Table 2.
Position, Title, and New Job Actions in HEICS Administrative Section During the SARS Outbreak
| Position (Title) | New Job Actions |
|---|---|
| Incident commander (Superintendent) | Authorized creation of new HEICS units and subunits, conversion of hospital areas to SARS-related functions, new infection control policy, and new job actions for HEICS unit leaders |
| Represented hospital in regional SARS emergency network* | |
| Liaison officer (Secretary of medical affairs) | Reported hospital surveillance results to city health bureau and Taiwan Center for Disease Control (TCDC) |
| Public information officer (Secretary general) | None |
| Infection control officer (Chair of infection control committee) | Recommended infection control policy to EOC |
| Prepared all infection control policy for personnel, patients, employees, and visitors | |
| Prepared policy designating SARS assessment, isolation, and critical care units as hot zones | |
| Prepared policy restricting hospital access by non-essential persons (visitors, vendors, media), allowing only one family member per hospital patient | |
| Prepared policy separating all hospital personnel into three rotating 8-hour shifts and all personnel in SARS hot zone areas into 4-h shifts | |
| Prepared decontamination policy for personnel leaving SARS hot zones | |
| Prepared policy restricting transport of non-essential equipment or materials out of SARS hot zones and requiring decontamination of essential equipment and materials leaving SARS hot zones | |
| Prepared policy designating transport routes for SARS-related patients, specimens, decedents, and possibly contaminated equipment or materials | |
| Prepared policy restricting aerosol-generating interventions in hospital (i.e., nebulized medications, suctioning, non-invasive ventilation, bronchoscopy) | |
| Prepared policy regarding isolation of SARS-related specimens in double plastic bags, laundry or waste in double plastic bags, and decedents in double body bags | |
| Prepared policy designating transport routes for SARS-related patients, specimens, materials, or decedents | |
| Prepared policy requiring fever screening of all persons entering hospital and all personnel twice per 8-h shift, including workers not employed by hospital (i..e., personal attendants, laundry workers, and delivery persons) | |
| Prepared policy requiring employees isolated at home to report their body temperature twice per day | |
| Prepared policy closing hospital restaurant and cafeteria and prohibiting unauthorized food delivery to hospital and requiring individualization of all meals in disposable box-style packages | |
| Supervised collection of body temperature data from all personnel on duty or isolated at home | |
| Supervised collection of health status data from entire hospital patient population and all isolated personnel | |
| Reported surveillance results to EOC | |
| Supervised release of information about health status of isolated persons to families | |
| Supervised acquisition of updated information and policy recommendations about infection control measures from external sources—TCDC, other hospitals in Taiwan, other countries | |
| Safety and security officer (Captain of hospital security)** | Enforced closure of all hospital entrances/exits except outpatient and ED entrances |
| Enforced traffic control in fever screening subunit and triage unit, and perimeter control in SARS assessment, isolation and critical care units | |
| Supervised demarcation of designated traffic routes into, out of, and within hospital, and off-limits areas with yellow tape barriers | |
| Enforced restriction of vendor deliveries to 5:00 a.m. at hospital basement entrance |
*
Regional SARS Emergency Network was comprised of the Tainan city health bureau and five hospitals in the city.
**
Appointed deputy safety and security officer to participate in survey.