Table 3.
Effects of unconditional cash transfer on all outcomes by intervention
| Effect | ||
|---|---|---|
| Alaska Permanent Fund | ||
| Low birthweight49 | 0·7 percentage points lower;* birthweight 17·7 g higher for every $1000 increase in income* | |
| AGPAR score: mean, proportion with low score49 | 0·063 higher;* low AGPAR score 0·4% lower* | |
| Prenatal care49 | Prenatal care began 2·23 days earlier;* no effect on number of visits | |
| Mortality47 | 13% increase among urban Alaskans immediately following annual payment receipt;† 8% of this attributable to increased substance use,† the remainder to an activity displacement effect | |
| Probability of child obesity at 3 years of age50 | 4·5 percentage points lower per $1000 additional dividend;* corresponds to a 22·4% reduction in number of obese 3-year-old Alaskans | |
| Annual household income <$25 000 | No effect | |
| Annual household income $25 000–75 000 | 4·5 percentage point reduction in probability of obesity; 22·4% fewer cases; significant but significance not reported | |
| Annual household income >$75 000 | No effect | |
| Employment rate45 | No effect | |
| Labour force participation45 | No effect | |
| Part-time employment rate45 | 17% increase* | |
| Men | No effect | |
| Women | 22% increase‡ | |
| Hours worked last week45 | 0·617 decrease | |
| Income inequality (Gini coefficient, relative mean deviation, and Thiel's Entropy Index)60 | Gini Coefficient 0·21* higher, relative mean deviation 0·13 higher,‡ and Thiel's Entropy Index 0·36 higher* in the long term | |
| Number of hours worked in reference week61 | 0·59 h (SE 0·253) decrease per $1000 increase in dividend payment‡ | |
| Men | 0·244 h (SE 0·346) decrease per $1000 increase in dividend payment | |
| Women | 0·913 h (SE 0·335) decrease per $1000 increase in dividend payment;* 1·96 h (SE 0·848) decrease for women with children younger than 5 years‡ | |
| Whether respondent employed in reference week61 | 0·6% (SE 0·006) increase per $1000 increase in dividend payment | |
| Men | 1·6% (SE 0·007) increase per $1000 increase in dividend payment‡ | |
| Women | 0·4% (SE 0·009) decrease per $1000 increase in dividend payment | |
| Crime 1 day after Permanent Fund Dividend receipt59 | ||
| Noise violations | No effect | |
| Property crime | No effect | |
| Substance abuse-related crime | 6·16 more incidents (SE 1·964)* | |
| Violent crime | No effect | |
| Medical assistance to other agencies | No effect | |
| Crime 4 weeks after Permanent Fund Dividend receipt59 | ||
| Noise violations | No effect | |
| Property crime | Average 8% fewer incidents per day; significant but level not reported | |
| Substance abuse-related crime | Average 10% more incidents per day; significant but level not reported | |
| Violent crime | No effect | |
| Medical assistance to other agencies | Average 9% more incidents per day; significant but level not reported | |
| Annual hours worked (triple difference comparison with all states)62 | ||
| Men | −182 h per year (SE 3·182)* | |
| Single women | −106 h per year (SE 3·561)‡ | |
| Married women | −151 h per year (SE 3·835)‡ | |
| Iranian targeted subsidy plan | ||
| Probability of low-income labour market participation63 | ||
| Men | No effect | |
| Women | Increased by 7%* | |
| Low-income hours worked (fixed effects, timing of participation)63 | ||
| Men | Increased by 0·069 h per week* | |
| Women | No effect | |
| Hours worked63 | ||
| Waged | Increased by 0·066 h per week‡ | |
| Self-employed | Increased by 0·082 h per week‡ | |
| Waged and self-employed | Increased by 0·050 h per week, but not significant | |
| Ontario Basic Income Pilot | ||
| Recipients' accounts of how Ontario Basic Income Pilot affected them56 | Improvements reported in many areas, including ability to explore different options and cope with various personal circumstances, long-term planning, improved diet leading to better health, paying off debt, dignity, and social interaction | |
| Recipients' accounts of how Ontario Basic Income Pilot affected them57 | Improvements reported in many areas including ability to plan, ability to take up work that fits around personal circumstances (particularly health issues), and work incentives; not having to deal with intrusive bureaucracy and removal of risk of sanctions was reported to reduce stress | |
