A comparison of the governance of tourism planning in the two Special Administrative Regions (SARs) of China — Hong Kong and Macao

Yim King Penny Wan*

Institute for Tourism Studies, Colina de Mong-Ha, Macao, China

HIGHLIGHTS

► Hong Kong and Macao have very different form of power relations.
► It is a city's political economy that shapes the power relations.
► The power relations are manifested in the tourism planning institutional arrangement.
► Both have a centralized mode of governance.
► Macao's tourism planning is more centralized than that of Hong Kong.

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ABSTRACT

This study compares the governance of tourism planning between Hong Kong and Macao — the two Special Administrative Regions (SARs) of China. Through using the qualitative research method, the two SARs' institutional frameworks of tourism planning are investigated. The political economy framework is also applied to explain how the wider political—economic conditions of each society shape the governance. The results reveal that despite governance under similar Basic Law and sharing the same culture, the two SARs have very different forms of power relations resulting from their unique political—economic circumstances. Both have a centralized mode of governance but Macao's is more centralized and fragmentary than that of Hong Kong. Through this comparative research, a better understanding of the two societies and their structures and institutions can be gained and useful lessons learnt about the two SARs.

1. Introduction

The perspective of governance has emerged as a powerful analytical concept in public policymaking since the late 1970s (Pierre, 1999). Economic restructuring and decline (Andriotis, 2002), globalization (Amin & Thrift, 1995), privatization (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992), internationalization and world cities' competition (Ng & Hills, 2003; Shen, 2004), and democratization (Healey, 2003) have led many governments to realize that they are losing their capacity to steer public policymaking in some areas alone. Instead, they need to collaborate with a much wider network of agencies for building strengths and accessing and utilizing resources (Göymen, 2000; Healey, 2003). A new method or mode by which society is governed from government to governance therefore is necessary (Rhodes, 1996).

Yet, interest in studying governance in the context of tourism has appeared since the 1990s due to the increased awareness of the importance of sustainable tourism development (Hall, 2011). Sustainable tourism development advocates a more balanced concern for economic, social and environment interests in tourism policy decision-making. As the concerns of sustainable tourism span numerous policy domains and involve diverse actors who have varied interests and priorities, the ability to strike a balance is often determined by how policy decisions are made and who governs or how power is distributed (Hall & Jenkins, 1995). Sustainable tourism development can only be achieved by having effective governance which draws a diverse range of actors into tourism decision-making (Bramwell & Lane, 2011).

The study of governance is important. Governance is essentially about power that governs the interplay of individuals, organizations,

* Tel.: +86 853 85982175; fax: +86 853 28838320.
  E-mail address: pennywan@ift.edu.mo.

and agencies influencing, or trying to influence, the direction of policy (Hall & Jenkins, 1995; Reed, 1997). The power relations affect tourism decision-making in many aspects including "the nature of government involvement in tourism, the structure of agencies responsible for tourism development, management, marketing and promotion, the nature of tourism in tourism development, and the identification and representation of tourism resources and attractions" (Hall, 2005, p. 100). Understanding governance sheds light on how power is distributed and, in this case, how tourism decisions are made. It provides information to governments on how well their governance systems are able to respond to the changing social, economic and political circumstances of a society (Pierre, 1999).

Hong Kong and Macao are the only two Special Administrative Regions (SARs) of China. Former colonies of the British and Portuguese governments, they returned their ruling sovereignty to China on 1 July 1997 and 20 December 1999, respectively. Although the SARs are both governed by China, sharing similar Basic Laws and constitutions and the same culture, they have very different forms of power relations caused by different economic, social and political conditions. Hong Kong's economic structure is based on the financial, real estate and service sectors. Macao, however, is heavily reliant on the tourism and casino gaming industry. The focus and position of the two cities, the bargaining power of the civil society, market and government, and the government's capacity and role in policymaking therefore are varied.

This study compares the governance of the two SARs in China, Hong Kong and Macao, with particular reference to their tourism planning. Comparative research has its own values. It is useful to identify, analyze and explain similarities and differences across different societies, gaining a better understanding of their structures and institutions (Creswell, 2009). Comparative studies also serve as a tool for developing classifications of social phenomena and for establishing whether shared phenomena can be explained by the same causes (Creswell, 2009). In particular, Masser (1984, p. 148) suggests that cross-national comparative planning studies act as means of improving planning practice through the interpretation and transfer of experience from one country to another; and as a way of developing planning theory by transcending national cultural boundaries. It is hoped that through a comparative study of these two cities, a better understanding of the two societies and their structures and institutions can be gained.

This article begins with a literature review on the concepts of governance in tourism. The second and third sections present the analytical framework and the methodology used in this study. Sections four and five present comparisons of the economic, social and political circumstances of Hong Kong and Macao and a discussion of how such differences shape the power relations of the two SARs' tourism planning. Conclusion, contributions and limitations of the research are discussed in the final section.

2. Literature review

2.1. Tourism planning and governance

Tourism planning is the decision-making process and detailed, on-the-ground outline of how a tourism destination should be developed, considering the various factors such as land use zoning, development density, transport, environment, landscape, and carrying capacity (Pearce, 1989). Gunn (2004, p. 6) argues that "the overall goal for better planning must include: better visitor satisfaction, improved business success and economic impact, greater protection of environmental assets, and improved integration into regular community life." Planning is an essential element of successful tourism development and management (Hall, 2005). Effective planning is necessary "to ensure that tourism is developed

according to broader economic and social development goals, that it is developed sustainably and that appropriate mechanisms and processes are in place to ensure that tourism development is managed, promoted and monitored" (Sharpley, 2008, p. 15).

Planning for sustainable tourism, however, is often affected by the entanglement of power and politics due to the presence and interaction of various stakeholders and interests, and therefore it is subjected to various power relations (Hall & Jenkins, 1995; Reed, 1997; Wesley & Pforr, 2010). People, values, place, culture and government philosophy all interact to shape the decision-making process (Hall & Jenkins, 1995). In order to manage the diverse interests, a new way to manage the tourism planning and development process therefore is needed. Governance is generally regarded as a more appropriate model of political steering whereby the values of non-governmental actors are also included in the decision-making process (Wesley & Pforr, 2010). Bertucci (2002) (cited in Wesley & Pforr, 2010) argues that a healthy governance environment is the most important factor in making tourism a successful activity for sustainable development. He highlights three cores features of governance: (1) a transparent political environment that facilities representation and participation; (2) political and regulatory coherency; and (3) partnerships between state, private interests and civil society. Governance therefore signifies "a new process of governing or a changed condition of ordered rule, or the new method by which society is governed" (Rhodes, 1996, pp. 652–653). It includes multiple stakeholders and emphasizes democracy, collaboration, coordination, stakeholder management, decentralization, community planning, power-politics, institutional arrangements and community participation (Caffyn & Jobbins, 2003; Robson & Robson, 1996; Sheldon & Abenoja, 2001; Tosun, 2000, 2006; Williams, Penrose, & Hawkes, 1998).

