning and policy processes related to land use and conservation. Where low: poor educational outcomes may be an impediment to local agency, and could impede inclusion of farmers in planning and policy processes related to land use and conservation, in the absence of concerted efforts to enable and improve communication and participation. |
Percentage of adults who completed at least middle school is below median (20.15%) |
| Type of product and market |
Where staple food crops, destined to local markets: price elasticity of demand relatively low, so rebound effects likely to be less pronounced. Where non-food crops and luxury crops destined to export markets: price elasticity of demand higher, and thus greater potential for rebound effects that undermine land sparing. |
Incorporated into alternative estimate of production potential |
| Forest Code deficit |
Where low (high compliance with Forest Code): more likely to retain native vegetation on private lands. Where high (low compliance with Forest Code): are less likely to retain native vegetation on private lands, but could provide funds for compensatory conservation or restoration (through tradeable forest certificates) if non-compliant landowners are obliged to meet legal requirements. |
Forest Code deficit in upper quartile and comprises ≥10% of native vegetation |
| Forest Code surplus |
Where no surplus exists: remaining native vegetation on private land (with some exceptions) is not legally available for clearance, but may still be in need of improved protection and restoration. Where surplus exists: native vegetation is vulnerable to legal clearance, but could be protected in new protected areas, with new incentives, or through tradeable forest certificates. |
Forest Code surplus comprises ≥10% of native vegetation in municipality |
A definition of how these variables were mapped as constraints for the illustrative analysis in Fig. 5 is provided. Our expectations are based on our reading of the literature, but can be considered as a set of preliminary conclusions or hypotheses amenable to further testing. We define success here as protection of a larger area of native vegetation, and concurrent concentration of food production on less land, than would be the case without land-sparing policies.