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. 2020 Apr 15;17(8):2731. doi: 10.3390/ijerph17082731

Table 4.

The effects of moral obligation and public leadership on villagers’ going out frequency.

Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Moral Obligation
General moral obligation 0.420 *** (0.054) 0.291 *** (0.071) 0.329 *** (0.072)
Sense of obligation 0.065 (0.076)
Personal satisfaction 0.017 (0.077)
Autonomy 0.129 * (0.075)
Objectivity 0.210 ** (0.094)
Public Leadership
General public leadership 0.389 *** (0.054) 0.214 *** (0.067) 0.251 *** (0.069)
Influence force 0.041 (0.084)
Decision-making ability 0.101 (0.099)
Executive ability 0.191 * (0.103)
Creativity 0.016 (0.075)
Interaction Item
General moral obligation * General public leadership 0.141 *** (0.046)
Physical Condition
Distance to the county 0.211 *** (0.056) 0.232 *** (0.059) 0.200 *** (0.056)
Household Characteristics
Age −0.003 (0.006) −0.004 (0.006) −0.003 (0.006)
Education −0.041 (0.071) −0.048 (0.071) −0.051 (0.071)
Child or elderly person 0.006 (0.106) 0.007 (0.106) 0.039 (0.107)
Rules-in-Use
Publicity 0.197 *** (0.068) 0.193 *** (0.068) 0.189 *** (0.068)
Supervision 0.087 (0.080) 0.075 (0.086) 0.078 (0.081)
Punishment 0.061 (0.067) 0.050 (0.069) 0.071 (0.067)
Number of observations 533 533 533 533
LR χ2 168.02 196.18 199.05 205.60
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1282 0.1496 0.1518 0.1568
Log likelihood −571.5180 −557.4400 −556.0010 −552.7296

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.