Although governance signifies a concern with a change in both the meaning and the content of government, it does not mean the end or the decline of the role of government. Governments do have several important roles to play in the governance process (Bramwell, 2011; Hall, 2005). They are the principal actor in the political process of tourism development (Bramwell, 2011). The governments may be in a position to offer incentives or impose requirements on actors to alter their behavior so as to promote sustainability (Bramwell, 2011). However, if the goal of sustainable development is to be achieved, a new form of governance is needed. The role of government has to change from a steering role to one that engages with and manages partnerships (Beaumont & Dredge, 2010).

2.2. Approach to study governance in tourism

2.2.1. The role of political economy to governance

Political economy concerns how politics affects choices in a society. It is a useful concept to understand how the political and economy conditions of a society shape the power relationship among key actors (Jessop, 2008), especially the capacity and role of a government (Pierre, 1999). The political economy approach starts from the proposition that the state is a "social relation" and is "socially embedded" (Jessop, 2008, pp. 1, 5). The political–economic environment of a city establishes parameters and legitimacy for local political interaction and decision-making, especially the role of government in the decision-making process (Digaetano & Klemanski, 1999). Conditions created by a particular political–economic environment produce opportunities for developing certain governing alignments (alliances and power structures) while imposing constraints on others. According to Jessop's strategic-relational approach to political economy, actors are reflective and are capable of taking a strategic view of the structural constraints

and are able to select their specific actions within those constraints strategically. Therefore, "the strategic choices of actors and organizations in the state are likely to be affected by the structural pressures in a specific society, including the broad economic and socio-cultural change and the lobbying by actors in civil society" (Bramwell, 2011, pp. 468–469).

Governance is always changing, searching for a more suitable or more effective form of governance adjusted to specific purposes and contexts to make progress toward securing the economic, socio-cultural, and environmental goals of sustainable development (Bramwell & Lane, 2011). Tourism planning concepts and approaches have changed considerably since the Second World War in response to the changing social circumstances. It began with the "boosterism" approach, upholding the view that tourism development was of automatic benefit to the hosts and therefore natural resources should be exploited for tourism development. The planning approach later shifted to an economic industry-oriented approach, which regarded tourism as an industry that could be used as a government tool to achieve certain goals of economic growth (Hall, 2005). In the 1970s, a rational planning approach was adopted, upholding the view that spatial planning could help to eliminate the negative impacts of tourism on the physical environment (Hall, 2005). In the 1980s, critical/emancipatory approaches prevailed in response to the increased concerns about the negative environmental and social impacts of development and the realization that public choices could not be determined by a few technocrats. Realizing that local residents were stakeholders who might benefit from tourism activity, the emphasis was on communication and dialogue with the aim of achieving more community consensus (Habermas, 1984). Finally, a sustainable approach emerged in the early 1990s which required each stakeholder to uphold the principles of sustainable development in decision-making and to work in a collaborative manner (Hall, 2005).

There are cases which illustrate how the political–economic circumstance of a society shapes a mode of governance. For instance, Göymen (2000) examined the governance of tourism planning in Turkey and found that, with the impacts of globalization, mounting customer demand and the global call for sustainable development, since the 1980s there has been a gradual transformation of governance from a basically state-sponsored and managed development to different forms of public–private cooperation and partnership. Gill and Williams (2011) reported the reasons for the shift in the mode of governance of the Canadian ski resort of Whistler from a pro-growth mode to a corporatist one which shows greater concern for sustainable development; this shift included realization of the degradation of the environmental conditions of the area, hosting the Winter Olympic Games, and the increasing political necessity of collaboration with local indigenous peoples.

2.2.2. Institutional studying approach

As suggested by Hall and Jenkins (1995), analyzing the power relations in the context of tourism requires examining the design and structure of institutional arrangements, which determine who has the ability to exert greater influence over the process than others through access to financial resources, expertise, public relations, media, knowledge and time. *Institutions* in the broadest definition are social rule structures with associated standing patterns of behavior and procedures (Lavoie, 1994). In tourism planning, *institutions* often refer to the decision-making rules, procedures, established practices, systems and organizational arrangements (Bramwell & Lane, 2011; Tosun, 2000). It is not uncommon for scholars to use the institutional approach to understand power. For instance, Andriotis (2002) found that the lack of a holistic and

integrative institutional structure and framework to coordinate planning in Crete, Greece had resulted in a fragmentary planning approach that was easily led by private or economic interests. Bramwell (2011) also reported that in Malta tourism was pro-growth driven because the working group which was responsible for conducting a study on local tourism growth limits was composed of a hotelier and two tourist board officers who were pro-growth.

2.2.3. Framework to study governance in tourism

Based on the previous literature review, a framework to compare the governance of tourism planning for the Hong Kong SAR (HKSAR) and Macao SAR (MSAR) is formed. First, power is not evenly distributed within a community. Some groups and individuals in society have relatively more influence than others on the governance processes affecting tourism due to their means of access to resources (Hall & Jenkins, 1995). The power relations of a society are shaped by the political and economic structure of that society. These power relations determine the rules and regulations and are manifested in a city's institutional arrangements. In tourism, this means the planning administration, process, and practices which place constraints on some stakeholders while delegating power to others, and they determine who acquires the greatest governing power, their policy agendas, and the capability and role of government.

3. Methods

In this study we adopted a qualitative research method, which is commonly used in comparative studies (Creswell, 2009; Ng, 1999) and has been instrumental in the governance study of tourism planning and development (Gill & Williams, 2011; Moscardo, 2011; Yüksel, Bramwell, & Yüksel, 2005). Data were collected from the secondary sources. This study began with an examination of the political economy conditions of the two SAR societies, Hong Kong and Macao. Data sources mainly comprised academic literature and government reports and statistics regarding the conditions of Hong Kong and Macao's political economy and society.

