Table 2.
model | model parameters (DV: subject punished [1=yes]) |
WAIC (standard error) | difference from lowest WAIC (standard error) | AIC weight |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Hypothesis: children punish selfish third parties (TPs) and prosocial TPs differently. Fixed effect: Third party behaviour (Selfish TP=1, Prosocial TP=0). Random effect: Actor ID | 1441.8 (25.78) | 39.5 (14.54) | <0.01 |
2 | Hypothesis: children punish selfish TPs and prosocial TPs differently, and this tendency varies across age. Fixed effects: Third party behaviour × Subject age (centred). Random effect: Actor ID | 1430.9 (26.80) | 28.6 (12.60) | <0.01 |
3 | Hypothesis: children punish selfish TPs and prosocial TPs differently, and this tendency is influenced by novel normative information about who to punish. Fixed effects: Third party behaviour × Dummies for normative primes (2: dummy for Punish-Selfish TP Prime, dummy for Punish-Prosocial TP Prime; Reference level = Punish-Either Prime). Random effect: Actor ID | 1431.8 (27.02) | 29.4 (12.32) | <0.01 |
4 | Hypothesis: children punish Selfish TPs and Prosocial TPs differently, this tendency is influenced by normative information, and these effects vary across age. Fixed effects: Third party behaviour × Subject age × Dummies for normative primes (2: dummy for Punish-Selfish TP Prime, dummy for Punish-Prosocial TP Prime; Reference level = Punish-Either Prime). Random effect: Actor ID | 1424.6 (28.74) | 22.3 (9.76) | <0.01 |
5 | Hypothesis: children punish selfish TPs and prosocial TPs differently, this tendency is influenced by normative information, and these effects vary across both age and societies. Fixed effects: third party behaviour × Subject age × Dummies for normative primes (2: dummy for Punish-Selfish TP Prime, dummy for Punish-Prosocial TP Prime; Reference level = Punish-Either Prime). Random effects: Actor ID, Subject's Society | 1402.3 (31.07) | 0.00 (n.a.) | ∼1.00 |