Table 2.
Challenges in infection prevention, ICU infrastructure, capacity, staffing, triage, and research
Recommendations | |
---|---|
Infection prevention | |
A global shortage of medical masks and respirators threatens efforts to prevent transmission | Consider reuse between patients and use beyond the manufacturer-designated shelf life |
N95 respirators that do not fit facial contours might not provide the necessary protection | Conduct regular fit testing, preferably before outbreaks |
Self-contamination often happens during removal of PPE | Train on both the donning and doffing of PPE |
Viable virus on health-care workers' mobile phones and hospital equipment can cause nosocomial transmission | Conduct surface decontamination and consider wrapping mobile phones in disposable specimen bags |
SARS-CoV-2 might be transmitted faecally | Practise immediate and proper disposal of soiled objects |
ICU visits pose a risk of infection to visitors | Restrict or ban visits to minimise transmission; use video conferencing for communication between family members and patients or health-care workers |
ICU infrastructure | |
Airborne infection isolation rooms with negative pressure are not universally available, especially in resource-limited settings | Consider adequately ventilated single rooms without negative pressure or, if necessary, cohort cases in shared rooms with beds spaced apart |
ICU capacity | |
Surges in numbers of critically ill patients with COVID-19 can occur rapidly | Implement national and regional modelling of needs for intensive care |
Low-income and middle-income countries have insufficient ICU beds in general, and even high-income countries will be put under strain in an outbreak like COVID-19 | Consider whether increasing intensive care provision is an appropriate use of resources; if so, make plans for an increase in capacity, including providing intensive care in areas outside ICUs and centralising intensive care in designated ICUs |
Increasing ICU capacity requires more equipment (eg, ventilators), consumables, and pharmaceuticals, which might be in short supply | Pay close attention to logistical support and the supply chain; reduce the inflow of patients who do not urgently require intensive care (eg, by postponing elective surgeries) |
Ventilators are in short supply | Consider transport, operating theatre, and military ventilators |
ICU staffing | |
Increasing ICU bed numbers and workload without increasing staff could result in increased mortality | Make plans for augmentation of staff from other ICUs or non-ICU areas, and provision of appropriate training (eg, with standardised short courses) |
Risk of loss of staff to illness, medical leave, or quarantine after unprotected exposure to COVID-19, with a potentially devastating effect on morale, is high | Minimise risk of infection; consider segregation of teams and physical distancing to limit unprotected exposure of multiple team members, and travel restrictions to limit exposure to COVID-19, which is now global |
Staff are especially vulnerable to mental health problems such as depression and anxiety during outbreaks | Reassure staff through infection prevention measures, clear communication, limitation of shift hours, provision of rest areas, and mental health support |
ICU triage | |
ICUs can become overwhelmed as surge strategies might not be sufficient in an emerging pandemic like COVID-19 | Consider implementing a triage policy that prioritises patients for intensive care and rations scarce resources |
ICU research | |
The traditional pace of research might not match the pace of the outbreak | Use and adapt pre-approved research plans and platforms |
Studies are often single-centre and underpowered | Collaborate through international research networks and platforms |
Rapid conduct and sharing of research might compromise scientific quality and ethical integrity | Cautiously analyse the study methodology when interpreting the literature |
COVID-19=coronavirus disease 2019. ICU=intensive care unit. PPE=personal protective equipment.