The power relations and governance of tourism planning as shaped under the wider political–economic framework have effects on the institutional framework of tourism planning of the two SARs. Three main aspects of the two SARs' tourism planning institutional framework were studied; these include: (1) the tourism planning administration, (2) strategies, polices and guidelines, and (3) the tourism plan-making process. Data were mainly collected from the secondary sources. First, the SARs' government website was browsed to understand their administrative structure of planning. Second, the published documents on the urban planning law, regulations and policies, and government planning studies and reports were carefully reviewed. Attempts were made to understand what laws, polices and guidelines related to tourism planning exist in the two SARs, along with the content and scope of information given for development. Information on the planning law, regulations and policies could be obtained from the governments or from the governments' websites. Third, some case studies about the two cities' tourism planning as reported in newspapers and academic articles were also reviewed. These case studies provided further insights into the operation, system and practice of tourism planning in the two SARs. Although newspapers and media reports have their own limitations in terms of the data reliability, they provide some insights into the current news of the two SARs. To improve reliability, multiple sources were checked and used. Fourth, two government officials involved in public works and one academic specializing in urban planning and tourism in the two SARs were interviewed. Finally, direct observation was used, since the author has lived in Hong Kong and

Macao for more than 10 years each and therefore has been able to observe the two SARs' political–economic conditions and their tourism planning practices.

4. Study area: Hong Kong and Macao

4.1. Hong Kong

Hong Kong is located at the southeastern tip of China, on the estuary of the Pearl River Delta (PRD) (Fig. 1). With a land area of 1104 km², the region comprises Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula, the New Territories, and 262 outlying islands (Hong Kong SAR Government [HKSAR Government], 2012a). More than 70% of Hong Kong is countryside. Hong Kong has a population of 7,108,100 people. Population density reaches 6438 people per square kilometers (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department [HKC&SD], 2012). Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China. Following British rule from 1842 to 1997, China assumed sovereignty under the "one country, two systems" principle. The HKSAR is governed under the Basic Law of Hong Kong, which ensures that the current political situation will remain in effect for 50 years (HKSAR Government, 2012b).

Financial services, trading and logistics, tourism, and professional services are the four key industries in the Hong Kong economy. From a total working population of 3,662,600, 1,690,200 (46%) work in the four dominant industries. The employment rate in 2011 was 3.4% (HKC&SD, 2012). In 2009, the Chinese Central Government positioned Hong Kong as an international metropolis in Asia, especially being a modern service industry center (Construction Department of Guangdong Province, Development Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Secretariat for Transport and Public Works of Macao Special Administrative Region [CDDBSTPW], 2009).

In terms of tourism, Hong Kong is often called the "Pearl of the Orient." It is not only famous for its beautiful night scenes surrounding the Victoria Harbor, but also renowned for its shopping and theme park facilities and a variety of dining choices. In 2011, Hong Kong received 42 million visitors, with 16.4% growth compared with 2010. Among these visitors, 40.6% (or 16,669,400) stayed overnight. The average length of stay of overnight guests was 3.6 nights. Mainland China was the largest visitor source market of Hong Kong, accounting for 68.5% of the total arrivals. It was followed by South and Southeast Asia (8.9%) and North Asia (5.5%) (Hong Kong Tourism Board, 2012).

4.2. Macao

Macao is located on the southeastern coast of China to the west of the PRD, 60 km from Hong Kong and 145 km from the city of Guangzhou (Fig. 1). It has a total land area of 29.9 km² including the peninsula of Macao, Taipa, Coloane and the Cotai Strip, with a total population of about 557,400 (Macao Statistics and Census Service

Fig. 1. Locations of Hong Kong and Macao. Source: HKSAR Government (2012a).

[DSEC], 2012). Population density is higher than in Hong Kong and reaches 18,642 people per square kilometers. Since the handover of the territory's sovereignty to China on 20 December 1999, Macao became a SAR (MSAR) of the Beijing government. As such it is governed by a Basic Law (a somewhat different version than Hong Kong's), which ensures the "One country, two systems" principle, and "Macao people governing Macao" for 50 years (MSAR Government, 2012a), where the Chinese government would exercise non-interference or minimal intervention in Macao the same as in Hong Kong (Sheng & Tsui, 2009).

The MSAR Government works toward the major objective of turning Macao into a premium tourist destination and unique Asian leisure, entertainment, exhibition and convention hub, which is the positioning as designated by the Beijing government (CDDBSTPW, 2009). Unlike Hong Kong, Macao's economy relies heavily on the tourism and casino gaming sector. Macao is often called the "Las Vegas of the East" because it is famous for its gaming facilities. At the same time, it is a "city of culture" with a rich cultural heritage. In July 2005, the Historic Center of Macao was inscribed on the list of World Heritage sites maintained by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (Macao Cultural Affairs Bureau, 2006).

Tourism, hospitality and gaming, therefore, are the key industries in Macao. Of the total 380,000 working population, 128,175 (or 33.7% of the overall employed population) work in the tourism, hospitality and gaming industries. With Macao benefitting from the booming tourism and gaming sectors, the unemployment rate remains low (lower than Hong Kong), at 2.3% in 2011 (DSEC, 2012). Gaming revenue accounts for more than 70 percent of the government's revenue. Since 2007, its gaming revenue has exceeded what the Las Vegas strip made (Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau [DICJ], 2011).

The city has experienced a boom in its tourism and gaming industry since 2002 as a direct result of the liberalization of casino licensing in 2002 and the implementation of the Chinese government's new visa regulations in 2003, which permitted many mainland Chinese to travel to Hong Kong and Macao under the Individual Visit Scheme (IVS). The number of tourists grew from 9.16 million in 2000 to 28 million in 2011 (DSEC, 2012). Casino operators increased from just one in 2002 to three in 2011 (managed by six companies). The number of casinos jumped from 11 to 34 over the same period (DICJ, 2011). World-famous casino resorts such as Wynn, Sands, Venetian, and Crown now have their own casinos in Macao. In contrast to Hong Kong, the three top major sources of tourists to Macao are Mainland China (16,162,747 or 57.7%), Hong Kong (7,582,923 or 27%) and Taiwan (1,215,162 or 4.3%). The typical length of stay was shorter than in Hong Kong and averaged 1.45 nights in 2011 (DSEC, 2012).

