Table 5.
Study | Alliances | Period | Findings |
---|---|---|---|
Gellman Research Associates (1994) | BA/US Air, KLM/NW | 1994 | Profits increased for all parties with BA and KLM gaining more than their partners |
Youssef and Hansen (1994) | Swissair and SAS | 1989–1991 | Increases in flight frequency; variations in fare levels; the strongest service levels had the lowest fare increases |
US General Accounting Office (1995) | KLM/NW, US Air/BA, UAL/Lufthansa UAL/Ansett, UAL/BMA | 1994 | All carriers enjoyed increased revenues and traffic gained at competitors' expense, not industry growth |
Dresner et al. (1995) | Continental/SAS, Delta Swissair, KLM/NW | 1987–1991 | Mixed successes with traffic volumes; in general alliances did not benefit partners |
Park (1997) | KLM/NW, Delta/Swissair/Sabena | 1990–1994 | Traffic increases at the expense of rivals. Complementary alliances lowered fares while parallel alliances increased fares |
Oum et al. (2000) | Star Alliance, oneWorld SkyTeam, KLM/NW | 1992–1994 | Increased traffic on alliance routes |
Brueckner and Whelen (2000) | US international alliances | 1999 | Fare are some 18–20% lower on international alliance, interlining routes |
These effects may be seen as the removal of the capacity constraint and the downward movement of costs illustrated in Fig. 3.