| Tribal dividends | ||
| Accidental mortality48 | Increase in dividend payment months; risk ratio 2·62, 95% CI 1·54–4·47 | |
| Substance abuse (qualitative) | Ethnographic evidence suggested young people often spent lump sum dividends on motor vehicles and substances | |
| Unemployment64 | ||
| Native Americans only | −3·13%‡ | |
| All | −2·09%‡ | |
| Labour force participation64 | ||
| Native Americans only | −7·22%* | |
| All | −3·22%‡ | |
| Per capita income | ||
| Native Americans only | $3944·79* | |
| All | $3141·17* | |
| Qualitative; community perceptions of effects of casinos58 | No effect on adult labour force participation; some reports of young adults living off their dividends; reports of increased substance abuse, but relevant personnel reported drops in driving under the influence, robbery, petty crimes, and increased participation in adult education; some conflict over eligibility for dividends (ie, tribal membership) | |
| Young adult obesity51 | 2–4% decrease in probability of obesity at 21 per $5000 per annum higher initial income,* but increased for those in poverty before dividends | |
| Young adult body-mass index51 | 0·6 lower at 21 per $5000 per annum higher initial income,‡ but higher for those in poverty prior to dividends | |
| Child health: accidents, allergies, headaches, and eczema51 | No effect | |
| Psychiatric disorders among children and adolescents—emotional (anxiety or depression), behavioural (conduct or oppositional defiant disorder), and substance abuse disorder53 | Odds of any disorder lower for Native American young adults (OR 0·66, 95% CI 0·48–0·90); reductions limited to alcohol and cannabis abuse | |
| Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Assessment Symptom Score46 | For those who exited poverty, score fell to that of never-poor children (4·28 to 2·90) | |
| Emotional and behavioural distress52 | −37% (SE 0·104) of a SD and −23% (SE 0·104) of a SD; significant but level not reported | |
| Trait conscientiousness52 | +25% (SE 0·128) of a SD; significant but level not reported | |
| Trait agreeableness52 | +37% (SE 0·147) of a SD; significant but level not reported | |
| Trait neuroticism52 | +0·38% (SE 0·141) of a SD; significant but level not reported | |
| Parental mental health (whether one or both parents sought mental health support)54 | Cumulative reductions in probability 2, 3, and 4 years after dividends began‡ | |
| Maternal and paternal labour force participation rate54 | No effect | |
| Educational attainment (years of completed education at age 21)54 | 1·1 years longer in education for children in poverty at baseline;* no effect on those not in poverty | |
| Finished high school by 19 years of age54 | +39% probability for children in poverty at baseline;* no effect on those not in poverty | |
| High school diploma or general equivalency degree by 19 years of age54 | No effect | |
| School attendance (days in previous quarter)54 | 3·85 additional days per quarter for children in poverty at baseline;‡ no effect on those not in poverty | |
| Criminal arrest figures50 | ||
| Young adult | 22% less likely to have been arrested at 16–17 years of age;‡ 7% less likely to have dealt drugs at 21 years of age† | |
| Adult | 3·9% reduction in probability of maternal arrest;‡ 11% reduction in probability of paternal arrest* | |
| Marital status52 | No effect | |
| Parent-child relationship quality52, 54 | Maternal relationships improved by 4%;* no significant improvement for fathers | |
| Parental supervision46, 52, 54 | 3–5% improvement* for mothers and fathers | |
| Qualitative; mechanisms linking casinos to health55 | Changes in tribal economy, built environment, and social landscape were identified as mechanisms connecting casinos and health; reduced financial stress and improved health behaviours were linked to higher incomes; some reports of payments financing substance abuse and dependency among young people | |
SE=standard error.
*
Significant at the 1% level.
†
Significant at the 10% level.
‡
Significant at the 5% level.