5. Findings

5.1. The political–economic status of Hong Kong and Macao

5.1.1. Hong Kong: executive-led polity challenged by the increasingly politicized community

Hong Kong is governed by an executive-led polity. The governing power is concentrated in the hands of a Chief Executive (also known as Governor in the colonial period) and the appointed civil servants. The first Chief Executive was formally selected by a 400-member committee, his selection a result of both pro-Beijing leaders' active head-hunting and the preference of those local pro-Beijing elite members who were put into the selection committee through a process of quasi-appointment (Cheung, 2005). Through the appointments of the local businessmen and professionals and pro-Beijing elites to the various important

advisory committees – including the Executive Council (ExCo) (responsible for overall policymaking) and the Legislative Council (LegCo) (responsible for the approval of law making and government budget) – to advise him on major administrative decisions, the government is able to form an elite consensus politics (Cheung, 2005). For instance, in the 2012 LegCo election, of the 70 LegCo members, 43 of them are pro-Beijing and 27 are pro-democracy (Cheng, 2012). Also, among the 30 seats from the functional constituency (FC) that were elected by industry and professional groups, 18 of them represent the interests of the traditional business and professional elites (e.g., commercial, industrial, finance, accountancy, medical, legal, real estate and construction, architecture, surveying and planning, financial services, textiles and garment, import and export, and insurance).

The government has adopted a pro-growth strategy since the earlier colonial period. Hong Kong's manufacturing power grew in the 1950s, as a result of a "transferred industrialization" (Ng, 1999, p. 11) process initiated by mainland capitalists who fled to Hong Kong with the establishment of the communist People's Republic of China in 1949. The colonial government had practiced a laissez-faire industrial development policy. As the largest landlord in the territory, the government relied on land sales to "boost the public coffers" (Ng, 1999, p. 11). Ng (p. 11) argues that "the government had a larger stake in the development-related industries (such as property and financial sectors) rather than the manufacturing one. The development ideology is very much economic growth-oriented. The invisible hand, the market, is a major means of urban governance in the HKSAR." The top-down elitist approach is reflected in its heritage and tourism planning practices. The declaration of which places, buildings, sites or structures should be designated as monuments for protection in Hong Kong is the sole responsibility of the Antiquities Authorities, after consultation with the Antiquities Advisory Boards and with the approval of the Chief Executive. There was no official mechanism for the public to launch a request for designating a historic building as a monument. The public was neither consulted before or after designation of monuments (Yung & Chan, 2011).

The values and political culture amongst the Hong Kong people are very much influenced by the 155 years of British rule. Ng (1999, pp. 10–11) notes: "People in Hong Kong have high respect for laws, rules and regulations. Although democracy was not introduced in the local political scene until recently, since the late 1970s, people in Hong Kong have always enjoyed liberty, individual human rights and freedom of speech." The new Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying during the swearing-in ceremony of the HKSAR's fourth-term government in July 2012 also emphasized the need to protect the core values of Hong Kong by saying that the new government would strive to safeguard the rule of law, clean government, freedom and democracy (China Daily, 2012).

Economic prosperity of the territory since the late 1970s led many Hong Kong people to quest for a more decent living environment instead of economic growth (Hills & Barron, 1997). In the 1980s when the British government started negotiating with the Beijing government for the future of the territory, Hong Kong people were active in fighting for democracy (Cheung, 2005). The post-1997 years saw an even more active community voice their demands and expectations to the government. Yung and Chan (2011, p. 459) observe, "After 1997, Hong Kong people have increasingly strived for their own identity, and the need for social equity in acquiring more social spaces, and more democratic right, particularly, in city planning and development is growing." Henderson (2008) also comments that there are increasing numbers of professionals and researchers speaking up to protect the city's heritage and tourism resources (Henderson, 2008). Cheung explains that this was because most of the Hong Kong

people did not have a chance to elect their Chief Executive. Also, a number of bold initiatives set up by the first Chief Executive, Mr. Tung (such as the 85,000 housing target which turned Hong Kong into an IT hub and an international center for Chinese medicine), were not successfully launched due mainly to the Asian Financial Crisis. Hong Kong people were also upset about the top-down and paternalistic policymaking style of Tung and felt that their voices and needs, especially the quest for a more democratic society, were not being heard (Cheung, 2005).

People's dissatisfaction toward the government was intensified by the government's proposed national security bill (Article 23 in the Basic Law) in 2002. People believed that the bill would threaten their freedom of expression and association. Therefore, on July 1, 2003, around half a million people, mainly the middle class and professionals, participated in a demonstration. Two other mass rallies were held in July 2003 and January 2004, pressing for full democracy in Hong Kong. Hong Kong in the post-2000 period had literally become a city of protest (Chan & Lee, 2007). However, unlike the previous period, these protests were more lively, spontaneous, and creative, and thus more difficult for the government to suppress. The new mode of political mobilization relied more on media and social networks supported by information technology (Chan & Lee, 2007). In response to the increasingly politicized community, the HKSAR government has increased their transparency in policymaking since 1997. A total of 226 public consultation exercises on public policy were conducted from 1997 to 2009 (Cheung, 2011).

To conclude, while the Beijing government has tried to protect business interests in running the SAR, the democratization process in the last years of British colonial rule nurtured the growth of a fledgling political community. The HKSAR government not only needs to face the challenge of being a Special Administrative Region (SAR) under Beijing's rule, it also needs to cope with demand raised by the Western-educated professionals, liberal-minded offspring of the refugee generation.

5.1.2. Macao: politico-administrative state led by the casino gaming industry without intense community challenges

Macao has long been a "politico-administrative state," which is defined as "a powerful bureaucracy led by political leaders without sufficient checks and balances from the legislature, political parties, interest groups, citizens, and the mass media" (Lo, 2009, p. 20). The Chief Executive of the MSAR is elected by a small 300-member Election Committee mainly comprised of pro-Beijing business people and labor union representatives (Lo & Yee, 2005). The Chief Executive is charged with the power to appoint members of the Executive Council (the highest decision-making body) and the seven secretaries who head the government offices and departments (Chou, 2005). Also, in the Legislative Council (LegCo) there is over-representation from business — the core interest group — and its allies (Sheng & Tsui, 2009). It consists of 29 members, of whom 12 are directly elected, 10 are indirectly elected from the thousands of associations and seven are appointed by the Chief Executive (Chou, 2005).

While Hong Kong has many organized middle class and professional groups, Macao has many diverse organized interest groups. In 2009, Macao had over 5000 interest groups with various backgrounds (Lee, 2011). To a large extent, interest groups are the basis of patron-client networks. For instance, the former Chief Executive Edmund Ho was a former vice president of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce (CGCC). The current Chief Executive Fernando Chui San On was once a leader of Tong Sin Tung (a local charity group) (Chou, 2005; Lo, 2009). In return interest groups received some benefits from the government, such as subsidies to finance their activities (Chou, 2005).

