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letter
. 2020 Feb 25;4(2):164–175. doi: 10.1002/evl3.164

Table 1.

Notation for the model

Parameter Definition
b Benefit (per unit of collective investment) to the group from public goods
c Cost (per unit of investment) to a player from public goods
N Number of players in the group
ωi
Fitness of the i th player
pi
Frequency of the i th player
xi
Investment strategy of the i th player
xG
Collective investment of all players in the group
x^i
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) with respect to the i th player
n Number of players in the group that contribute to public goods
p¯
Average frequency of all contributing players in the group
x^G
Coevolutionarily stable strategy (coESS) of collective investment by a group of players each pursuing the ESS