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. 2020 Apr 7;20:291. doi: 10.1186/s12913-020-05075-y

Table 1.

Design of P4P schemes in LMICS (41 schemes in 29 LMICs)

Design features Proportion of schemes [Number of schemes]
Measures of performance incentivised (N = 41) a
 Healthcare visits 83% [34]
 Quality of care (process) 66% [27]
 Health outcomes 17% [7]
 Quality of care (structural) 27% [11]
 Management practices 22% [9]
 Efficiency 5% [2]
Whose performance measured (N = 41) a
 Individuals 26% [10]
 Groups of health workers 3% [1]
 Health facility 76% [31]
Health system managers 5% [2]
 Who (ultimately) receives the payment (N = 38) a
 Individuals 86% [32]
 Groups of health workers 3% [1]
 Health facility 46% [17]
 Health system managers 10% [4]
Payment attributes
(N = 23) Frequency
Monthly or weekly 44% [10]
Bi-monthly or quarterly 30% [7]
Every 6 months 13% [3]
Annual or one-off 13% [3]
(N = 11) Median size 10% of monthly income
(N = 0) Lag time
(N = 41) Reward versus penalty
Rewards 98% [38]
Penalties 2% [1]
(N = 3) Coupled payments
Yes 67% [2]
No 33% [1]
(N = 34) Use of money
Staff income 56% [19]
Operating budget 6% [2]
Both 38% [13]
Basis for payment
(N = 32) Each action (e.g. visit)
Yes 72% [23]
No 28% [9]
(N = 32) Threshold target (single target)
Yes 28% [9]
No 72% [23]
(N = 32) Threshold target (multiple targets)
Yes 9% [3]
No 91% [29]
(N = 41) Type of ranking
Relative ranking (tournament) 5% [2]
Own performance (absolute) 76% [31]
Own performance (improvement) 19% [8]
(N = 41) Payment adjustment
Equity 22% [9]
Quality 19% [8]
None reported 59% [24]
Gaming safeguards
(N = 41) Performance audit
Yes (without penalties reported) 61% [25]
Yes (with penalties) 5% [2]
None reported 34% [14]

Note: a = multiple options possible