Governors under the Portuguese rule did not perform impressively in the eyes of most Macao Chinese residents. Issues included close alliances with powerful interest groups, corruption, inefficient and incompetent government officials and poor economic performances (Lo, 2009). To build up its own legitimacy, the Macao government with the permission of the Beijing government decided to liberalize the casino license in 2001 with the aims to provide additional employment opportunities with the associated benefits of enhanced social stability and to position Macao as the regional center of casino gaming (DICJ, 2011).

Before 2005, Macao people in general were satisfied with the city's economic benefits that were brought by the gaming industry. However, the casino gaming boom has posed new challenges for the ruling authorities. Residents increasingly realized the negative impacts that were caused by the gaming boom (i.e., addictive gambling, young people choosing casino jobs rather than pursuing technical and advanced studies, traffic congestion, environmental pollution) (Sheng & Tsui, 2009; Vong, 2004; Wan, 2012). In addition, government corruption continues in the new SAR government. Ao Man Long, the former Secretary for Transport and Public Works, who was responsible for issues related to land, planning and transport and other public works, was arrested in December 2006 on corruption charges (he took US$100 million in bribes) and now is serving a 27-year jail sentence (Macau Daily Times, 2008). All these events led to a low satisfaction of the Macao public with its government. Satisfaction level fell to a historical low of 24% (Shimin Daily, 2007).

Unlike the case in Hong Kong, an active political community developed quite late in Macao; due to not only the overall lower education level of Macao people and having fewer professional groups than Hong Kong, but also the long-term segregation and miscommunication between the Portuguese government and the locals. The official language used in the colonial period of Macao was Portuguese, but this language was not a compulsory subject at school. (The situation was unlike Hong Kong, where the official language in the colonial period was English and most citizens received their education in English.) The larger scale of community protests against the government only began in 2006, with discontent expressed over the government's inability to protect local heritage (e.g., the Guia lighthouse), government corruption, the overheated casino sector and the deteriorating living environment and standards (Lo, 2009; Wan & Pinheiro, 2011). On May 1st 2007, thousands of residents including civil servants, legislators and laborers protested on the streets. The event eventually turned violent and led to a policeman firing warning shots into the air to disperse the demonstrations (Mingpao Daily, 2007).

Both the Beijing government and international heritage organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) had closely monitored the city's economic and heritage development. In mid-2008 the Guangdong provincial government restricted the number of visits per individual mainlander to two visits to Macao every two months to suppress the overheating gambling industry and reduce the incidents of money laundering, problem gambling and corruption (Hong Kong Economic Journal, 2009). Also, in May 2008, Beijing reined in the local government and Chief Executive Edmund Ho announced that new land could not be used for casino projects (Lo, 2009).

In addition, the decision to lower the maximum building height near historic Guia Hill in 2008 (MSAR Government, 2008) was also the result of several local interest groups writing letters to UNESCO (Tso, 2006) and a warning letter subsequently being issued to the Cultural Bureau of the Chinese Government (Guia Lighthouse Protection Concern Group, 2007). The debate started when the media announced plans to construct an office, residential, and hotel complex with several towers over 99.91 m in height within a 300-m-long slot at the foot of historic Guia Hill. Local residents believed

that these developments would completely block views of the 90-m historic lighthouse on Guia Hill (Tso, 2006). This site was carefully protected by the previous colonial administration in the 1990s, which enforced a maximum development height of 20.5 m (*Ponto Final*, 2007). The guidelines were now being revoked and the government explained that the changes stemmed from the need "to modernize the legislation, already 15 years old and completely outdated, out of touch with the gambling sector development and the increasing need for building sites" (cited in Tso, 2006, p. 19).

However, a full awareness of and concrete action to prepare a master plan to balance the interests of urban development and heritage conservation only appeared after the visit of a senior government official from Beijing in 2010. Guo Zhan, the Vice President of the International Council on Monuments and Sites, publicly warned that the world historic center of Macao was facing difficulties. He requested that Macao's Public Works Department and Cultural Institute Bureau present a development and protection plan before the next UNESCO committee meeting (*Jornal Tribuna de Macau*, 2010; *Macau Daily Times*, 2011).

To conclude, similar to Hong Kong, Macao is ruled by an executive-led polity without any checks and balances. While the Chinese government has tried to protect the business interests (mainly the real estate sector) in running the HKSAR, Macao is more interested in serving the interest groups, the Beijing government, the international heritage organizations, and the casino gaming operators. In Hong Kong, the mature political community led by the educated middle class and professionals has imposed direct pressures and significant challenges to the city's governance. Macao's political community, however, has developed late. Unlike the Hong Kong government, the Macao government does not receive intense citizens' criticisms or face opponents from their citizens.

5.2. Tourism planning system of Hong Kong and Macao

The tourism planning administration reflects the characteristics of the respective political economies under study. The following section compares the tourism planning system of the two SARs in three aspects: (1) tourism planning administration, (2) planning strategies, polices and guidelines, and (3) the plan-making process.

5.2.1. Tourism planning administration
5.2.1.1. Hong Kong. Fig. 2 shows the major administrative units which are responsible for, or related to, tourism planning in Hong Kong. The Executive Council, which is predominantly made up of business, commercial or professional interests, makes the final decision for public policies. Before drafts of policies are sent to the Executive Council for approval, the policies are first scrutinized by the Chief Secretary Committee, which comprises various policy secretaries and monitors government polices and related issues.

The Financial Secretary is responsible for planning and land development in Hong Kong. Specifically, the Tourism Commission within the Commerce and Economic Development Bureau is in charge of the policy issues related to tourism. The Development Bureau, however, is responsible for the overall development (including tourism) in the territory. There are two important departments under the Development Bureau, the Land Department and the Planning Department, which deal with the administration of land and land use planning, respectively.

Under the Chief Secretary for Administration, the Transport and Housing Bureau and Environment Bureau are responsible for transport and environmental issues in Hong Kong, respectively. The Leisure and Cultural Services Department provides policy advice for all issues related to leisure and cultural heritage in the territory.

Some major tourism planning-related statutory boards also play an important function in Hong Kong's tourism planning. First, the Town Planning Board (TPB) is a statutory body established under the Town Planning Ordinance. It consists of seven officials and 29 non-official members all of which are appointed by the Chief Executive. According to the Town Planning Ordinance, the TPB has two major functions: the preparation of statutory plans, and the consideration and reviews of development applications. Second, the Appeal Board (AB) members are also appointed by the Chief


Fig. 2. Tourism planning administration in Hong Kong. Source: adapted from HKSAR Government (2012c).

