Table I.
Uncertain Hazards Versus Intelligent Adversaries
| Uncertain Hazards | Intelligent Adversaries | |
|---|---|---|
| Historical Data | Some historical data: | Very limited historical data: |
| A record exists of extreme events that have already occurred. | Events of September 11, 2001, were the first foreign terrorist attacks worldwide with such a huge concentration of victims and insured damages. | |
| Risk of Occurrence | Risk reasonably well defined: | Considerable ambiguity of risk: |
| Well‐developed models exist for estimating risks based on historical data and experts’ estimates. | Adversaries can purposefully adapt their strategy (target, weapons, time) depending on their information on vulnerabilities. Attribution may be difficult (e.g. anthrax attacks). | |
| Geographic Risk | Specific areas at risk: | All areas at risk: |
| Some geographical areas are well known for being at risk (e.g., California for earthquakes or Florida for hurricanes). | Some cities may be considered riskier than others (e.g., New York City, Washington), but terrorists may attack anywhere, any time. | |
| Information | Information sharing: | Asymmetry of information: |
| New scientific knowledge on natural hazards can be shared with all the stakeholders. | Governments sometimes keep secret new information on terrorism for national security reasons. | |
| Event Type | Natural event: | Intelligent adversary events: |
| To date, no one can influence the occurrence of an extreme natural event (e.g., an earthquake). | Governments may be able to influence terrorism (e.g., foreign policy; international cooperation; national and homeland security measures). | |
| Preparedness and Prevention | Government and insureds can invest in well‐known mitigation measures. | Attack methodologies and weapon types are numerous. Local agencies have limited resources to protect potentially numerous targets. Federal agencies may be in a better position to develop better offensive, defensive and response strategies. |