Executive. Applicants aggrieved by TPB's decisions can appeal to the AB. Other important statutory bodies include the Land Development Corporation and the Tourism Board, which deal with urban renewal and tourism products planning and promotion in the territory, respectively.

5.2.1.2. *Macao.* The tourism planning administration in Macao is depicted in Fig. 3. Similar to Hong Kong, the Executive Council appointed by the Chief Executive makes the final decision for public policies, including development and planning policies. It is predominantly made up of businessmen and heads of large-interest groups. Before drafts of policies are sent to the Executive Council for approval, the policies are first scrutinized by the Chief Secretary Committee, which comprises various policy secretaries and monitors government polices and related issues.

There are two important Secretariats dealing with tourism: the Secretariat for Social Affairs & Culture and the Secretariat for Transport & Public Works. Underneath the Secretariat for Social Affairs and Culture (SAC), the Cultural Affairs Bureau (CAB) is responsible for drafting and implementing the Territory's policies on culture. The Macao Government Tourist Office (MGTO) is tasked to promote and market the products. The Institute for Tourism Studies (IFT), however, is a government-owned higher educational institution, which provides degree programs and trainings in tourism and hospitality and conducts research regarding tourism.

The Secretariat of Transport and Public Works is responsible for translating the tourism polices into real town plans. Under this Secretariat, the Land, Public Works and Transport Office (LPWTO) looks after many aspects related to planning and land development including land management, urban planning, project management, infrastructure, traffic and transport planning and management, and heritage maintenance and improvement. The Infrastructure Development Bureau (IDB) takes care of special projects such as

land reclamation between Island and Light Rail Transit. The Environmental Protection Bureau deals with all issues related to environment management in Macao. Finally, the Institute for Civic and Municipal Affairs (IACM) under the Secretariat of Administration and Justice is in charge of the maintenance, renovation or rehabilitation works of public spaces and facilities.

Based on the above outline, some similarities and differences can be found between the tourism planning administrations of the two SARs. Though both territories are executive-led in their tourism administration, Macao's model is both more centralized and more fragmentary than Hong Kong's for five main reasons.

First, unlike in Hong Kong the TPB (comprising both official and non-official members) plays a crucial and active role in the daily tourism planning activities. Thus, a certain level of public participation in tourism plan-making is allowed through this Board.

Second, in Macao the planning power is very much centralized in the Land, Public Works & Transport Office (LPWTO). In Hong Kong, land, planning, tourism and transport issues are separately handled by four different departments/units under two different Secretaries and Authority, with each accountable to the others. In Macao, these issues are all handled under the LPWTO.

Third, in Macao the Infrastructure Development Bureau (IDB), the Land, Public Works and Transport Office (LPWTO) and the Institute for Civic and Municipal Affairs (IACM) are performing similar jobs (i.e., heritage maintenance and planning, transport management). This often results in work overlap and inefficient project coordination. The situation gets worse when inter-departmental coordination and communication is poor. A government official who is responsible for public works gave examples in an interview, pointing out that there were few guidelines and communication within government agencies for how to handle heritage projects. In the Military Club conservation project two more floors were added without destroying the quality or classic


Fig. 3. Tourism planning administration in Macao. Source: modified from MSAR (2012b).

ambience of the building; while in the BNU Bank project only the facade was conserved and the overall ambience and architecture of the building were totally destroyed. The reasons why these cases have been dealt with so differently are not known to everyone. He further observed that the World Heritage locational signage for Senardo Square (a major tourist destination) required all the agencies to sign off on it, so it had often bounced around between different government agencies for many years, and this was the reason why it was not erected until years after the World Heritage Site inscription.

Fourth, Hong Kong has the Commerce and Economic Development Bureau to take charge of strategic tourism policymaking, unlike the situation in Macao. This makes Macao's tourism planning activities more fragmentary than Hong Kong's.

Fifth, in Macao all land reclamation proposals need approval by the Beijing government, but this is not in the case in Hong Kong. Another difference between the two SARs' tourism planning administrations is that the Macao government has incorporated a higher institution (the Institute for Tourism Studies) for tourism planning, through conducting tourism research and providing advice, and Hong Kong does not have such an arrangement.

5.2.2. Planning strategies, polices and guidelines

5.2.2.1. Hong Kong. Hong Kong has a three-tiered system of land use plans (Fig. 4). The highest level of the hierarchy is the Territorial Development Strategy. The "Hong Kong 2030 Study" provides a broad planning framework to guide the future development of the territory up to the year 2030 (Hong Kong Planning Department, 2006). The Study estimates that the total visitor arrivals for Hong Kong could rise to about 47 million by 2016 and some 70 million by 2030, of which two-thirds could be from the Mainland. It has plans to develop more tourist attractions such as an integrated arts, cultural and entertainment district in West Kowloon, and the new cruise terminal at the former Kai Tak Airport. Hong Kong people are permitted to participate in the study in four different stages including setting research agendas, determining the key issues and elective criteria that should be used to define development options, comments on the scenarios and options that are formulated, and finally, discussing the draft-recommended development strategies and response plans (Interview with an academic in Hong Kong; Hong Kong Planning Department, 2006).

The second tier is the sub-regional development strategies which translate territorial development goals into more specific planning objectives for the five sub-regions in Hong Kong. At the district level, there are four types of plans. The Outline Zoning Plans (OZPs) and the Development Permission Area (DPA) Plans are statutory and involve mandatory citizen participation in their preparation; the rest of the plans are prepared administratively. Both DPAs and DPAs can be brought from the government and browsed from the websites of the Planning Department.

All the planning activities are governed under the Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines which are reference manuals setting out the scale, location and site requirements of various land uses and facilities. Currently, there are 32 guidelines for such considerations as living density, recreation, leisure and green belt, environmental protection, conservation, urban design, and public infrastructure and facilities (Hong Kong Town Planning Board, 2012a).

5.2.2.2. Macao. Unlike Hong Kong, Macao does not have a town planning ordinance stipulating the planning procedures, or a strategic plan directing its future development goals and objectives. It also lacks a master plan. According to a press interview with a senior government official in the Urban Planning Bureau, the priority of urban planning in Macao is economic development, especially to meet the needs of the gaming industry. He believed that Macao did not need a master plan – sectoral plans supported by guidelines issued on a case-by-case basis were sufficient because they are more flexible and create fewer controversies (Jornal Tribuna de Macau, 2006). Public consultation on tourism projects and plans are not the norm. Some LegCo members complain that even when there were public consultations, many of them were not carried out in a proper way. The Chief Secretary for Administration also admitted such failure in a LegCo meeting (Macau Daily Times, 2012a). As a result, the general public only knows of the result when construction is started (interview with an academic in Macao).

The absence of clear city goals and strategic or master plans causes tourism planning to lose its direction and to be easily led by business interests. The previously mentioned controversy of Guia Hill is a case in point. Another example includes the carefully drafted and detailed laws (running to 175 pages) issued in 1991 for the NAPE area (new reclaimed areas in the Outer Harbour and Nam Wan Bay), which were initially aimed at overcoming the weaknesses of previous partial plans by comprehensively developing the entire area for residential use and community facilities, and which were repealed by the Chief Executive on August 16, 2007. The place is now occupied by casinos and hotels.

To allow more flexibility in planning, there are very few laws and practical development guidelines governing urban and tourism planning in Macao; the majority of these were developed between 1986 and 1987 and are outdated (Land, Public Works and Transport Bureau, 2008). Of the 34 laws and orders that relate to urban planning, about seven of them are directly concerned with tourism planning (interview with an academic in Macao). Examples of the laws related to tourism planning are those covering the heritage protection zone, land law, building heights near the Guia Lighthouse (a local protected heritage), inner harbor renewal, and architectural, landscape and cultural assets protection (Land, Public Works and Transport Bureau, 2008). Perhaps there are planning standards and guidelines within the government department, yet, they are not available for public scrutiny. Without a checks-and-balances mechanism, the limited guidelines that are in place in Macao can easily be canceled since public consultation is not the norm. Apart from the Guia Hill case described earlier, the Urban Intervention Plan (PIU), containing the only heritage design guidelines for Macao as a whole, is also being canceled (Pinheiro & Costa, 1998).


Fig. 4. Hierarchy of plans in Hong Kong. Source: Hong Kong Planning Department (1995).

5.2.3. Plan-making process

5.2.3.1. Hong Kong. Fig. 5 presents the plan-making process in Hong Kong. Hong Kong's plan-making process follows tightly a set of procedures under the Town Planning Ordinance (HKSAR Government, 2012d), and is considered by Macao's planning bureau to be more transparent than their system (Land, Public Works and Transport Bureau, 2012, p. 62).

In Hong Kong, all new plans, amendments to approved plans or amendments to draft plans will be exhibited for two months for public inspection. During this exhibition period, any person may make representation (either supportive or adverse) to the TPB in respect of the draft plan. All representations received by the TPB during the plan exhibition period will be published for public inspection. The TPB or its Representation Hearing Committee (RHC)

will hold a hearing to consider the representations and comments received. Since 2005, the Hong Kong TPB meetings and their minutes have been opened to the public (Hong Kong SAR Government [HKSAR Government], 2012d).

5.2.3.2. Macao. Fig. 6 shows the tourism planning process adopted in Macao. Jurisdiction over tourism plan-making is vested solely in the Secretary of Transport and Public Works (STPW) and senior officials of planning and land-related government bureaus such as the Urban Planning Department of the Public Works Department. There is no formal channel for public involvement. Unlike the case in Hong Kong, their meetings for decision-making are not opened to the public. Sometimes residents are consulted through neighborhood workshops, but as yet this is not an official requirement.

Note: CE stands for Chief Executive

CE in C stands for Chief Executive in Council

TPB stands for Town Planning Board

Fig. 5. The tourism plan-making process in Hong Kong. Source: Hong Kong Town Planning Board (2012b).

Fig. 6. The tourism plan-making process in Macao. Source: adapted from Land, Public Works and Transport Bureau (2008) and Wan and Li (2011)

6. Conclusion

6.1. Discussion

This study has compared the governance structure of tourism planning of Hong Kong and Macao – the two Special Administrative Regions in China which are governed by a similar Basic Law and share the same culture. Their institutional framework of tourism planning in terms of the planning administration, strategies, polices and guidelines, and plan-making process are studied. The results reveal that there are similarities in governance between the two SARs as well as differences reflecting the distinct forms of power relations shaped under each unique economic, social and political circumstance.

Both Hong Kong and Macao have an executive-led, pro-growth governance structure. In the two SARs' tourism planning administrations, the Chief Executive (CE) (who is elected by an Election Committee of a few hundred members mainly comprised of pro-Beijing business people and labor union representatives) and his appointed Chief Executive Council makes the final decision on any public policy related to tourism. Through the appointments of the

local businessmen, professionals and friends to the various important advisory committees including the Executive Council (ExCo) and the Legislative Council (LegCo), the two SAR governments are able to easily form consensus in politics. It is argued that the emergence of the executive-led mode of governance is a result of the belief of the Beijing government that only by this mode of governance could the interests of real estate and finance for Hong Kong, and casino gaming for Macao, be safeguarded; as they are the major economic drivers of the two territories and lead to the continuation of the two SARs' economic and political stability.

The power relations of tourism planning in the two SARs reflect the characteristics of the respective political economies. Tourism planning administration in the two SARs is executive-led and top-down, and is more obvious in Macao. As reflected in the tourism plan-making process, only the Chief Executive and a few senior government officials have the chance to be involved in the planning decision-making. There is lack of any formal channel for public involvement. In Hong Kong, even though the public is permitted to participate in tourism planning through their comments on new plans during the statutory plan exhibition period and through the TPB, the power of the general public to influence tourism planning

remains very limited (Cheung, 2011; Ng, 1999). First, the extent of information published for public comment is often criticized as not sufficient and too complicated for a layman to understand (Ng, 1999). Second, only exhibiting the new plan through the government gazette cannot arouse public awareness. Third, the role of the 29 non-official TPB members in making tourism plans for Hong Kong is limited. The number is small and all these members are appointed by the Chief Executive. The representation of these 29 non-official members is another issue (interview with an academic in Hong Kong). Members have expertise and backgrounds in banking (2), social welfare (2), law (4), education (1), real estate, surveying and construction (5), engineering (3), business (2), architecture and urban planning (4), historical preservation (2), geography and environmental management (2) and logistic and transport (2) (Hong Kong Town Planning Board, 2012c). Stakeholders with interests in other fields such as information technology, medical services, tourism, and the cultural industry are not included. Finally, the comments received from the public and TPB members serve only as reference for the government. The Chief Executive has the ultimate power to accept or reject their opinions.

Despite the above-mentioned similarity between the two SARs, the results show that Macao's tourism planning is more centralized and fragmentary than Hong Kong's model. Evidence includes the absence of a strategic plan and master plan, fewer planning guidelines and laws guiding development, and the ability to cancel guidelines easily. Also, the Land, Public Works & Transport Office (LPWTO) in Macao holds an enormous power in planning. Despite this, there is no centralized body within the LPWTO responsible for the issue, resulting in some work being duplicated. In terms of land reclamation, Macao needs to obtain the approval from the Beijing government, but this is not the case in Hong Kong. Without checks-and-balance mechanisms, the existing institutional arrangement of Macao provides more access to, and the means to determine the use of, a city's resources; it encourages clientelism and could easily be led by private economic interests (Andriotis, 2002).

The differences in capacity for public involvement in tourism planning between the two SARs could be explained by the pace of development of an active civil community. Macao's active civil community developed late when compared with Hong Kong, due to the overall lower level of education in Macao, fewer organized professional groups compared with Hong Kong, and long-term segregation and miscommunication between the Portuguese government and the locals. In Hong Kong, the mature political community led by the well-educated middle class and professionals was developed in the early 1980s. It has imposed significant challenges to the city's governance by actively demanding more transparency in policymaking. While Macao's casino gaming has contributed significantly to the local economy and employment opportunities (Wan, 2012), Hong Kong does not show great achievements after the handover of power. Instead it has to deal with a lot of social and economic problems brought on by the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome and the Asian Financial Crisis. Hong Kong people are becoming even more vocal in demanding that their government handle all these problems, and they would like to be informed and involved in every policy made in the territory. This is also a reason why transparency and public participation in policymaking is more emphasized in Hong Kong than in Macao.

6.2. Transferable experiences and theoretical implications

A numbers of lessons with theoretical implications can be identified from these cases. First, the political economy theory provides a useful framework to understand the power relations and governance of the two SARs. The political economy of each produces opportunities for developing certain governing alignments (alliances and power structures) while imposing constraints on others (Bramwell, 2011). In particular, it shapes the capacities of the two SAR governments.

Second, from the two cases we recognize that there is no a form of government which best suits all societies at all times. Each society has its own political–economic conditions. Therefore, there is always a need to search for a more suitable or more effective form of governance adjusted to specific purposes and contexts (Bramwell & Lane, 2011). A thorough understanding of the political environment and developing a supportive legal, institutional, and administrative framework to include the diverse interests in the decision-making for sustainable tourism development becomes necessary (Hall, 2005; Sharpley, 2008; Yung & Chan, 2011).

For Hong Kong, the challenge is to strike a balance between participation and getting things done, and to achieve an optimal mix of centralization and decentralization of power to plan and act. Facing an increasing politicized community and more complicated social and economic settings, the HKSAR government has to exert greater effort to work collaboratively with different stakeholders in order to gain governing capacity and legitimacy. It needs to act proactively and use more creative means to communicate plans to the public. As professionals and local elites are active in voicing their needs, they could be invited to play greater roles in the planning process to contribute their talents and ideas. At the same time, Hong Kong can adopt Macao's planning model to incorporate local universities and higher institutions into the policymaking mechanisms, to help achieve consensus building in the tourism planning process.

For Macao's part, it needs to reorganize and redesign its planning system to gain back the public confidence, especially after serious government corruption scandals and its failure to cope with the problems caused by the expansion of casino gaming. The preferential treatment of the gaming and tourism sector combined with the present prosperity in tourism development has made Macao over-reliant on tourism, which is very unhealthy in the long run. Developing mass tourism without a comprehensive and participatory planning approach has resulted in environmental, social, and economic problems (Bramwell, 2011; Gunn, 2004; Hall, 2005).

The territory needs to diversify away from its casino industry, to avoid one particular sector holding the greatest bargaining power and to distribute resources in a much fairer way. In the past, "economic diversification" was more of a slogan than any set of concrete measures, although in the 12th Five Year Plan the Central Government publicly supported Macao to diversify its economy, aiming to transform it into a worldwide tourism and entertainment destination and a platform for services to Portuguese-speaking countries. The major problem is the lack of rigorous research on economic diversification and a precise definition (*Macau Daily Times*, 2012b; Wan, 2012). It appears that what Macao is needed now is to conduct more scientific research and debate on the notion of "economic diversification," to achieve community consensus on the definition and to develop strategic plans to achieve its goal.

The institutional framework and arrangement for tourism planning and development has to be modified to create more transparency. Perhaps Macao can learn from Hong Kong to start preparing a much clearer strategic, long-term sustainable tourism master plan. More detailed planning standards and guidelines could help to resolve current and potential conflicts, speed up the planning process, and avoid the case-by-case planning approach. A centralized government body, such as the Hong Kong Commerce and Economic Development Bureau in charge of strategic tourism policymaking, should help to coordinate matters related to tourism development. Finally, sustainable tourism growth needs to incorporate the diverse

values of different stakeholders in the decision-making process (Beaumont & Dredge, 2010; Wesley & Pforr, 2010). The first step could be speeding up the process of drafting the Town Planning Ordinance to stipulate clearly the tourism planning process and how the public could participate.

6.3. Contributions, limitations of the study and directions for future research

This study is the first formal academic study which compares the governance of tourism planning of Hong Kong and Macao — the two SARs which are governed by similar Basic Law and constitutions but have different governance structures. The study is not without its limitations, including difficulties in accessing some of the tourism planning guidelines and policies of the government, and the lack of previous studies in this area. Future research could use qualitative interviews with the key informants in the community to obtain more insights of the issues; stakeholders could include the Church (a major landowner), the gaming experts and operators, government planning officials, local residents and professional bodies and interest groups. This study highlights the issue that as the mode of governance/ governance does not exist in a static form and is subject to change, in order to have a better understanding of the process of the shift in the mode of governance of tourism planning in Macao, researchers should observe and record the evolving process on a regular and continuing basis.

Note: The words "Macao" and "Macau" are often interchangeably used in the city. The official name is Macao, and generally we follow that usage in this article. However, some organizations and institutions, such as, for example, *Macau Daily Times*, use the alternative spelling and we follow their practice where appropriate.

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Yim King Penny Wan works as a visiting assistant professor at Institute for Tourism Studies, Macau. Her research interests include tourism planning and development; cultural heritage tourism; casino gaming and hospitality services. She has published in several internationally reputable journals in the field, such as International Journal of Hospitality Management, Journal of Travel Research, Journal of Sustainable Tourism, Cornell Hospitality Quarterly, International Journal of Tourism Research, and Tourism Analysis, among others.